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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with attitudes towards supra-national bodies, and 
more specifically with Scots’ attitudes towards imion in Britain and Europe. Firstly, 
it is suggested that support for, or opposition, to integration in a supra-national body 
depends on the extent to which this body is believed to enhance or undermine the 
ability to express national identity {identity enhancement vs. identity undermining). 
Identity undermining, in turn, depends upon a combined sense of incompatibility 
with outgroup identities/interests and of ingroup powerlessness within the supra­
national body. Secondly, it is suggested that these features of the social context and 
of identity meanings can be actively constructed in order to fulfil str ategic purposes, 
such as persuading audiences in favour of separatism or integration.
Five studies are reported which investigated these hypotheses. In study 1, we 
looked at the discour ses of Scottish politicians and at the way their accounts of group 
identities and social reality could be understood in strategic terms, i.e. in relation to 
their political projects regarding Scotland’s status in Britain and in Europe. In the 
second study, a surwey design was used in order to provide quantitative evidence of 
the relationship between identity undermining, incompatibility, powerlessness and 
separatism. The third (experimental) study sought to clarify the causal relationship 
between these variables and showed that manipulating identity undermining lead to 
increased support for separatism. Finally, the fourth and the fifth (experimental) 
studies suggested that identity constructions, in the form of judgements of gr oup 
prototypicality, can vary as a function of the strategic claim made by participants.
In conclusion, the merits are stressed of an approach to identity processes and 
attitudes towards supra-national bodies that is sensitive to both context and content. 
It is also stressed that context and contents should not be taken as perceptual givens 
but as actively constructed by social actors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis has two major threads. First and foremost, it aims to contribute 
towards a social psychological analysis of national separation and integration. It will 
seek to analyse the conditions under which people support different types of relations 
within and between nation states and which lead to support of or opposition to 
separation from or intégr ation within supra-national bodies. It will also explore some 
of the consequences of those particular political attitudes. More precisely, it will 
focus on the role social identities (i.e. in this case, national identities) play in those 
phenomena. Empirically, it will focus on the case of Scotland and investigate 
Scottish people’s attitudes towards the United Kingdom and the European Union.
Second, in exploring these issues, this thesis also seeks to make a point at a 
more general level. It seeks to argue for an approach to group and intergroup 
phenomena which takes into account the social context in which social identities are 
inscribed, as this context constitutes an essential requirement for understanding and 
predicting social behaviour in these areas. This includes, as we will see, socio- 
stnictural variables as well as the specific meanings ascribed to social identities and 
to the relationship between different identities in a given context. Accordingly, the 
model of national separation/integration which will be proposed attempts to follow 
this general perspective.
In taking up the issues of national separation and integration with the concept 
of social identity at the core of our focus and argument, we are placing ourselves 
explicitly in strong continuation with Social Identity Theory (SIT), founded and 
developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979; Tajfel, 1978, 1981) -  or rather, with what can 
be labelled the Social Identity (SI) approach or tradition (Turner, 1999), which 
includes both Social Identity Theory and its development into Self-Categorisation
Theory (SCT: Turner, 1985, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).
It is indeed this tr adition which is mainly responsible for having put the issue 
of identity to the fore of social psychological investigations of intergroup relations 
and group phenomena, for the past 30 years or so. In a nutshell, and as its very name 
indicates, the main credo of the SI approach has consistently been that, besides any 
other factors which might contribute to the explanation of group relations and 
conflict, identity does matter and is indeed crucial to their understanding.
Thus, originally, much of SIT’s argument was directed at pointing to the 
limits of more sociological approaches to intergroup relations, such as Sherif s 
realistic conflict theory (RCT: Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harwey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 
1961), which saw intergroup relations as determined by conflicts over objective, 
material resources, or else by the co-operation that the appropriation of these 
resources might require. In relation to those theories. Social Identity theorists argued, 
and still argue today, that intergroup dynamics should not be seen as being driven 
only by the pmsuit of ‘economic’ resources or other ‘real’ rewards of life (Geertz, 
1993), but can also be imderpiimed by interests over symbolic resources, i.e. 
concerns relating to identity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The 
theory therefore provides a framework for a better understanding of what has 
sometimes been called ‘identity politics’ in the contemporary world of international 
and intra-national relations (see e.g. Guibemeau, 1996).
To be more specific, one of the main claims of SIT is that intergroup 
behaviour comes about to the extent that we see others and ourselves in terms of our 
group memberships (social identity) rather than our individual characteristics 
(personal identity). If our personal identities are defined by comparing ourselves to 
other individuals (I vs. you/he/she), we also possess social identities which come 
from our memberships of different groups and which are defined by comparison with 
other groups (we vs. them). In areas of group and intergoup phenomena, it is the 
processes and interests associated with those social identities which are relevant, 
rather than those associated with personal identity.
According to Tajfel (1972b; 1981), social identities are important because 
they help us make sense of the social world, giving us a situated and distinct place 
within it, and thereby acting as a guide for social action. Fuitheriuore, the theory 
assumes that, for reasons of self-esteem, people are motivated by a desire to possess
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a positive social identity. The pursuit of a distinct and positive social identity is 
therefore a key driving force in the dynamic of intergroup relations.
As it sees social identities as being comparative in nature (i.e. their content is 
determined by comparison with other groups), SIT states that a distinct and positive 
identity can be achieved through the establishment of positive differentiation from 
other groups on valued dimensions of comparison (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1975). It 
thus also provides an account of a tendency frequently observed in social life and 
often referred in the social-psychological literatur e as ingroup favouritism or ingroup 
bias: namely, the tendency to favour the ingroup over the outgroup and to evaluate it 
more positively. Indeed, much of SIT research to date, if not the majority of it, has 
focused on the investigation of this phenomenon (or associated ones, such as 
prejudice and discrimination: see e.g. Brown, 1995). Potentially, however, SIT’s 
tenets also have important implications for the understanding of attitudes towards 
superordinate groups (including supra-national bodies), i.e. whether or not ingroup 
members are willing to be part of such groups (for practical pmposes, these will be 
simply label as ‘political attitudes’ from now on) - hence its relevance for the present 
work.
Thus, SIT distanced itself from ‘sociological’ approaches such as RCT by 
stressing the importance of the psychological dynamics of identity. On the other 
hand, however, it also rejected intergroup explanations based purely on intra-psychic 
cognitive processes (such as categorisation processes). This is expressed not only in 
its assumption of a motivational element, based on self-esteem, but, even more 
crucially, with its insistence that the effects of social identification should always be 
understood within the social context in which it is embedded. Social factors, such as 
economic, ideological, political, cultural and historical circumstances, are not to be 
considered as mere secondary complications to an essentially psychological 
dynamic, but as cmcial elements which, by feeding identity processes, determine 
their very outcomes. In relation to that point, Tajfel and Turner (1979) actually 
praised Sherif s RCT which, by talcing seriously the impact of some of these broader 
social factors, was at least the first truly intergroup approach within social 
psychology.
However, as we will see, the treatment of this ‘contextualist’ side of the 
theory by SIT researchers has been somewhat more problematic, and there have been 
many questions raised about whether the approach has really been up to the task it
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gave itself in that respect. Thus, despite oui* indebtedness to SIT, it will argued below 
that, if this approach has originally helped to make both the issues of identity and of 
its social context relevant for enquiry, subsequent research based on its principles has 
also contributed to the neglect of the contextualist dimension by showing a tendency 
to focus on identity processes in isolation. We will argue that this side of the theory, 
which was present in its original impetus, has to be retrieved and expanded in order 
to avoid some pitfalls and shortcomings which were for the most part identified by 
Tajfel himself (Tajfel, 1981). This will also have direct consequences for the model 
of political attitudes we will propose. Indeed, the reasons for developing such an 
argument are not only to provide some insight into the basis of SIT, and thus into the 
origins and logic of our own approach, but also to disentangle what aspects of SIT 
we intend to keep and where we tend to diverge somewhat from the way it has 
sometimes been understood and applied.
Before going on with this argument, however, a note of caution might be 
necessary. The issue of the interplay between psychological processes and social 
context touches on fundamental epistemological and metatheoretical questions that 
are, of course, not limited to the SI tradition itself, but that concern social psychology 
and indeed social science as a whole. The argument is, basically, that we need to 
understand not only psychological processes but also the ideological, cultural and 
social framework in which they take place in order to understand social behaviour*. 
The scope of this argument will appear clearly when it will lead us to consider, for 
instance, questions about levels of analysis, individualism and the relation between 
the individual and the social, the tension between universalism and particularism, 
methodology, or* even the very way in which social psychology can be seen as a 
science.
It is unavoidable to touch on these more general issues, lest too many 
questions are left rmanswered. Moreover, some of the tenets of om* model of political 
attitudes towards superordinate groups crucially rely on our own view about the way 
such issues are best addressed. At the same time, however, it should be clear that 
what follows does not pretend to deal with them as fully as they would deserve -  
even less should it suggest that this thesis attempts to empirically address all the 
general points which will be raised. As a result, even within our* metatheoretical 
discussion, the focus will very much remain on the more specific domain of social 
identity.
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The remainder of this chapter will be divided into two parts, dealing 
respectively with each level of oui* argument. That is, we will start firstly by 
outlining the general background of om enquiry, based mostly on metatheoretical 
reflections on the problem of interactionism and the relationship between social 
context and psychological processes. Then, in a second part, we will delineate our 
model of political attitudes, which, amongst other things, attempts to do justice to the 
argument developed in the first part.
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1. CONTEXT. CONTENT AND PROCESSES IN THE SOCIAL IDENTITY
TRADITION
1.1. Social context and social behaviour
Interactionism: between two reductionisms
In most of its classical presentations (see e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979), SIT is generally reported as having gr own from two main bases. On 
the one hand, at the empirical level, the findings yielded by the minimal group 
paradigm (or MGP: Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) are said to have 
triggered a search for an adequate theory which would be able to explain them. On 
the other hand, at the metatheoretical level, SIT is presented as an attempt to provide 
an answer to tire epistemological concerns and critiques that Tajfel expressed in the 
context of the ‘crisis’ in social psychology (Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel, 1969, 
1972a, 1981)'.
In one of these key metatheoretical texts, entitled ‘experiments in a vacuum’, 
Tajfel argued most forcefully that, in order to understand social behaviour, social 
psychology should talce into account the peculiarities of the social context in which 
people live, and stated "the impossibility o f making efficient predictions about the 
former without a close analysis o f the latter, ” (Tajfel, 1972a, p.20). He then drew up 
the consequences of this position for social psychological research and attributed the 
origin of the ‘crisis’ to the fact that traditional social psychology, influenced by an 
individualist ideology, had so far practised its experimental works in a ‘social 
vacuum’, blatantly ignoring the influence that participants’ social background may 
have on the results of those experiments. According to him, people’s social 
background helps them to define the meaning of the situations they are confr onted 
with, including experimental situations, thereby determining which type of behaviour 
they will find appropriate in order to do deal with the situation at hand.
 ^ The ‘crisis’ or ‘crisis o f confidence’ are the usual terms used to designate this period in the early 
seventies when social psychology was crippled with self-doubt, to the point that the question was 
posed whether the discipline had any intellectual or practical value at all. Since tiien, die critics might 
not have totally disappeared, and tlie problems might not be solved for everybody, but this was the 
moment, more than any other, where the critics took hold of the mainstream.
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Consequently, Tajfel rejected an universalist view of social psychology and 
dismissed the possibility of universal laws of social behaviour* as a myth. He noted 
that, if in a particular experiment, subjects share the same social definition of the 
situation, behavioural regularities might indeed be observed; but that should not 
imply that it will be possible to deduce or confirm universal laws from it, given that 
these regularities are tied to a particular* social context. The meaning and scope of 
experimental results and social psychological findings will always be intrinsically 
linked to particular* social contexts, falling somewhere between the uninteresting 
individual case and the mythical general case.
Of comse, in order to avoid sociological reductionism, Tajfel also insisted on 
the importance of psychological processes in understanding social phenomena, of 
which some might indeed be universal (Tajfel, 1969). But he stressed that the way 
these processes will tr anslate into behaviour* always depends upon the social content 
that feeds them, a content which is in turn always provided by a specific social 
context. In short, he pleaded for* an interactionist social psychology and developed a 
form/content solution to the problem of relating the psychological and social levels 
of analysis (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Wetherell, 1996). This point, which is also the 
position we will adopt, is reiterated by Turner 30 years later:
Process theories such as social identity and self-categorization 
require the incorporation o f specific content into their analyses before 
they can make predictions either in the laboratory or in the field, and 
are designed to require such an incorporation. (1999, p. 34)
The context in SIT research
Nowadays, the ability to offer an interactionist and non-reductionist theory of 
social behaviour* is still one of the sti*ongest claims of the SI tradition. However, 
when we look closely at the other basis of SIT with this claim in mind, i.e. the results 
and explanation of the MGP experiments, things can appear* somewhat confusing.
In the minimal group par adigm, par*ticipants are divided into two artificial and 
arbitrary categories (e.g. according to whether they tend to under- or overestimate the 
numbers of dots on a screen), designed only for the purpose of the experiment, and 
devoid of any historical or evaluative content. It is therefore with some surprise that
15
Tajfel and his colleagues, when they ran the first version of this paradigm (Tajfel et 
al., 1971), discovered that despite the arbitrary nature of the division, people 
nevertheless tended to favour* their ingroup when they were given the opportunity of 
distributing resomces between the two groups. Participants were apparently even 
willing to sacrifice absolute gain in order to maximise the difference of gain between 
the two groups.
As it has been mentioned, SIT was first developed in order to provide an 
explanation for these results. This explanation r*uns as follows. First, through a 
universal cognitive process of categorization, people subjectively divide the 
participants into two groups, according to the arbitrary labels provided by the 
experimenter. Then, because those categories are tlieir only accessible tool for 
making sense of the situation at hand, they are assumed to accept the category they 
belong to as defining their self or, in other words, to psychologically identify with 
the ingroup category (i.e. a process of identification). Finally, through the 
distribution of resources (the dependent variable in the experiment), people engage in 
social comparison with the other group and, because they are driven by a universal 
motivational need for positive self-esteem, they show a tendency towards positive 
differentiation from this other group.
However, the problem lies in the fact that, as many authors have pointed out, 
this explanation is rmdoubtedly mainly psychological, and ultimately rests on intra­
psychic and universal processes. As we can see, any reference to participants’ social 
background or to a social context existing outside the laboratory is remarkably 
absent. Given such a picture, it is therefore not so surprising that SIT has not been 
exempt from being criticised for its individualism and its universalism, for* the ver*y 
same reasons it uses to criticise its rival theories. It seems, at least at first sight, to be 
at odds with its own interactionist claims.
One of the first attacks against SIT which was built on this basis came from 
Taylor and Brown (Taylor & Brown, 1979) while Tajfel was still alive. In his answer 
to these authors, Tajfel acknowledged that the processes assumed by SIT to be at 
work in the MGP are indeed fimdamentally psychological. But he added that there 
was more to the theory and that these processes only represented ‘one leg of a 
conceptual tripod’:
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...the aim o f a theory o f intergroup behaviour is to help us to 
understand certain selected uniformities o f social behaviour. In order 
to do this, we must Imow (i) something about the ways in which groups 
are constructed in a particular social system; (ii) what are the 
psychological effects o f these constructions; and (Hi) how the 
constructions and their effects depends upon, and relate to, forms o f  
social reality (Tajfel, 1981, p.46).
Thus, if SIT’s answer to point (ii) does indeed lie in the psychological 
sequence of social categorisation -  social identification -  social comparison 
described above, Tajfel was nevertheless aware that this sequence is far from being 
sufficient when it comes to making concrete predictions about the behaviour of real 
groups, in contrast to the artificial groups used in the MGP. According to him, these 
processes provide the necessaiy psychological basis which makes intergroup 
behaviour possible, but, on their own, they do not allow one to predict the particular 
form such behaviour* will talce. For instance, as some experimental variations of the 
MGP have shown (see e.g. Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996, 1997; Tur*ner, 1975), 
negative discrimination is not the only strategy which people can rely on to establish 
a positive and distinct social identity (or, more generally, to protect and enhance their 
self-esteem). In order to determine which strategy and which type of behaviour* will 
actually be chosen, it is necessary to take into accoimt the specific social reality in 
which the psychological processes of categorisation, identification and differentiation 
take place (i.e. point i and iii), as these latter processes do not operate in a vacuum. In 
other words, social identities possess contents that are socially defined, and these 
contents must influence behaviour and the particular choices that are made between 
strategies. Otherwise it would mean that we deal with universal psychological 
processes which work identically and give rise to the same behaviours, whatever 
their content and the social context might be.
Thus we can see again how much the solution to reductionism proposed by 
SIT is entirely dependent upon relating psychological processes to social context and 
to the social content of identities. This is indeed the very backbone of its 
interactionist claims. And if the development of this aspect cannot be found in MGP 
accounts, then it has to be sought elsewhere.
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When they are confronted with this question, SIT researchers commonly refer 
to what has been called the macro-social aspect of SIT. This facet of the theory 
contains mainly propositions about how various understandings of the intergroup 
context (e.g. whether any differences in group status are perceived as legitimate or 
illegitimate, whether intergroup boundaries are seen as peimeable or not, etc.) impact 
upon the strategies chosen by people in their search for a positive and distinct social 
identity. Such understandings determine, for instance, when they will pursue social 
change (i.e. collectivist) or social mobility (i.e. individualist) strategies (for more 
extended accounts, see e.g. Haslam, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This macro­
social aspect of SIT also includes some writings about the social functions of 
stereotypes in intergroup dynamics (e.g. then role in promoting or impeding social 
change in the status quo of intergroup relations; see Tajfel, 1981).
However, despite all the conceptual answers provided by TajfeTs points and 
by the macro-social side of SIT, a first criticism that could be made is that, 
empirically, SIT researchers have tended to focus most of their attention on the 
psychological consequences of group membership (Tajfef s point ii) and thereby to 
neglect this macro-social dimension. For instance, Reicher (1996b; see also 
Moghaddam & HaiTé, 1995) has argued that, apart from a few exceptions (see 
below), they have largely forsaken the study of social change (and its related 
concepts of legitimacy, permeability, etc.), although this was at least one of the main 
priorities aimed at by Tajfel through the creation of SIT, if not the very raison d ’être 
of the theory. Likewise, Condor (Condor, 1990; see also Reicher, Hopkins, & 
Condor, 1997b) makes a similar point regarding tlie study of the social functions of 
stereotypes.
Given this relative lack of interest in its macro-social aspect, one can thus 
understand why, despite Tajfel’s answer, SIT has also been subject to criticisms of 
individualism and universalism. Although it still makes theoretical references to 
macro-social concepts, actual empirical research has for the most part focused only 
on the universal, intia-psychic processes which translate these macro-social products 
into behavioui*. As Abrams (1990) also notes, the strategy by which SIT attempts to 
avoid individualism rests primarily on the idea that:
...social behaviour is explicable in terms o f psychological states,
structures or processes only to the extent that these represent shared
18
social meanings. Increasingly, however, the processes which are 
specified by social identity theory and later self-categorization 
theory...emphasize individual cognition and motivation. It may be true 
that the macrosocial part o f social identity theory contains a 
rudimentary conception o f social structure, but explanation for 
behaviour still rests on the dual operation o f cognitive 
(categorization) and motivational (self-enhancement) processes within 
individuals, (p. 89).
A case in point is certainly the very strong dominance of MGP experiments -  
and, more generally, of artificial groups paradigms - in the SIT research progiam. 
Too often SIT is used as if its main aim and scope were to explain discrimination in 
those experiments, seemingly ignoring Tajfel (1981) when he stated clearly that 
"these studies were in no sense crucial experiments; but, rather, they setyed as 
crutches for further thinking about the issues involved” (p.268), and when he 
acknowledged, as noted above, that if SIT was limited to that, it would be as 
individualist as traditional social psychology. But on the other hand, the tendency of 
investigating and relying almost exclusively on general psychological processes is by 
no means limited to MGP experiments, as, for instance, the intergroup contact 
research inspired by SIT framework shows (see part two of this chapter).
The noim explanation of the MGP
Perhaps one of the turning points in the move away from Tajfefs 
contextualist position can be found in the rejection of the first explanation of the 
MGP in terms of social norms, in favour* of tlie social identity account (Wetherell, 
1996) -  or, even if it did not play a causal role in this move, at least it can help to 
illustrate it. In their first account of the MGP’s results, Tajfel et al. (1971) proposed 
that participants in the MGP discriminated because they behaved in terms of a norm 
of ‘competitiveness’, which is associated with many group memberships in our 
competitive society, and which participants therefore deemed appropriate in order to 
respond to the experimental situation framed by an intergroup divide. Likewise, 
attempts to treat the two groups equally, which also appeared in the MGP results, 
were attributed to the influence of an existing norm of ‘fairness’.
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As we can see, this explanation had the advantage of maldng explicit 
reference to the social context outside the experimental situation, and thus of being 
more consistent with Tajfel’s epistemological claim. This is not to say, however, that 
Tajfel did not have good reasons to reject this explanation, nor that we should regret 
it. Indeed, the concept of social identity has proved very fruitful within social 
psychology, triggering a whole new stream of research. And it remains, in our 
opinion, an essential cornerstone in trying to conciliate individual and social levels of 
analysis in social psychology.
However, Tajfel (1981) also stated that the norm explanation was not 
incorrect as such. He just found it iminteresting and not truly heuristic. An ad-hoc 
norm, he argued, could always be invoked to explain experimental results afterwards, 
and as such it did not allow one to make risky and a priori predictions. Also, it did 
not answer the question of why people do accept social norms in the first place as 
guidelines for their behaviour. The concept of social identity, on the other hand, was 
in a position to provide an answer to such a question: through the process of 
identification, people come to see particular social contents, including norms, as 
defining themselves and thus are ready to behave in accordance with them. As such, 
SIT should therefore have allowed to integrate the norm explanation into its 
framework.
However, as time went by, there has been little attempt to realise such an 
integration more concretely. Again, in MGP accounts, everything is explained by 
reference to psychological processes together with the characteristics of the 
experimental situation itself. All the participants need to bring in fr om the outside is 
their basic psychological potentialities. Faced with the TCafkaesque’ situation of the 
MGP, they are assumed to make sense of the situation by accepting the artificial 
categories provided by the experimenters, and to discriminate not because of a 
specific (though widespread) norm but because of a universal need for positive 
differentiation. The possibility to resort to more familiar situations, to existing social 
identities and noims is not touched upon.
On the other hand, this picture might also explain why a few authors, in 
trying to retiieve some of the original spirit of SIT, have argued for a reinterpretation 
of the MGP which is quite close to a reinstatement of the norm account. Ibanez 
(1994), for instance, reminds us of Tajfel’s (1972a) statement about the fact that 
participants resort to their social backgiound in order to make sense of the
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experimental situation. It is on this basis that he argues that natural groups do play a 
role in the MGP. When this experimental paradigm does succeed in inducing 
discriminatoiy behavioui*, it is because subjects associate the content of those real 
categories with the experimental categories ‘we/they’ and ‘import’ their associated 
norms -  possibly, but not necessarily one of competitiveness - into the experimental 
situation. Likewise, this is also how Wetherell (1996) accounts for her findings of 
cultural variations in the patterns of responses within the MGP, with participants in 
some cultures not choosing discrimination as the dominant strategy (Wetherell, 
1982).
However, our purpose here, in discussing this alternative view of the MGP, 
was not so much to discuss which account of it is the best one, nor, if they both play 
a part, exactly how they should be integrated. Rather, our aim was twofold. Firstly, it 
was to provide a specific illustiation of where and how attention has moved away 
from context and content to processes in SIT, and, as such, it can serve as an analogy 
for many other areas of SIT research. In the process, something is gained, i.e. a more 
sophisticated view of people’s psychological processes through which social factors 
impact on them. On the other hand, however, something is also lost, which is more 
than just the idea that specific social norms impact on behaviour*. For resorting to 
norms was also what allowed Tajfel et al. (1971) to linlc the results of the MGP to 
broad sociological and ideological aspects of our society. With the loss of this point 
of articulation, it is therefore that dimension as a whole which tends to disappear 
from the pictur e.
Secondly, the mere existence of the norm explanation shows that a purely 
universal explanation of the MGP is not the only possible one. Consequently, it 
suggests that the problem of universalism in SIT might not only lie in what should be 
added to the MGP to complete the picture, as has been argued above, but might also 
be found inside its very explanations as well. This leads us to a slightly different 
level of criticism of the universalist tendencies within SIT.
Generic processes and social behaviour*
This second level of criticism often flows as a direct consequence of the first. 
To put it briefly, it is that the empirical neglect of social context can sometimes lead 
to its theoretical neglect as well. Indeed, if one starts by prioritising processes at the
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expense of context, it is easy to end up with theoretical positions which use content- 
free processes in an attempt to predict specific behaviour* patter*ns. In such cases, it is 
not only that the ai*ticulation between processes and context/contents is not realised. 
More than that, this articulation becomes impossible and its necessity is, implicitly if 
not explicitly, denied.
Thus, for* instance, a large number* of studies conducted within the SIT 
framework have proposed different kinds of generic relationship between the 
psychological process of identification and particular* attitudinal and/or behavioural 
outcomes, such as discrimination, ingroup favouritism or ingroup protectionism (see 
e.g. Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Brown, 1995, 1999; Hewstone, 2000; 
Hinkle & Brown, 1990). In relation to such uses of SIT, Turner, after* emphasising 
once more the importance of social context, collective ideologies and shared social 
meanings in predicting intergroup behaviour, has lamented that:
To suppose, therefore, as many researchers have done, that social 
identity theory holds that there should be simple correlations between 
ingoup bias in some real-world setting and degree o f ingroup 
identification, or status position, or some measure o f personal self­
esteem, is seriously to misconstrue the theory.../.../...the social 
identity perspective is often reduced to a 'prejudice ’ theory and then 
criticized because the evidence fails to support the revised version o f 
the theory. Some o f the main examples o f this reduction are assertions 
that social identity theory predicts that social categorization 
automatically leads to ingroup bias, that intergroup relations should 
be characterized by universal ethnocentrism, that there should be 
positive correlations between individual differences in ingroup 
identification and ingroup bias, that low status groups should always 
be more biased than high status groups, that intergroup 
discrimination is driven by an individual need for self-esteem and 
should directly enhance self-esteem and so on. There is a notion in 
many reviews that social identity theory is simply the assertion o f a 
universal irrational drive for ethnocentrism, unconstrained by social 
realities or the social meanings o f intergroup attitudes, that this drive 
serves some individual, almost quasi-biological need for self-esteem,
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and that some simple, single factor which triggers or relates to this 
drive should be positively correlated with intergroup discrimination, 
virtually independent o f social context or the perceived nature o f 
intergroup relations. (1999, p. 9/19)
In this passage Turner gives us several examples of this tendency. One of the 
most common one, which will become particularly relevant for the present work, is 
the idea of SIT as ‘a prejudice theory’, with the prediction that the more someone 
identifies with his or her ingroup, the more he or she should favour the ingioup and 
discriminate against the outgroup (see e.g. Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hinlde & Brown, 
1990; Messick & Mackie, 1989). Thus, according to this view, bias and prejudice are 
the inevitable consequences of social identification, and ingroup favouritism a 
universal characteristic of human social life. This is so because the requirements of a 
positive social identity entail a view of the ingroup as ‘better’ than the outgroup, or, 
in other words, because discriminating against outsiders is the only way to achieve 
positive individual or collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).
Much research is usually quoted in support of this view, and in particular the 
experiments using the MGP. Indeed, given the fact that the MGP seems to suggest 
that mere categorisation can be enough to trigger intergroup differentiation, this 
might seem, at least at first sight, like a powerful demonstration of a deep-rooted 
tendency towards discrimination, and, more generally, towards etlinocenti'ism. If 
discrimination can happen in such an arbitraiy and artificial situation, then certainly 
it should be even more the case for natural gioups where the emotional stakes can be 
much higher. FuiTheimore, some subsequent variations of the MGP have shown with 
some success the existence of a linlc between the degrees of identification and 
ingroup bias in that paradigm (Branscombe & Wami, 1994; Gagnon & Bouihis, 
1996; Peireault & Bourhis, 1999).
However, to complement the earlier theoretical critique with an empirical 
one, there is also significant evidence which undermines this view (see e.g Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Firstly, as far as the MGP itself is concerned, it is not clear 
that it does constitute a demonstr ation of universal ethnocentrism. Possible cultural 
variations in MGP findings have already been alluded to, but even in our competitive 
Western culture, one should not forget that not everybody discriminates in the MGP 
experiments, and that a strategy of fairness is also the choice of many of the
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participants (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999). Moreover, some authors have 
argued for a distinction between the activity of positive differentiation, which is what 
is found in the MGP, from open hostility towards outgroups (Crocker, Blaine, & 
Luhtanen, 1993; Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Mummendey et al., 1992) - or else, 
between differentiation and discrimination in its negative connotation (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001).
Secondly, the question of the empirical generalisation from the artificial 
groups of the MGP to natural situations is far from being straightfoi*ward. Ingroup 
bias is far from being always present in natural groups (Mummendey & Schreiber, 
1984; van Knippenberg, 1984). Some researchers have even found evidence of 
outgroup bias in such situations (lost & Banaji, 1994; Spears & Manstead, 1989). 
Hinkle and Brown (1990) reviewed 14 studies investigating the linlc between 
identification and ingroup bias in a variety of research frameworks, and concluded 
that this link has proven to be somewhat unstable, with some research failing to find 
it or finding it only in a weak forni. In fact, some authors (see e.g. Branscombe, 
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) have been arguing that the ease with which 
discrimination appears in the MGP might precisely be due to the fact that the 
experimental conditions are minimal, i.e. (ideally) devoid of all social context and 
content, which might constitute particularly favourable conditions to tiigger a 
powerful need for differentiation. Also, Turner (1975) has suggested and provided 
evidence that discrimination in the MGP is tied to the fact that this paradigm only 
makes available a limited number of behaviourial choices to participants. That is, in 
the classic MGP, discriminating against outsiders is the only means offered to 
participants in order to achieve positive collective self-esteem. However, providing 
group members with other opportunities to raise their self-esteem can lead to the 
disappearance of discriminative behaviour. In that respect, it is interesting to note 
that, in Hinkle and Brown’s review, the correlation between identification and 
ingroup bias appears more often when artificial groups are used, whilst for 6 out of 8 
studies using natural groups the median correlation was negative or effectively zero.
From a contextualist point of view, what accounts for these results is the fact 
that, as we have already stressed above, while psychological processes of 
identification might be universal, the way they will translate into specific attitudes 
and behaviours always depends on other factors of a more social nature. Ellemers, 
Spears and Doosje (1999), for instance, have str-essed the role of the social content of
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identities (i.e. everything that defines ingroup identiy: stereotypes, norms, values, 
etc.) in deteimining the outcomes of identification processes. Using an argument 
which integrates SIT with the earlier norm explanation of the MGP (see above), they 
propose that while the salience of identity will lead group members to emphasise 
their distinctiveness from the outgroup, the dimensions along which such 
distinctiveness is expressed depend upon ingroup norms. Distinctiveness could mean 
being especially fair or tolerant towards the other if this is the specific valued 
ingroup nonn and dimension of distinctiveness involved (Jetten et al., 1996). This 
impact of identity content is precisely what makes the difference between the process 
of differentiation and negative discrimination, which is only one of the possible 
outcome of this process (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
Likewise, Turner (1999) has emphasised the role of the broad structural and 
ideological context of group processes^. In particular, he ai'gues that intergroup 
hostility will emerge when groups in unequal power relations perceive the social 
situation to be illegitimate, unstable and liable to change. Another example of such 
an emphasis can be found in Tajfel (1981), when he pointed out that, while it is true 
that SIT assumes a drive for positive identity and self-esteem, there are actually 
many instances in the social world where, due to specific political and ideological 
conditions, minority groups have come to accept their supposedly ‘inferior’ status as 
legitimate and actually show some fonn of outgr oup favouritism.
More generally, then, this kind of research shows that the same psychological 
process of identification working with different contents can yield different or even 
opposed results in tenns of actual behaviour*. And although the research reviewed 
here concerns mainly attitudes towards outgroups, there is no reason why the 
importance of the social context and of the social content of identities would not 
apply in predicting attitudes towards superordinate groups, and this will be reflected 
in our model.
Experiments in a vacuum
Another issue which has been identified by some critics is the question of 
whether and to what extent the slide towards psychological universalism in much
 ^Of course, contents of identities ai'e intimately related to die social context. However, there are actually a 
number of different positions on the extent to which tiiey are related and in what ways.
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research which claims the SIT mantle could be due to the faith Tajfel kept in the 
experimental method and to the ensuing predominance of this method within SIT 
research in general (see e.g. Reicher, 1996b; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Wetlierell, 
1996). Although, as pointed out at the beginning, the aim of this introductory chapter 
is not to treat this question in detail, it would indeed be a mistake to consider method 
and theory as separate issues, especially in this case. As the title and content of 
TajfeTs text ‘experiments in a vacuum’ indicates, the problems surrounding the 
neglect of the social context and those regarding experimentation have been 
interwoven from the very start. After all, it was also in order to save the experimental 
method, whilst criticising the way it had been practised until then, that Tajfel wrote 
this chapter, in which he pleaded for a more social social psychology.
However, the important point is not so much that Tajfel considered 
experimentation as a valid method of enquiry in social psychology (if properly used), 
but rather that he also maintained its privilege over other methods, a privilege it has 
always enjoyed inside the discipline. In introducing his 1981 book, he wrote:
..,the aim o f the present chapter was to express my preoccupations as 
a social psychologist whose work has been entirely within the 
experimental tradition o f the discipline and who continues to believe 
that...theories which can be tested experimentally contain the least 
doubtful promise for the future.../.../... there is no evidence that other 
approaches to the psychological aspects o f social conduct present 
even as much solidity as the experimental straw appears to have.
(p. 18).
If there is, at least in our view, nothing wrong about trying to save the 
experimental method from more radical critiques that would like to see it totally 
disappear, giving it a strong privilege over other methods is more problematic. All 
methodologies, including experiments, have their own strengths and weaknesses, as 
SIT researchers often admit when they underline the benefits of methodological 
pluralism (see e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988). For example, insofar as they constitute 
short-term interventions taking place at a particular point in time, it can be argued 
that experiments are particularly ill-suited for the study of social change and the 
social functions of stereotypes - some of the very issues which, as we have seen, SIT
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research has been accused of neglecting. Indeed, a thorough study of these issues 
would obviously require at least some diachronic analysis of the social context 
(Condor, 1990, 1996; Moghaddam & Harré, 1995; Reicher, 1996b). Turning the 
argument around, it can also be argued that experiments are, on the other hand, 
particularly well adapted for the investigation of some other aspects of socio- 
psychological phenomena. This could be the case for cognitive and automatic 
processes, as these latter are less sensitive to problems of reactivity and of 
experimental demands than processes in which people are more actively and more 
consciously involved (Stengers, 1997).
Thus, the peculiarities of the experimental method could help to explain the 
pattern of neglects and emphases regarding the objects of enquiiy in SIT research 
(and, as a matter of fact, in social psychology as a whole), given that, despite 
frequent claims in favour of methodological pluralism, it has been as much 
dominated by experimental work as traditional and mainstream psychology. As 
experimentation is classically associated with the production of universal laws, it 
therefore also provides a place to look for the origins of universalist tendencies in 
SIT. It might well be tme, then, that if these universalist tendencies can be partially 
described as the result of a selective emphasis on some parts of TajfeTs work - such 
as the insistence on psychological aspects, and, even more specifically, on cognitive 
aspects - together with a move away fi*om some other parts of its work, it can also be 
attributed to some tensions in TajfeTs own work and principles, such as its criticism 
of universalism in experimentation versus his will to maintain the value and the 
privileged status of this method within social psychology (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; 
Wetherell, 1996).
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that, whatever priority Tajfel gave to 
experiments, he also stated that, at least in the domain of social psychology, they 
should be conceptualised in a different manner, that is, not as tools leading directly to 
universalism. The whole point of ‘experiments in a vacuum’ is, as pointed out 
earlier, precisely to stress that no general, universal laws about social behaviour can 
be drawn from them. But once again, one can observe that most of those who 
followed Tajfel retained from this chapter only the importance of social context and 
the idea of an interactionist social psychology. When it is quoted, it is usually to 
make this point; while, on the other hand, the consequences that Tajfel drew from 
this insistence on social context, in terms of how we should conceive experiments
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and regarding the limits of general laws in social psychology, tends to be forgotten 
(again, see e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988).
These comments also show that the issues of universalism and 
experimentation are further linked to the question of whether social sciences should 
be considered as similar in natur e to natural sciences. Again, it would be an error to 
treat these problems as separate. The classical, universalist way of thinldng about 
experiments and about the status of their results actually draws its ideas from the 
official model of natural sciences.
Many of TajfeTs statements, as well as Bruner’s foreword for his 1981 book, 
hint that he indeed thought of social psychology as being unlike natural sciences or 
even general psychology. For instance, he rejected without any ambiguity the 
possibility for the social psychologist to be neutral or objective^ in the same sense 
that the natural scientist is (whatever objectivity might mean for the latter). But it is 
crucial to emphasise that this should not especially be taken as a question of 
hierarchy and superiority of the latter over the former, as if a more truly scientific 
status could only be achieved by copying the model of natural sciences. On the 
contrary, trying desperately to do so by pursuing a quest towards an ever stronger 
and more rigorous purification in experimentation can have detrimental 
consequences. A telling quote by Tajfel makes the point more clearly:
Our experimental conditions are always ‘contaminated/ and the 
nature o f this contamination is one o f the principal objects o f our 
study. (1981, p.23)
Thus, if unlike research in natural sciences, social psychological experiments 
are always ‘contaminated’, this contamination is not a curse, a deviation from a pure 
ideal. A totally pure, non-contaminated experimental setting is not even an ideal 
model which, while knowing it can never be fully reached, we would still have to 
pursue, hoping to reduce the contamination further with each advance in research. 
Rather, the ‘contamination’ is an essential part of socio-psychological work, and by 
trying to eliminate it, we would thereby eliminate ‘one of the principal objects of our 
study’.
 ^ Although xuifortunately, he never provided a more detailed account of his view about the way and the 
extent to which tliis non-neutrality acts in social psychological research.
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Practically speaking, however, the most concrete and direct consequence of 
these remarks for the present work lies not so much in the details of how experiments 
in social psychology should be conceived. Rather, it lies in underlining our 
commitment to the principle of methodological pluralism (Hewstone, 1997), and of 
what has sometimes been called triangulation (Denzin, 1970), i.e. the use and 
integration of results drawing from different methods investigating the same 
phenomenon. Accordingly, the research canfed out in the next chapters will attempt 
to reflect that principle by using different tools of investigation tailored to answer 
different questions. This section should malce clear that this is not just a matter of 
preference, taste, or practicalities, but reflects fundamental epistemological choices.
The dangers of particularism
At this point, the attacks that have been levelled against universalism might 
raise the question of whether a contextualist and more genuinely interactionist view 
of SIT, and of social psychology in general, implies that we should reject all kinds of 
general statements entirely and all universal notions in this area. Again, this is a 
complex question, which goes well beyond the scope of this discussion. However, 
leaving it totally unanswered could give rise to some legitimate concerns and to 
detrimental misunderstandings.
A first concern could be that a contextualist view of SIT, or of social 
psychology in general, would undermine its predictive power, and thus the 
usefulness of the theory. However, if we follow Tajfel on this point, the opposite is 
true: it is only by taking context into account that accurate empirical predictions can 
actually be made. Thus, fonnulated in this way, the question could be seen as being 
in part an empirical one; that is, empirical tests should arbitrate between the two 
positions and show us which one yields the best results.
But it would be too simple if that was all there is to it. In part, this is also a 
matter of intellectual strategy and of what is judged to be ‘useful’ and worthy of 
emphasis in order to give us a better understanding of social behaviour. 
Contextualists might argue, for instance, that attempts to reduce social and cultural 
variations into universalist formulations, even where successful, often end up in 
generalities which are so vague that they are barely illuminating in giving us more 
insight into the social phenomenon under investigation. On the other hand,
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universalists might argue that, even where empirically correct, too strong a focus on 
the particular is equally uninteresting for it does not allow to draw any conclusions 
holding outside the context of particular pieces of research. This leads us to a second, 
and more serious concern.
This concern relates to the very dynamic of scientific activity. Indeed, 
scientific research is not a lonely activity; quite the opposite, its very essence lies in a 
community of people working and collaborating together, exchanging ideas and 
relying on each other’s work and results. But how then would it still be possible to 
use other people’s research, and how could one ever succeed in interesting in one’s 
research other researchers who are not investigating exactly the same topic, if all 
research results and their explanations were always inescapably tied to the particular 
social context in which the phenomenon under investigation takes place?
However, as argued above, a contextualist stance does not necessarily mean 
that we cannot find, in principle, generality in social psychology or social identity 
phenomena -  and this, even if there might be arguments about each generality which 
is actually proposed. As a matter of fact, the present research and the model which 
underpins it will rely more than just a little on postulating generic processes.
In fact, at one level, it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to reject all 
kind of generalities. Generalities have a recuisive quality, which makes them 
reappear as soon as one tries to reject them, although (and this is a key proviso) not 
especially in the same form. Stating the inescapable social and ideological nature of 
human action, for example, is in itself a statement about the essence of human 
beings, characterising them by their very sociability. Similarly, stressing the diversity 
in human foims of life that flows from this social character is indeed making a 
general claim about human natuie, characterising it by the very diversity of its 
expression.
The key difference, however, lies in how we conceive these generalities and 
what role they should play in oui* theorisation of human beings and social behaviour. 
Thus, the contextualist position does imply that these generalities should not lie in 
commonalities of behaviour (Geertz, 1993; Reicher, in press). Rather, they lie in 
generic human potentialities, such as psychological capacities and processes. But 
those general processes are only empty potentials which always take shape in 
particular societies, and if they can be used and possibly simulated in laboratory 
settings, they must always wait to be given a specific social and ideological content
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before we know which behavioural outcomes they will concretely lead to in the real 
world. Where the problem lies is not especially (or not always) in the postulation of 
universal processes per se but in their use in understanding and predicting behaviour 
on their own.
In other words, such processes should not lead us to disregard the specificity 
of ideological meanings and of behaviours in different societies; quite the opposite, it 
is possible to argue that it is precisely by paying attention to these specificities that 
we can discover richer and more enlightening generalities. Indeed, confronting the 
same issue in anthropological enquiries, this is what Geertz (1993) has argued most 
vividly:
...the notion that the essence o f what it means to be human is most 
clearly revealed in those features o f human culture that are universal 
rather than in those that are distinctive to this people or that is a 
prejudice we are not necessarily obliged to share. Is it in grasping 
such general facts — that man has everywhere some sort o f ‘religion ’ — 
or in grasping the richness o f this religious phenomenon or 
that.../.../...that we grasp him?.../.../...it may be in the cultural 
particularities o f people -  in their oddities -  that some o f the most 
instructive revelations o f what it is to be generically human are to be 
found... The notion that unless a cultural phenomenon is empirically 
universal it cannot reflect anything about the nature o f man is about 
as logical as the notion that because sickle-cell anemia is, fortunately, 
not universal, it cannot tell us anything about human genetic 
processes, (p.43-44).
And with such a perspective comes
...a definition o f man stressing not so much the empirical 
commonalities in his behaviour...but rather the mechanisms by whose 
agency the breadth and indeterminateness o f his inherent capacities 
are reduced to the narrowness and specificity o f his actual 
accomplishments, (p.44-45).
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Likewise, Reicher (in press) has argued that when generalities and 
specificities aie set up against each other, as it is necessarily the case if generalities 
are conceptualised at the same level as specificities (i.e. in terms of behaviour), the 
implication is that the search for the former can only be made at the expense of the 
latter. It is then that we are confronted with the dilemma that the more general the 
categories are, the more they end up to be poor in meaning, whatever their degree of 
truthfulness. But if, on the other hand, we stop seeking generalities in behaviour, then 
the opposition generality/specificities is not inevitable anymore.
The very concept of a social self as conceived by the SI tradition, the 
cornerstone of our own enquiry, provides a good example of how a notion can 
embody both universal and specific components at the same time. It can be argued on 
the one hand that it is a universal concept insofar as every people and all individuals, 
whatever the society they belong to, possess ways of defining and thinking about 
themselves, which include their group memberships and social relationships. But on 
the other hand, the social self is equally a contextualist notion because the precise 
way those people will think about themselves is always particular and shaped by the 
social milieu they live in.
Thus, in sum, if we do not want to be reduced to anecdotism, generalities can 
and even must play a role in socio-psychological explanations, as they do for 
instance in anthropological enquiries. But as many authors in this area realise, they 
should do so as ingredients which, by themselves, do not tell us how they will 
manifest themselves in a pai'ticulai* context. It is therefore possible to look in other 
researchers’ work for hints and inspirations, but not to use them as a source of 
authority which would legitimise the mechanical application of pre-set models and 
laws, allowing one to judge in advance what is going on and to bypass the work of 
reconstructing the historical, social, political and ideological particularities of the 
context in which particular phenomena take place.
32
1.2. Context: given or constructed?
So far we have reviewed the argument for a social psychological approach to 
group phenomena which takes into account the social context in which they are 
embedded. However, it might not come as a surprise that, in concrete terms, this can 
mean quite different things to different researchers. Therefore, it is now time to 
switch to another side of the debate concerning the SI tradition. That is, to put it 
briefly, it is possible to distinguish between two general ways of dealing with the 
social context, depending upon whether it is taken as a given or seen as constructed. 
We will underline the limits of the first view and place our approach within the 
second framework. This, however, is in direct continuity with the preceding 
aigument for, as we shall see, it raises the same general issues.
The origins of social context and contents
To start with, it is worth acknowledging that, if the view of the SI tiadition 
which has been presented so far contains, in our view, more than a grain of truth, it is 
also, arguably, in part a picture relying on a ‘straw man’, i.e. a caricature put in place 
in order to malce as clear an argument as possible. Indeed, there are many notable 
exceptions to the neglect of social context within the SI tradition.
First of all, even though it has been the exception rather than the rule, there 
has been some research on the macro-social aspect of SIT. For the most part, this 
work has been trying to simulate experimentally the socio-structural conditions 
stated by Tajfel (1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as detennining the way social identity 
processes unfold in particular- contexts (i.e. legitimacy, permeability of group 
boundaries, unequal power, etc.), in order to see what their effects are on intragroup 
and intergroup behaviour -  using measures such as ingroup bias, ingroup 
identification, or individual mobility vs. social change strategies (see e.g. Caddick, 
1992; Ellemers, 1993; Ellemers, van Rnippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Ng & Cram, 
1988; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Turner & Brown, 1978; Wright, Taylor, & 
Moghaddam, 1990).
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, there is of course the 
impressive amount of work inspired by Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985, 
1991; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994) of which we have not spoken yet.
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Indeed, one of the main aims of SCT is, according to Tuiiier and Bonrhis (1996), to 
provide a detailed answer to the first point mentioned above by Tajfel in his 
‘conceptual tiipod’ (i.e. how groups are constructed in particular social settings). 
More specifically, this is addressed in the part of SCT which deals with the question 
of the salience of social categories, i.e. the question of what conditions lead people to 
categorise at a social rather than at an individual level in a specific social setting, 
and, provided that the social level is used, what specific social categories, amongst 
the different possibilities, will be made psychologically salient by that setting. In 
dealing with this question, SCT is directly concerned with the impact of the social 
context, and, moreover, with the concept of normative fit (described below) it does 
make explicit reference to the situated social content of categories.
Nevertheless, both those lines of work create different but related difficulties 
to those raised by the universalist/contextualist debate. This stems fiom their 
particular treatment of the social context and from the fact that, for both, the focus of 
enquiry is exclusively on the psychological (and, eventually, behavioural) 
consequences of the features of this social context. What feeds the psychological 
processes, the social context and the content of categories, does play a role in the 
explanation of the results, but these are very much taken for granted. That is, they are 
treated as an obvious point of departur e and the question of their origin, how they are 
constr ucted and how they come to be as they are in the first place, is avoided. SCT’s 
hypotheses about the salience of social categories, for instance, deals with how 
groups are constructed psychologically, leaving the problem of social construction to 
other areas of enquiry.
In section 1.1., we stressed that there is nothing wrong per se in postulating 
general psychological processes in order to understand social behaviour. Likewise, 
there is certainly nothing wrong with asking questions about the effects of social 
reality on psychological processes and behaviour (and accordingly, this will also be 
part of the present investigation, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4). Yet, the 
difficulties arise once more from the one-sidedness of such a focus. And those 
difficulties have to do, again, with the question of promoting a tmly interactionist 
social psychology. Indeed, such an interactionist ambition requires us to do more 
than simply relating psychological constructions and their behavioural effects to 
social reality. If the relationship between social context on the one hand and 
psychological processes and social behaviour on the other has to be a two-way
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dialogue, as both Tajfel and Turner have stressed many times (see e.g. Oakes, 
Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Tajfel, 1981; Turner & Oakes, 1986), then the logical 
conclusion is that there must be a feedback of social behaviour- and social practices 
into social reality. In other words, social psychological processes must play a part in 
the construction of social reality.
The reasons for this are pretty straightforward. A one-way linlc going from 
the social to the psychological implies that the latter would be under the deterministic 
rule of the former, i.e. that the social would be imposing itself upon psychological 
processes. Such sociological reductionism thereby rims the risk of denying human 
agency and responsibility o f social actors for constructing the world in which 
they live” (Condor, 1996, p.286), ending up in a view of individuals as ‘social dopes’ 
or ‘social puppets’, a view that Tajfel explicitly wanted to avoid.
However, to take it as a case in point, this is actually the picture which 
sometimes seems to emerge from SCT in its treatment of the issue of category 
salience. According to SCT, the salience of a specific social category can be 
conceived of as a product of its ‘accessibility’ and ‘fit’ (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & 
Turner, 1986). Accessibility, or perceiver’s readiness, is defined as '/he active 
selectivity o f the perceiver in being ready to use categories that are central, relevant, 
useful, or likely to be confirmed by the evidence o f reality” (Turner et al., 1994, p. 
456). The concept of fit concerns the relationship between categories and external 
social reality. It is divided into two complementary aspects. The principle of 
comparative fit stipulates that the categories which maximize the ‘metacontrast 
ratio’, that is which botli maximise intergroup differences and minimise intra-group 
differences on the relevant dimensions of comparison, will be most salient. As for 
normative fit, it refers to the fact that those intergroup differences and intiagroup 
similarities must match the social stereotypes of these categories. In other words, the 
socially available stereotypie expectations provide the specific dimensions on which 
the meta-contrast ratio, the calculation of differences, operates.
Thus, with the only exception of the under-investigated concept of 
accessibility, the psychological categories used by people are assumed to match 
almost perfectly the suiTounding social context; they reflect objective (but selective) 
features of the social world (Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes, Turner, & 
Haslam, 1991). Those features are assumed to be read by people through an 
automatic and rather mechanical process of cognitive computation, which leaves
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little room for human agency (Abrams, 1990; Reicher, 1995, in press). Moreover, 
even with the idea of accessibility on board, it presents a Tabyrinthic’ view of 
activity (Ibanez, 1994), whereby people can make choices between pre-formed 
options, but without any participation in their actual construction. Such picture, it 
could be argued, hardly does full justice to the scope of human activity. It also 
presents the context and its features as being obvious and transparent to people. 
Thus, once a category is salient for a group of people, every member of this group is 
supposed to share the same definition of its meaning (i.e. stereotypes, norms, etc.), as 
if this latter could simply be read from an unproblematic reality'*.
Another related consequence of this essentially cognitive-perceptualist 
position, is that the social context tends to be reified. It ends up being seen as a 
reality composed of objective features lying outside intergroup and 
sociopsychological processes. As Condor (1996) states,
...in self-categorization theoiy, the ‘socialfield’ or ‘context’ is treated 
(or at least spoken of) as i f  it were essentially external to the perceiving 
subject...rather than a process o f which they are a part. (p. 289)
Again, this way of treating context can arguably be imputed, at least in part, 
to a tendency to rely mostly on experimental work. Indeed, within experiments, 
features of the context are usually imposed on participants, and the ideal is that these 
features should be defined in such a way that they are perceived in the same way by 
all members of the same experimental condition (in order, for instance, to avoid 
‘noise’ variability). Accordingly, the experimental studies which have been 
conducted to support the salience hypotheses have taken place in an environment in 
which all the relevant featuies of the context with which the experimental 
participants are confronted are set in advance and are unambiguously defined 
(Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986). This is hardly the case in most ‘real-world’ 
social situations, where social context and social meanings are more often than not
More recently, Haslam, Oakes, Turner, MoGarty and Reynolds (1998; Haslam, 2001) have qualified this 
assumption. They propose tliat consensus about meaning is not an automatic product of self-categorisation 
but the result of a process of consensualisation into which gioup members enter because, by virtue of their 
common identity, they expect to agree. However, the final outcome is still the same, i.e. die process of 
consensualisation always leads to a final consensus, even if contestation might take place in the fust 
instance.
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ambiguous, always evolving, and subject to multiple interpretations (see e.g. Herrera 
& Reicher, 1998).
However, the rationale which is often invoked within the SI approach, in 
order to justify leaving aside questions of the consti*uction of social reality and the 
origins of content, is of a different nature. It can be traced back to Tajfel who, despite 
his two-way interactionist statements, also implied that such questions should be left 
to other disciplines:
The content o f the categories to which people are assigned by virtue o f  
their social identity is generated over a long period o f time within a 
culture; the origin and development o f these ideas are a problem for  
the social historian rather than for the psychologist The task o f the 
social psychologist is to discover how these images are transmitted to 
individual members o f a society. (1981, p. 134)
At the very least, this has provided an epistemological justification for his 
followers to naiTow the focus onto the consequences of social reality (see e.g. Turner 
& Boui'his, 1996; Turner et al., 1987), if it has not actually triggered this tendency. 
Of course, there should be no doubt that Tajfel is right to point out that social 
psychology cannot represent the whole story of intergroup relations and behaviour, 
let alone of the processes of constmction of social reality and social identities. 
Amongst other things, the study of these phenomena would indeed need to be 
complemented by detailed historical analyses. But if it is right that social psychology 
cannot deal with all aspects of social construction (especially in its long-term 
historical aspect), a truly interactionist discipline should nevertheless have something 
to say about it, lest it becomes (in fact if not in theory) a one-way interactionism with 
all the pitfalls that this implies.
Thus, at one level, leaving questions of construction to other disciplines can 
be seen as a wise and welcome statement of theoretical modesty (Billig, 1996). 
However, at another level, and when it is stated in absolute tenus, it also tends to 
lead to a picture of social processes working in their own separate and independent 
realm, a realm which would therefore concern social psychology only when it comes 
to affect psychological processes and is translated through them into behaviour. 
Besides, and regardless of how sincerely it has been wished for, the expected cross­
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fertilisation between social psychology and other disciplines, which would have 
filled in the gaps voluntaiily left open, has actually hardly happened. 
Symptomatically, Billig (1996) and Condor (1996) have noted how little the SIT and 
SCT literature - in contrast to TajfeTs own wiitings - actually refers to the work 
taking place in other disciplines such as social history, sociology or social 
anthropology (and vice-versa).
Context and content as rhetorical constructions
Our aim is therefore to promote an approach which not only takes seriously 
the impact of the social context and the social meanings of identities on social 
behavioui*, but which also takes the view that context and meanings are constmcted 
through social interactions and practices as well as being their determinants. Both 
sides should be seen as evolving together in a constant dialogue. Our notions of 
identities and social reality are constantly constituted, sustained and/or transformed 
through and by the very social practices they engender (Billig, 1995). As Reicher 
(1996b) points out, identity is both a reflection of the world and a project about how 
it should be. In that respect, it is the source of social behaviours which aims to 
maintain or change the very social context in which they take place.
In order to address this second side of our approach, we will dr aw in part on 
the resources of Billig's rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987, 1995) and of discourse 
analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). A synthesis of these 
strands of research with SIT and SCT’s principles has recently been attempted by 
Reicher and Hopkins (1996a; 1996b; 2001; Reicher et al., 1997b), and for a major 
part the present body of resear ch aims to expand the approach of these authors in 
relation to attitudes towards supra-national bodies. However, before going into the 
details of our model, what we wish to do here is to consider in what way the resort to 
rhetorical and discursive approaches fits into the debate on interactionism and how 
these can help us in addressing the second side of the two-way relationship -  in a 
way that does not necessarily require us to become social historians.
In that respect, what these approaches provide is twofold. First of all, they 
provide a specific area of social practices in which to look for constructions of 
identities and context, i.e. the highly social and public domain of discourse. Indeed, 
one of the basic arguments of both these lines of work is that reality, far from being
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an obvious given, is constantly constructed (and argued over) through language and 
discursive practices. The idea, to put it simply, is to apply this argument to the 
aspects of social reality which we, in line with the SI tr adition, are interested in, that 
is the aspects of the social context and of category definitions which we will 
hypothesise to be linlced with political attitudes.
Secondly, they also give us some theoretical and methodological tools for 
analysing the discursive construction of those aspects. In particular, these approaches 
argue for a functional approach to language and for seeing discourse as a form of 
social action. They argue that language is more than a neutral means of 
communication, that even the simplest descriptions are constructions not organised in 
function of some truth criterion aiming at a simple reflection of reality, but according 
to pragmatic ends. If there is, as Edwards and Potter (1992) put it, no neutral account 
of reality, it is because people’s interests and motivations are not separable from the 
particular constructions of the social world they provide. Accordingly, different 
versions of reality serve different puiposes by maldng different inferences available.
Thus, it can be argued that, if the SI perspective is right about the 
consequences of context and identity for guiding social action, then the definition of 
those aspects should be of the greatest importance for those who seek to direct social 
action in particular ways. That is, it should be a central concern for those who seek to 
promote specific political projects related to the futur e of the group and its identity. It 
is in this spirit that Reicher and Hopkins have looked at the way in which the form 
and the content of social categories, far fiom being taken for granted, are fiercely 
argued over, contested and constructed by various ‘entrepreneurs o f identity' 
(Besson, 1991) - such as politicians, activists or politically committed intellectuals -, 
thi'ough discourses which aim at mobilising the audience around different political 
projects. What this work shows is that the classic idea that perceptions of the social 
context lead to specific intergioup and political attitudes is only one side of the story. 
For it is in order to make a case for their specific positions that speakers develop 
particular constructions of social categories which sustain them. Thus, for those 
social actors, it is very much their general attitudes and projects concerning the 
future of their identity, as well as their more localised strategic concerns, which 
determine their account of social reality and social identities (see also Klein, 1999; 
Klein & Azzi, 2001b; Klein, Azzi, Brito, & Berckmans, 2000; Klein & Licata, 2003; 
Roosens, 1989).
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This, of course, is not to say that all constmctions of social reality always 
answer to sti ategic concerns of social actors, whether they are aware of them or not. 
Nor is it to say that it is the only possible process of constmction, and that discourse 
and political mobilisation are the only forms of social practice through which it 
occurs, even if we exclude questions of long-term historical development and stay 
within the confines of social psychology. Other forms of social activity where this 
takes place would include, for instance, intergroup contact and interactions (Sherif et 
al., 1961), crowd behavioui* (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996a), 
communication and negotiation (Emler & Hopkins, 1990). The aim of the present 
work is only to provide a limited contiibution to this issue and to the dialogue
between social reality and social behaviour and practices.
Nevertheless, as a concluding remark, it is worth noting that the question of 
the construction of social reality and of identities does constitute more than an add­
on to be put in simple juxtaposition to the issue of their psychological, attitudinal 
and/or behavioural consequences. Rather, these aspects should be seen as going hand 
in hand, and cannot be theoretically separated (even if, in the context of specific 
empirical studies, and for analytical purposes, they can be somewhat isolated). This 
is so because, first of all, promoting a two-way model implies that the consequences 
of social reality do not stop at attitudes or behavioui* as an end point. Asking 
questions about the latter also leads to asking questions about the way they, in turn, 
help in sustaining or redefining the very social context which nourished them. 
Secondly, and conversely, we thinlc that it is precisely because social reality has
strong psychological and behavioural consequences that it is subjected to
argumentative, strategic and constructive work, and it is oui* contention that without 
those consequences in mind, it would be impossible to understand the particular form 
they take. Therefore, such an understanding requires a specific model of what their 
consequences might be.
By the same token, this is where we meet with what we see as one of the 
limits of discursive approaches in their most radical foiins, i.e. where they deny 
altogether the importance of intra-psychic processes in favour* of purely discursive 
ones. Without going here into the details of such a critique, let us just say that it 
would be, at the vei*y least, quite difficult to understand why all this argumentative 
work is done if it would never lead to practical consequences, outside the purely 
discursive domain. And, without a basis in intra-psychic processes (though this
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should by no means be limited to cognitive ones), it would be equally difficult to 
explain how it can have such consequences and impacts on social actors, as well as 
what makes specific constmctions more or less efficient in that respect (Reicher, 
Hopkins, & Condor, 1997a; Reicher et a l, 1997b).
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2. NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SUPRANATIONAL GROUPS
Unification between and separation within states are certainly major issues in 
the contemporaiy world. Separatist nationalism has undoubtedly attracted most of the 
attention from both scholar s and the media, especially with the collapse of the Soviet 
block and the ensuing ‘resurgence of nationalism’ - as it has been called -  in ex- 
USSR and in Eastern Europe. One of the main reasons for such attention is the 
intergroup violence such phenomena have often been associated with, although it is 
important not to forget that there have also been more peaceful examples of 
separation, such as in ex-Czechoslovalda. Less dramatically, devolution is also an 
important topic in today’s state politics, with many a state now being on the road to 
some sort of decentralisation of power -  in particular within the UK, which is going 
to be at the centre of our empirical focus -, while sometimes having followed str ong 
centralisation and homogenisation policies in the past (see e.g. Anderson, 1991; 
Sabatier & Berry, 1994) .^ On the other hand, however, we are also witnessing several 
important attempts and pressures towards various forms of supra-national 
rmifrcation, most notably perhaps in Eruope with the advances of the process of 
European integration.
The major purpose of this work is, as already indicated, to provide some 
insight into the sociopsychological conditions and consequences of political attitudes 
relating to such phenomena. What leads social actors to support separatism or 
integration and how does this affect their group judgements? What are the views of 
social reality, of gi'oup identities and group relationships which goes with such 
positions, both as perceptions which underpin them or as strategic constructions 
which sustain their political claims?
2.1. The antecedents of political attitudes
Impact on ingroup identitv: undermining or enhancement?
Let us start by considering the question from the angle of the antecedents of 
political attitudes. It should already be clear from the first part of this chapter that the
 ^ Of course, tiiis does not mean that these states have totally abandoned all centralisation and 
homogenisation policies.
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view that these could be explained and predicted simply on the basis of people’s 
degree of identification with their nation (i.e. the stionger the national identity, the 
more people would be opposed to supra-national groups and vice-versa) has to be 
rejected from the veiy start. This view is relatively widespread in our culture, and 
often equates national(ist) sentiments with separatism, depicting high identifiers as 
the inescapable victims of an inward-looking and parochial spirit^. This is also a 
view which could come out of a reductionist view of the SI perspective which we 
criticised above. Indeed, if we were to accept the idea that ingroup identification led 
directly and inevitably to discrimination and negative perceptions of outgroups, 
supposedly because this would be the only way of maintaining a positive and distinct 
identity, the same reasoning could as well be applied to super-ordinate groups. From 
there, it would then be only a small step to argue that high identifiers would 
inevitably tend to hold separatist tendencies, favouring independence from 
superordinate gioups.
In answer to this reductionist view, our general argument, which we intend to 
apply here, was that rather than being a direct function of psychological processes 
such as identification, attitudes should depend upon the social context and the social 
meanings associated with the relevant identities in specific situations.
At a general level, and based on a SI perspective, it is possible to distinguish 
between two different ways in which this might occui* in the context of attitudes to 
superordinate groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), First of all, as is the case for 
attitudes towards outgroups (Jetten et al., 1996, 1997; see part 1), specific noims or 
values or ideologies attached to ingroup identity can be such as to prescribe the way 
ingroup members should react towards superordinate groups (in general or vis-à-vis 
specific ones). If we agree with SIT’s prediction that the more one identifies with 
one’s group, the more we act according to the norms and values of this group, it 
follows, that, depending on the specific content of these norms and values, ingroup 
identification could lead to unionist attitudes as well as to separatist ones. Thus, for 
instance, for those European nationals who see themselves as being outward-looking 
and having an international outlook, being in favour of membership in the European
® This should not necessarily be understood as a critique of ‘common sense’: indeed, it is clear that 
nationalism can lead to negative consequences, and it is usually this kind o f nationalism which the 
‘common sense’ has in mind when making this amalgam. The point, however, is that it only 
constitutes a particular form o f nationalism, but not nationalism per se (Billig, 1995).
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Union can be construed as the right way of expressing this identity while opposing it 
can be constmed as denying it (we will see an example of this in Chapter 2).
It is the second way, however, which is going to receive most of our attention 
in the studies carried out in the following chapters. Since the norms and values which 
characterise ingroup identity define what is valuable to ingroup members, i.e., the 
nature of the collective self interest (Ringmar, 1996; S indie, Castano, & Reicher, 
2001; Sonnenberg, 2003), attitudes towards a specific superordinate group can be 
determined by the way this group is seen to impact on ingroup identity and hence on 
these interests. The key factor here is going to be whether national identity and the 
national interests it defines are construed as being enhanced or undermined within 
the superordinate group. Thus, political attitudes will depend upon the definitions of 
ingroup identity, of the superordinate body itself (and/or of any specific outgroups 
belonging to it), and hence of the relationship between them.
This point has been illustrated by Reicher and Hopkins (Hopkins & Reicher, 
1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; Reicher et al., 1997b) in their 
analyses of political rhetoric. As the work of these authors not only constitutes the 
basis for our present model, but also focused mainly on the same empirical case 
which is going to be the focus of enquiry in the present research, i.e. the issue of 
Scottish identity and of Scots’ relation to the U.K. and the European Union, let us 
illustrate our argument by describing some of their findings.
A major part of Reicher and Hopldns’ data was collected during the 1992 
election campaign for the UK government, in which the constitutional status of 
Scotland within the UK (i.e. whether Scotland should be independent, receive some 
limited autonomy thr ough the creation of a devolved Scottish parliament, or whether 
the status quo should be perpetuated), as well as its relationship with Europe were 
central political issues.
Their analyses of this data showed that, first of all, tire idea that the strength 
of national identification would be enough to predict attitudes towards separation or 
integration was far too simplistic. Indeed, a fact that came out very clearly was that 
politicians could claim a very strong national identity together with holding a 
position in favour* of the inclusion of Scotland within Britain or Europe. For* instance, 
the politicians of the Scottish National Party (SNP), the main political party 
advocating independence, quite logically professed a strong attachment to Scottish 
national identity; but, despite their anti-UK stance, they also advocated the merits of
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European integration. Their electoral slogan, ‘independence in Europe’, reflected that 
double position. On the other hand, however, making political claims in the name of 
Scottish identity was not the privilege of SNP members. Conseiwative politicians, for 
instance, who were defending the Union in Britain by opposing independence as well 
as devolution, also stated their own strong attachment to Scottish identity and rooted 
their pro-UK political claim in this very attachment. Here are two examples of such a 
claim:
I  yield to no-one in my Scottishness and I  believe that I  do have some 
understanding o f the needs and aspirations o f the people o f Scotland. I  
therefore yield that emotional high-ground to none. It is not anti- 
Scottish to be for the Union rather it is anti-Scottish to put the future o f 
Scotland at risk...For all o f us who love Scotland, let us ensure her 
continuing place as a full partner within the United Kingdom. (Lord 
Mackay, Conservative peer; quoted in Hopkins & Reicher, 1996, p. 82)
...to me, my Scottishness in fact, transcends all other 
considerations ...wanting to be part o f the Union within the United 
Kingdom, is a very natural corollary o f my personal feelings as a Scot. 
(Conservative candidate; quoted in Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p.60).
Thus, a pro-Union stance appeared to be quite compatible with a strong 
Scottish identity. What seemed to be the main basis of politicians’ attitudes towards 
the constitutional status of Scotland, and what seemed to differentiate them at this 
level, was therefore not the locus or strength of their identification as such but the 
way they conceptualised the impact of the larger community on ingroup identity - 
that is, whether the relationship between Scotland and Britain or Scotland and 
Eiu’ope was construed as undermining or enhancing ingroup identity. Contrast, for 
instance, the two following views:
The trouble with the Scots is that without their own government they 
therefore don’t have a political system which actually reflects the true 
nature o f the Scottish psyche. What I  mean by that is that now we have 
policies in education, law, which are based on alien English ideas
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which are being imposed. (SNP MP; quoted in Reicher & Hopkins,
2001, p.87)
...I think as part o f the UK we enjoy the benefits o f an influential 
presence and that is what in turn helps us to preserve what it is that 
matters to us and what is important to us and what is discernibly 
Scottish. (Conservative candidate; quoted in Hopkins & Reicher,
1996, p.84)
As we can see, whatever the position actually defended, in both cases 
Scottish identity and interests stay the main focus of concern for the speakers. The 
key question resides in whether this identity and its interests are positively or 
negatively affected by being part of the superordinate gioup.
Quantitatively speaking, and as regards the general electorate rather than just 
politicians, a similar lesson comes out of the Scottish Parliamentaiy Election Survey 
1999 (Paterson et al., 2001) and of earlier Election surveys since 1979 (see Thomson, 
Park, & Brooks, 1999). Reviewing the evidence of these surveys, Paterson and 
colleagues point out that whether Scots identify themselves primarily as Scottish or 
British is a very poor predictor of their support for devolution, as well as of their 
actual votes in the 1997 referendum on devolution (Brown, McCrone, Paterson, & 
Surridge, 1999; Thomson, Park, & Bryson, 2000; see section 4 for some details on 
the context of this referendum). Consequently, these authors underline that the issue 
of home-rule “does not act to partition the electorate by national identity” (Paterson 
et al, 2001, p. 112). As regards support for the SNP and for independence (which in 
fact appears not to be one and the same thing), they acknowledge that it does bear a 
somewhat more significant relationship with people’s prime locus of identification: 
for instance, in 1999, 31% of Scottish identifiers supported independence, as 
opposed to 11% of British identifiers. However, as the authors equally stress, this 
latter result also means that the majority of Scottish identifiers do not support 
independence, and therefore that “...thinldng o f oneself as Scottish does not 
guarantee support for independence” (p. 112). In view of these results, these authors 
conclude that:
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The fact that party choice, national identity and constitutional 
preference do not overlap in any neat way suggests that there are 
different ways o f ‘being Scottish’. When the SNP lays claim to be 
‘Scotland’s party’, this is highly contested by other parties who have 
strong claims o f their own. This rather loose correspondence between 
ways o f being Scottish permeates social and political life. One might 
say that national identity in Scotland is a poor predictor o f vote and 
constitutional preference not because it is unimportant, but because it 
is all-pervasive, and not the property o f any single political party. 
(p.115-116)
In other words, Scottish identity in itself is a poor direct predictor of political 
attitudes not because it does not play a role in explaining them but because all 
political projects pretend to speak in the name of Scottish identity and interests. What 
differentiates these projects is how they define this identity and these interests.
Thus, following Reicher and Hopkins’ work, the general psychological 
processes which the present research will rely on are, as we have already stated, by 
and large the basic processes postulated by the SI perspective, i.e., the process of 
social identification and the related motivations to protect and enhance one’s social 
identity. However, these general identity processes are a starting point rather than the 
end of the story, and if we were to relate them directly to political attitudes without 
any intermediary, our position would be open to the critique of establishing generic 
relationships to attitudes and behaviour outside the social context. Thus, in our 
model, these processes do not themselves predict their outcomes, i.e. whether there 
will be support for integration or for separatism, as this will be dependent on how the 
specific natuie of the superordinate group and/or of ingroup identity is construed.
Furtheiinore, this is not to imply that any kind of positive or negative impact 
produced by a superordinate group on the ingroup will necessarily and automatically 
lead to attitudes of separatism or unionism. There is a gap between reacting to protect 
or enhance one’s identity and doing so by promoting separatism/union, if only 
because other strategies could be available. For instance, a subgioup whose members 
feel their identity is threatened within a common group could potentially engage in 
resistance and direct social competition with other subgroups within the 
superordinate group rather than in a separatist stiategy - i.e., to choose a ‘voice’
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rather than an ‘exit’ strategy (see Tajfel, 1981, after Hii'schman, 1972) at the 
subgroup level.
Thus, we need to identify the specific social conditions leading to the kind of 
feelings of identity undermining or enhancement which should be correlated more 
specifically with support for separatism (or at least for enhanced autonomy) or for 
integiation. We need to ask how such feelings come about, i.e. how and to what 
features of the social context and of identity contents they relate. This is essential not 
only in order to understand the social and practical conditions which trigger those 
feelings, but also in order to understand their very nature and their likely 
consequences. In other words, it is by putting identity threat (or enhancement) into 
context that it starts to become more than a merely psychological phenomenon and 
that we can actually start to make predictions concerning political attitudes.
Distinctiveness threat
As pointed out by Branscombe and her colleagues, the notion of identity 
thieat remains ill-defined within the intergroup literatuie, as it encompasses research 
which has investigated many different types of thieats (for a review see Branscombe 
et al., 1999). However, according to Reicher and Hopkins’ data, the sort of issue 
which seems associated with claims of separatism or unionism, at least within the 
Scottish context, is probably most akin to what has been labelled ‘distinctiveness 
threat’ (see e.g. Breakwell, 1986; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Indeed, the 
quotations we have cited show a concern to preserve “what is discernibly Scottish ” 
or for the ability to express “the true nature o f the Scottish psyche” within the British 
political system (see above), and then make the point that Britain either protects and 
enhances this distinctiveness of Scottish identity, or conversely that it undeimines the 
ability to express it (e.g. because it is an alien English identity which dominates the 
political system).
Thus, although most of the research on distinctiveness threat has focused on 
its effects on attitudes and behaviour* towards outgroups, it could potentially also be 
highly relevant for understanding political attitudes towards superordinate groups 
and the origins of feelings of identity undermining/enhancement, given that the 
membership in such groups might indeed create conditions where ingroup specificity 
is tlireatened by the other subgroups.
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Distinctiveness threat relates to SIT’s statement that people need not only a 
positive but also a distinct identity, and there is indeed evidence suggesting that the 
need for distinctiveness is different from the need for positiveness and might even in 
some cases have priority over it (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). SIT predicts that any 
situation where the specificity of ingroup identity is put in jeopardy will be 
uncomfortable and lead to attempts towards re-establishing ingroup distinctiveness 
through increased differentiation from other groups. Overall, there is some evidence 
that threat to ingroup distinctiveness can have such an effect (Jetten, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1999), whereas respecting or even emphasising ingioup distinctiveness 
can improve intergioup perceptions and relations (Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps 
& Brown, 1983). Thus, according to Hornsey and Hogg (2000), distinctiveness threat 
is one of the central factors shaping subgroup relations within a common group and 
which determines whether or not identity processes will lead to actual hostility 
towards these other subgroups.
Apart from the work which has directly addressed this issue, there aie two 
other lines of research which tend to converge with that conclusion. First of all, it can 
be seen as one of the lessons coming out of the work on intergroup contact, also 
partly inspired by a SI perspective, which has focused on the question of whether 
promoting or reducing the salience of different levels of identity is the best strategy 
to reduce intergroup hostility and tensions. Thus, in their Common Ingroup Identity 
model, Gaertner and his colleagues (Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001; 
Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachevan, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner, Mann, Murrel, & 
Dovidio, 1989) have stressed the advantages of promoting a superordinate identity in 
order to reduce intergroup bias and prejudice, in the context of groups which are put 
in presence of each other. On the other hand, such a model has been criticised by 
Hewstone and Brown who, in their own ‘mutual intergroup differentation model’, 
have stressed the necessity of keeping subordinate identities salient, insofar as they 
see it as a necessary condition for the potentially beneficial effects of contact to 
generalise outside the specific contact situation (Brown, Vivian, & Hewstone, 1996; 
Hewstone & Brown, 1986). More recently, however, both these recategorisation and 
categorisation models have somewhat converged, ending up in recognising the 
merits of a dual identity model (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997; 
Dovidio, Gaeitner, & Validzic, 1998; Hewstone, 1996), in which promoting the
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salience of both the subordinate and superordinate level of categorisation are 
assumed to yield the best results.
At one level, this research can be seen as a variant of the generic approach to 
identity processes which has been criticised, insofar as it relies on hypotheses which 
directly link the degree of identification (or level of identity salience) to specific 
orientations towards outgroups. However, its partial convergence with our concern 
lies in the fact that, apart from the generalisation issue raised by Hewstone and 
Brown (1986), one of the main reasons for advocating the maintenance of some level 
of salience of subordinate identities is that attempts to remove or undeiplay those 
identities might be experienced as a tlueat for ingroup members and thereby trigger 
hostility against those who are responsible for these attempts.
Another major area where the idea of identity thieat has been explored is in 
research on multiculturalism (which stretches well beyond the boundaries of social 
psychology; for a review see e.g. Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). Berry’s acculturation 
model (Berry, 1984; Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujald, 1989), for instance, 
describes the different ideological and/or political strategies which can be followed 
within multicultural or multiethnic societies (i.e., most of the time, nation states) in 
order to deal with their inter-subgroup relations. One common strategy, called 
‘assimilationist’, recommends that all individuals should (ideally) be treated in a 
‘category-blind’ fashion. All are supposed to drop their particular subgroup identity 
and to accept and live only by the culture, norms and ideology of the superordinate 
group (melting-pot assimilation). Or yet, minorities have to accept the culture of a 
particular dominant subgroup within it (minority group assimilation; see Hornsey 
and Hogg, 2000; Moghaddam and Solliday, 1991; in practice the distinction might 
sometimes be blurred though, for often the superordinate culture will reflect in large 
part the dominant subgroup). In both cases, the ideal is of ‘one group, one culture’, 
which, for the promoters of tliat model, is the recipe for haimony.
By contrast, the advocates of a strategy of ‘integration’ or ‘cultural pluralism’ 
recommend that, as with the idea of ‘dual identity’, subgroups should be encouraged 
both to keep their distinct identity and to take on board some aspects of the 
superordinate group culture. As with contact models (see also Schofield, 1986), the 
main argued rationale for such a strategy is that assimilation policies might lead to 
resentment and defensive or aggressive reactions amongst those who have to drop 
their original identity (even by those who are willing to integiate and adapt to the
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cultuie of the superordinate group). The premise is that people are strongly motivated 
to retain their subgroup cultural heritage and need to be secure in their subgroup 
identity in order to relate positively to others.
The origins of identity undeimining and enhancement: incompatibilitv and power.
In sum, there is now a large body of empirical work available relating to 
distinctiveness threat and its effects, which suggests the key role that the need for a 
distinct subgroup identity might play in relation to membership in a superordinate 
group. Nevertheless, this work only provides limited help for our puiposes, for 
several reasons. First, as has been alluded to above, the effects of this threat on 
political attitudes towards superordinate groups -  i.e., on whether subgroups, as a 
whole, wish to leave or stay within that common group - still remains in need of 
direct investigation. Second, this research has not explored the other side of the 
‘thieat’ phenomenon, namely, in the context of superordinate group membership, the 
possibility that (and the reasons why) subgieup members might also feel that their 
identity is enhanced within such a group.
Third, and more fundamentally, the basic problem which stands in the way of 
an application to political attitudes is that this research has mostly dealt with 
distinctiveness threat conceived of as a cognitive threat, as if it was a question of 
comparing group tiaits or attributes in the abstract. However, as the research on 
multiculturalism illustrates, the question of membership in superordinate groups is, 
for subgroup members, at least as much a practical issue as it is a cognitive one (i.e. 
whether or not such membership constitutes a practical threat to ingroup identity).
That is, our general view is that people are not merely concerned about 
having a distinct identity as if this were only a matter of possessing a certain 
psychological/cognitive state and of making an abstract comparison of traits with 
other groups. Given that identity is a guide to social action (Reicher, 1996b; Tajfel, 
1981), people are also concerned about having the means to express and enact this 
distinct identity in practice, at a material and concrete level, and to possess 
institutions and social practices which are build around the values of this identity, i.e. 
a way of life which allows and is based on the expression of their identity. This is 
tme in general, but takes particular importance in the context of superordinate group 
membership. Indeed, in this context, the key question is, as we alluded to before.
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whether this membership, and the integiation with the other subgroup(s) it entails, 
implies that the distinct ingroup identity can still be practically expressed, or else that 
it will be repressed, assimilated and ‘diluted’ in the common group, perhaps in 
favour of other subgroup(s) identity(ies), as a result of having to share common 
institutions and practices with these.
Such a perspective also requires us to reconsider the antecedents of 
‘distinctiveness threat’ as they have usually been conceptualised. Indeed, when 
conceived of at the cognitive level, the logical implication of the notion of 
distinctiveness threat is that it should be triggered by intergroup similarity, or a lack 
of clear intergioup boundaries. Accordingly, much research in this area has been 
focusing on the role of these variables (Brown, 1984a, 1984b; Brown & Abrams, 
1986; Moghaddam & Stringer, 1988). As intergroup differences might be also seen 
as potential source of intergroup tension and conflict (Byrne, 1971; Rokeach, 1960), 
a debate has therefore ensued on whether it is similarity or difference with outgroups 
which is the most threatening situation for ingroup members (see e.g. Brewer, 1991; 
Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Jetten & Spears, 2004).
In OUI" view, the controversy around this issue has taken the wrong track. At 
least within the context of subgroup-superordinate gi'oup relationships, what matters 
is not so much inter-subgroup similarities and differences per se, but the practical 
meaning or implication of such similarities or differences. That is, what matters is 
whether the contents of ingroup and outgroup identities are construed as being 
incompatible or not, i.e. whether or not they can be both expressed in the context of a 
common group. In some circumstances, group differences (whether they concern 
traits, values, norms, behavioms, ways of life or interests) might indeed be construed 
as fundamentally incompatible, i.e. that it is not possible to bring them together or 
express them both without some form of conflict, in which case differences are likely 
to be a source of thieat. But, on the other hand, it is also possible, in other 
circumstances or for other people, to construe group differences as having a positive 
meaning because, for instance, they are perceived as complementing each other 
(Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps & Brown, 1983). As for similarities, they might 
well be more likely to be associated with a perception of compatibility between 
groups and their interests; yet, though this might be empirically less frequent, 
similarities between gioups could also potentially be seen as incompatible, if for 
instance the enactment of an ingroup characteristic risks to enter into conflict with
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the outgroup’s expression of the same characteristic (e.g. if two groups see 
themselves as competitive, expansionists, etc.)^.
Accordingly, the problem of superordinate group membership is not that it 
can raise the threat of having to live with one or more similar or different outgroups, 
but that it can raise the threat of having to live with one or several incompatible 
outgroups who are going to impose their own incompatible identity and interests. In 
other words, it is not existing similarities or differences which are threatening per se, 
but the prospect that the expression of ingroup specificity might be impeded, and 
thus that it might be lost in the long-tenn, replaced by a created and imposed 
similarity. In this spirit, a study by Henderson-King and colleagues (Henderson- 
King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, & Chiker, 1997) suggests that 
intergroup differentiation might be used precisely in order to resist such threats. 
Indeed, these authors have shown that similaiity with outgroups can lead to ingroup 
bias and negative outgroup evaluation, as predicted by SIT, but only for those 
outgroups which constitute a perceived ‘practical’ and concrete threat, such as an 
external threat to the existence of the ingi oup itself.
Thus, as far as identity contents are concerned, we see the issue of 
incompatibility vs. compatibility (or complementarity) of those contents, rather than 
differences vs. similarities, as key in terms of the detenninants of support for 
separatism or union. Incompatibility, however, does not just refer to the sort of 
incompatibility which could come from comparing groups and their characteristics 
cognitively, at an abstract level. Rather, it has to be considered within a practical 
context, which can create situations where it is perceived that only one way of life, or 
one set of norms and values can be followed in order to guide practices - an analogy 
with zero-sum games could be made. To put it simply, different values, even 
seemingly incompatible ones, might not be a problem where everybody can follow 
their own path. But these might become problematic when it is necessary to decide to 
which ones the institutions and the practices of a superordinate group will be 
tailored.
The reference to the practical dimension of attitudes to superordinate groups 
also allows a transition to the next point. What also needs to be integrated in a model
’ This is not to say that any combination of characteristics can be considered as being in essence 
compatible or incompatible. Again, it depends upon peoples’ inteipretations. Witli some creativity, 
someone could for instance argue that there is nothing incompatible widi two groups being competitive or 
expansionists.
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of national separation and integration is a consideration of perceived power 
differences. It is easy to understand that, when it comes to join potentially 
incompatible outgroup(s) in a common group, the thi’eat to ingroup identity acquires 
different meanings depending upon whether or not the ingioup feels it has the power 
to make its specific views and identity heard and respected by others. Incompatibility 
might lead to a zero-sum game situation in practice, but it might not be such a 
problem if one can get one’s way, at least to some extent. It certainly becomes a 
problem if one feels that the others’ views are to prevail consistently. The danger is 
then raised not only that the ingroup is unable to enact its own identity but that, 
within common practices, it will be imposed upon the incompatible ways of the 
other.
Thus, incompatibility and lack of power together might lead to a situation 
where it is felt that the superordinate group, its values, institutions and ways of life, 
are defined exclusively by others and do not represent the ingroup and its identity. 
This is illustrated by the common complaint of Scottish separatists that Britain 
actually means England (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001), or that British identity only 
reflects English identity (so that there is in actual facts no such a thing as a British 
identity). It also converges with recent research on ‘ingroup projection’ 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2001), 
which has shown that subgroups, and particularly dominant ones, can indeed project 
their identity onto the superodinate group and develop a ""sense o f 'ownership ’ over 
the superordinate identitÿ" (Hornsey and Hogg, p. 152). What matters here, though, 
is not so much the actual attitude or ‘ingroup projection’ of the dominant outgroup, 
but how this issue is perceived by the ingroup. That is, in reaction to a perceived lack 
of power, ingroup members might actually exhibit the opposite tendency, i.e. 
resenting the fact that it has no ownership over the superordinate identity and that the 
latter is not representative of ingroup identity (see Chapter 5).
Overall, our insistence on the practical dimension of identity threat explains 
why the research on multiculturalism comes closer to our perspective than the 
literatme on distinctiveness threat, for it does contain such practical considerations. 
Indeed, where there is assimilation, it means that there is a practical pressure towaids 
accepting the dominant culture, norms and ideology of the superordinate group, 
which shows the relevance of the power dimension. As alluded to earlier, the 
common group might or might not be dominated by a specific and powerful outgroup
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who has the means to impose its views (e.g. because its bigger size gives it a stionger 
voice in a democratic context, or because it has a stronger hold on institutional 
power). But in any case, feelings of ingroup powerlessness remain possible and 
relevant. Moreover, even within the context of melting-pot assimilation, the process 
is not just one of mere ‘natural’ assimilation by sheer weight of number, but depends 
on an ideology of melting-pot held by the superordinate group itself, which might not 
be shared by the subgroup under thi'eat.
Our perspective is also in line with research on ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles, 
Boui'his, & Taylor, 1977; Harwood, Giles, & Bourhis, 1994; Sachdev & Bouihis, 
1993). The idea of subjective etlinolinguistic vitality proposed by these authors refers 
to perceptions of how well or how badly the identity of ethnic subgroups is suiviving 
and tliriving within a multicultuial group, and depends on factors such as the 
dominance of outgioup(s), the ingroup’s sense of control over its destiny and of 
representativeness within the superordinate group. The thieat of the repression and 
dilution of ingroup identity can be seen as the downside of this sense of vitality, i.e. 
the feeling that ingroup identity is in danger of dying out within the superordinate 
group because it cannot be properly expressed within that group.
As for identity enhancement, it could also be linlced to considerations of 
power in two ways. Firstly, the converse of the above reasoning is that we would 
hypothesise identity enhancement to be linked to the perception that the ingroup has 
enough power within the superordinate group to express itself. However, power can 
also relate to identity enhancement in another way, for being part of a common group 
where incompatibility is not an issue can lead to a feeling of enhanced power and 
agency for both the ingroup and the superordinate group. One’s identity can be 
enacted on a larger scale within the superordinate group, and/or the subgroup can 
also enjoy a stionger voice in terms of relations to other groups outside the 
superordinate group. Likewise, even where some degree of tlueat is present, the 
perception that breaking from the superordinate group might entail a loss of tliat sort 
of power could potentially mitigate the link between this threat and a wish for 
separatism (however, if the lack of power within the superordinate group does not 
allow ingroup identity to be enacted at least to some extent, then the superordinate 
group is unlikely to be construed as giving more power in relation to outsiders; see 
Chapter 2).
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Thus, OUI' aim is to investigate the specific kind of threat/enhancement which 
is rooted in those conditions. The concern is not only about the possession of a 
distinct identity (and certainly not if it is just a question of comparison between 
abstiact traits), but is also about having the means to express this identity in practice 
and the possibility that it might wither away, actively overcome by an alien identity, 
in the process of establishing common practices and values . Rather than talking of 
‘distinctiveness threat’ then, we will use the tei*ms of identity repression or identity 
loss, depending on whether we want to refer to the perception that the expression and 
enactment of ingroup identity is repressed, or to the perception that such repression 
will lead to a loss of ingroup identity.
Of course, there would be, admittedly, many others features of the social 
context which would be worthy of consideration if we wanted to provide an even 
richer picture of the conditions of national separatism/integration. Examples would 
include the perceived legitimacy/illegitimacy of power differences, the perceived 
feasibility and viability of projects of change, and so on. At this point, we have to 
acknowledge the limits of what can be accomplished within the framework of a 
single set of studies. For practical reasons, we need to narrow oui' focus somewhat, 
and the conditions identified here are, at least in oui* view, amongst the most crucial 
ones. However, let us turn now to one last contextual dimension which will also be 
of relevance for one of our studies (see Chapter 2).
The ideological context of nationalism and national identities
Understanding how general identity needs and the general processes 
associated with identity undermining and enhancement might lead to seeking 
national separation or integration also requires, to some extent, an understanding of 
the ideological context within which such a quest takes place. That is, we are not 
dealing here with any type of subgroup-superordinate group relationship, but with 
the specific case of the relationship between national groups and supra-national 
bodies. Accordingly, the peculiar ideology of nationalism and national identities 
might also be a necessary component in making the linlc between these processes and 
their attitudinal and behavioural expression.
As Billig (1995) points out, being a nation is only possible within the context 
of a world of nations. That is, it does not only imply living by the ingi oup identity
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and values but also the acceptance of a wider ideology, a common framework within 
which the specificity of all national identities are expressed (e.g. each nation must 
have a specific flag, a national anthem, etc...). This peculiar ideology does not only 
contribute to explain the fact that national identity matters, perhaps more than many 
other type of identity (Billig, 1995; Reicher et al., 1997a; Sindie et al., 2001). It also 
frames the ways in which the national self should be expressed in general, and 
therefore, what can be construed as threatening to that self and its expression, and the 
types of strategy deemed appropriate in order to deal with those threats.
Thus, in the context of nationalist ideology, one component which is 
undoubtedly of crucial importance is the principle of national sovereignty. The 
ideology of the nation prescribes that the latter should be autonomous, sovereign, and 
l'un by its own people. Furthermore, it also involves a theory of the nature and basis 
of this sovereignty, which often entails the principle that each nation should have, 
and deserves to have, its own state. Indeed, the idea that the nation should be co­
extensive with the state is part of the very basis of today’s prevailing international 
system of nation states, where the nation state has become the political form or unity 
by definition (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1995), As Billig (1995) 
stresses, nowadays the very principles of collective self-determination and 
democracy reside within the nation states.
In the same spirit, other ideological components would include, for instance, 
the roots of nationalism in romantic expressivism, which helped to bring about the 
very idea of national culture and ""the notion that each people has its own way o f 
being thinlcing, and feeling, to which it ought to be true; that each has a right and a 
duty to realize its own wav and not to have an alien one imposed on fr” (Taylor, 
1989, p.415, emphasis added; see also Guibemeau (1996) and Chapter 6).
Accordingly, these ideological components specific to national identities 
might contribute to explaining, for instance, why national identities might be 
particularly sensitive to thieats to their expression and their sovereignty, and why the 
feeling that it is undermined by membership in a larger group can translate into a 
quest for a separate statehood. Indeed, by contrast, groups based on other types of 
identities (i.e. regional, religious, ethnic identities) which come under threat might 
not react through such claims for a separate state, not necessarily because those 
identities would be less strongly felt, but because it would be quite difficult to see it
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as a legitimate claim and/or to gain acknowledgement of this legitimacy in our world 
of nation states.
This is not to rule out the possibility that national identities and national 
ideology can also be used and invoked in order to sustain purposes other than (or 
even opposed to) separatism and the creation of an independent state. We have seen 
above that it can also be a basis for supporting supra-national integration (see also 
Chapter 2). But even in those cases, the principle of national sovereignty will more 
often than not maintain its hold, for it is likely that arguments based on that principle 
will be put forward, e.g. the supra-national body does not lead to a loss of 
sovereignty, or that the ‘supra-national body’ is itself a nation.
This ideological dimension of nationalism and national identities will not be a 
central focus in this thesis, though we will touch upon it in Chapter 2. However, at a 
general level, it provides a cleai' example of how general processes of identity and 
identity threat, however relevant and central, do not allow one to malce predictions of 
social behaviour on their own, for the specific ideological content which feeds these 
processes is necessary in order to understand the ways (national) identity is 
expressed, the forms of threats and the forms of resistance to those thieats. 
Empirically, it might not be such a problem, in most cases, to make general 
predictions without a detailed consideration of this ideological context, simply 
because of the all-pervasive nature of nationalist ideology in today’s world (see e.g. 
Anderson, 1991, who points out for instance how even Marxist movements have 
come to define themselves in nationalist teims throughout this century), and also 
because some aspects of this ideology, in particular those touching the very 
conception of the (national) self, might not be exclusive to national identities. But 
what this does mean is that the nationalist fr amework, and the foiin of responses to 
identity thieat which can emerge within it, cannot be taken for granted, at least at 
theoretical level (and sometimes empirically as well; see Chapter 2).
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2.2. The consequences of political attitudes
So far, we have considered the question of political attitudes in terms of their 
antecedents. That is, we have tried to delineate a model of the conditions of social 
reality and identity meanings which lead to support for separatism or union. It is now 
time to consider the other side of the story, which has to do with the consequences of 
these attitudes. Of course, political attitudes towards superordinate groups potentially 
have many diverse consequences, e.g. in terms of intergroup attitudes and behaviour. 
But, for this research, we will focus on a specific aspect of those consequences which 
can involve the veiy redefinition of those features of social reality and of group 
identities shaping political attitudes. This should help in making a contribution to our 
understanding of their origins, i.e. how social identities and reality come to be 
construed in certain ways.
Indeed, we have argued above that the social context and the social contents 
of identities should not be taken for granted, i.e. as obvious and transparent features 
of an objective reality. Theoretically, it is important that we reject this view, lest we 
end up reifying these. But, perhaps even more importantly, such an outlook would 
simply overshadow the empirical fact, illustrated by Reicher and Hopkins’ research 
(Dixon & Reicher, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, 1996b, 2001; Reicher et al., 
1997b) that context and meanings are open to debate and to different rhetorical 
constructions. Indeed, their evidence shows that ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ can 
constmct the social situation of being part of a superordinate group as either one of 
undeimining or one of enhancement of ingioup identity, depending on how they 
construct and argue over what constitutes the key ‘essence’ of the ingroup, the nature 
and meanings associated with membership in the supra-national group and the 
presence of the outgroup(s), or both. This can lead to very different accounts of the 
relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup(s) and between the ingroup and 
the superordinate group.
Fuithermore, this flexibility in identity construction allows for strategic work 
to be done. Rather than being a mere reflection of their views, the constructions 
deployed by the ‘entrepreneuis of identity’ are led by their attempt to mobilise 
support for their political projects concerning the status of the ingroup vis-à-vis 
supra-national bodies. Beyond the variability in constructions found between 
different speakers, and which reflects their different projects, this functional
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dimension appears even more clearly in the light of the empirical finding that, when 
they are confronted with different argumentative or communicational contexts, or 
when their immediate strategy of influence has to be adapted, the same speakers can 
use quite variable constmctions, whilst at the same time those different constructions 
remain consistent in teims of sustaining their broader political objectives.
In the same spirit, and in relation to the question of whether specific group 
relations are characterised by incompatible or complementary interests and goals, 
Hornsey and Hogg (2000) have underlined that:
Further complicating the issue is the fact that goal relations are very 
susceptible to rhetorical and ideological construction. Where social 
identity threat is perceived to exist, it is remarkably easy to 
reconstruct goal relations to be zero-sum game and thus to legitimize 
and encourage intergroup competition... (p. 151)
We endorse that point wholeheartedly, though we would add that it can also 
work the other way round, i.e. rhetorical and ideological constructions can contribute 
to the inteipretation of a situation as being non-incompatible/complementary and 
encourage intergroup cooperation/union, as much as doing the opposite.
In sum, and more generally, this suggests that one of main motives which can 
lead to sti ategic work on the meanings of identities and social reality is precisely the 
very political project - or political attitude -  held by a particular social actor. Given 
that specific views on these meanings lead to support for specific political positions, 
those who support a particular project can seek to actively constmct these meanings 
in such a way that they are congment with their project, in order to convince others, 
or at least to justify their own position in front of others. In other words, the political 
attitudes we are interested in can therefore participate in the veiy constmction of 
their antecedents.
Thus, the implication for the stance taken here is that all the concepts we have 
outlined above and which concern definitions of identity and identity relations 
(identity undemiining, identity enhancement, identity contents, incompatibility, 
complementarity and even power differences) should not simply be seen as 
unproblematic featuies of reality. Rather, they are an arena for argumentation and 
dissension. Moreover, they should also be seen as (strategic) constructions put into
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place by social actors in order to sustain specific projects, as much as they are 
perceptions or interpretations which determine their attitudes.
However, this does not mean that strategic constructions of social reality are 
limited to the domain of discourse - at least not when discourse is taken in a narrow 
sense -, let alone of political discourse, nor that they can only be tapped by the 
specific qualitative methodology of discursive approaches. Indeed, pragmatic 
approaches to gioup judgements have also illustrated the flexible and sti*ategic 
aspects of these judgements through the use of experimental methodology (see e.g. 
Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1999; Klein, 1999; Klein & Azzi, 2001b; Leyens, 
Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Rijsman, 1988; Reicher & Levine, 
1994). Strategic concerns can impact on people’s answers even when they are 
measured with, say, experimental questionnaires. After all, those can be seen as a 
form of discourse, yielding itself to rhetorical claims (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Our 
perspective is in line with this work, and, in this thesis, we will also explore the 
consequences of strategic concerns on the perceptions of groups and social reality 
using both experimental and qualitative methodologies.
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3. Plan of the Thesis
It would have been impossible, in the framework of this thesis, to empirically 
address all the questions and hypotheses we have raised throughout this introductory 
chapter. Nevertheless, the research strategy we adopted for the present research is 
one whereby we have attempted to address our general model from a different angle 
in each separate study (using different methodologies as deemed appropriate). As 
always, many questions will remain unanswered, but our purpose was to put us in a 
position where, hopefully, we would have at least something to say on each of the 
general aspects of the model we have outlined.
Thus, in the next chapter (Chapter 2), we will start by investigating the 
strategic construction of identities and social context within discui'sive practices - 
more specifically, within political rhetoric. The study presented in this chapter was 
based on interviews with Scottish politicians, and, in analysing their discourse, we 
will pay particular attention to their constructions of the concepts we have underlined 
- such as identity undermining/enhancement, incompatibility and power - and on 
how these constructions relate to the political projects for which they seek to 
mobilise support, in relation to Britain and the EU. For instance, we will examine 
whether those who promote separation from a supra-national body construct this 
body as undermining the expression and the realisation of Scottish identity; whether 
they depict ingroup and outgroup(s) as incompatible in their identity and interests; 
and whether they constme the ingioup as powerless within the supra-national body. 
We will also examine whether those who promote integration deny that there is such 
undermining and constmct group identities and context in such a way that the supra­
national body is seen as enhancing ingroup. Thus, we will seek to demonstrate the 
relevance of our concepts in the understanding of separatism and unionism, as well 
as to show how they are strategically constmcted in order to sustain these political 
attitudes.
In the next two chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), we will aim to provide 
quantitative evidence of the existence of a link between the way in which the impact 
of the superordinate group on ingroup identity is constmed and support for or 
opposition to separatism. That is, we will try to show that, rather than being limited 
to the level of discursive and sti*ategic arguments, views on the nature of this impact 
can also act as perceptions which can indeed influence people’s attitudes.
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Thus, in Chapter 3, we will present the results of a sui'vey study run on a 
sample of ‘ordinary’ Scottish people. In this suiwey, we hypothesised that support for 
separatism should be predicted by the perception that ingroup identity is undermined 
within a supra-national body, in interaction with die degree of ingroup identification. 
That is, it is only when people feel that their identity is undeimined that a high 
degree of identification should lead to stronger support for separatism. In other 
words, there is nothing incompatible with being a high identifier and supporting 
integration in a supra-national body, if this body is not seen as undermining ingroup 
identity. Secondly, we also hypothesised that perceptions of identity undeimining 
should arise from a combined sense of incompatibility with the outgroup and ingroup 
powerlessness. Moreover, we hypothesised that it is because incompatibility and 
powerlessness affect the sense of identity undermining that they have an impact on 
support for separatism (i.e. identity undermining should mediate the impact of these 
variables on support for separatism). Indeed, it could be argued that power and 
incompatibility represent separate issues which could impact on political attitudes 
independently of identity factors. By contrast, should our hypothesis be supported, it 
would show that these aspects are important because they relate to and affect identity 
concerns.
Given the conelational nature of the data presented in Chapter 3, in Chapter 
4, we will address more directly the issue of the causal relationship between 
perceptions of the impact of the superordinate group and political attitudes, by using 
experimental manipulations. Accordingly, the experiment presented in this chapter 
attempted to manipulate the former in order to appraise its effects on the latter. We 
will ask whether inducing participants to believe tliat Britain undermines or enhance 
a specific aspect of Scottishness lead them to show more support separatism or 
integration.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we will come back to the issue of the strategic 
constmction of group identities and explore the consequences of strategic concerns 
for the perceptions of groups and social reality, but this time within a quantitative 
and experimental context. More specifically, we will focus on judgements of group 
prototypicality, as these judgements constitute a potentially appropriate area for 
testing OUI* strategic hypothesis. Indeed, on the one hand, the paradigm of ingroup 
projection (see part 2 above) predicts that ingroup members usually tend to judge 
their gi'oup as more prototypical of the superordinate group than the outgroup. On the
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other hand, however, om* model predicts that those who support separatism will 
sustain their position by sti*essing the fact that ingroup identity and interests are 
ignored within the superordinate group and therefore do not contribute to defining 
the superordinate group identity and practices. In other words, we would expect 
supporters of separatism to claim that the ingroup is not prototypical of the 
superordinate group, as a way to underline the fact that the superordinate gi'oup 
undermine ingroup identity and interests. Thus, rather than being always biased in a 
specific direction, this suggests that judgement of group prototypicality could in fact 
vary as a function of the strategic claims made by participants, in relation to the 
political project they support. We will investigate this question in the two 
experiments presented in chapter 5.
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4. The Scottish context^
Before proceeding with our first study, it might be useful to add a few 
comments in order to situate the general context of our specific empirical case, i.e. 
the relationship between Scotland and the two supra-national bodies it is involved in, 
the UK/Britain^ and the European Union.
Historically, Scotland has been part of Britain since the Union of the 
Parliaments in 1707, which merged both the Scottish and the English parliaments 
into the British parliament. This latter is often referred to simply as ‘Westminster’ 
given that it is located at Westminster, London. Technically, England is not the only 
other group fonning the UK with Scotland, for it also includes Wales and Northern 
Ireland. But it is reasonable to assume that, as the largely dominant group, it does 
constitute the main focus of comparison and of potential threat for the Scots.
It might perhaps come as a surprise that we refer to Britain as a supra-national 
organisation. Indeed, as opposed to the EU perhaps, the UK, or Britain, is often seen 
as a nation rather than a supra-national body, especially in the eyes of many 
outsiders. However, within the UK, Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
are quite commonly seen as nations in their own rights (even by unionists), and thus 
the UK as an Union between those different nations, as in fact the name United 
Kingdom suggests. Of course, whether or not Britain (and, as a matter of fact, 
Scotland) is also a nation can in itself be a matter of argument with important 
political implications (see Chapter 2), but the important point for now is simply that 
it can be seen as a supra-national body as well as a nation.
During the 20‘^  centuiy, movements within Scotland aiming at achieving 
either increased or total autonomy from the UK have come and gone. To focus on the 
most recent events, support for the Scottish National Paity (SNP) reached highpoints 
in the 70s and since then the party has remained a serious political force to contend 
with (in fact, at the time of wiiting, the second most popular party in Scotland after
* The information in this section is taken from the following websites: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/: 
http://europa.eu.int: http ://www.alba.org.uk: http://wv'W.leeds.ac.nkAaw/hamlvn/devoplan.htm: 
http://w%'w.scotland.Eov.uk.
® Technically, the two terms, UK and Britain, are not exactly the same as the former (but not the latter) 
includes Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in practice, they are commonly used interchangeably (i.e. 
Britain meaning the UK as a whole), and we will follow that practice in this thesis (to die risk of 
perhaps shocking some Nortiiem Irish sensitivities).
The case of Northern Ireland is more complex as Nortiiem Ireland can also be seen as part of the nation 
Ireland,
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Labour). In 1979, a first referendum on devolution was held. The majority of Scots 
who did participate in this referendum voted in favour, but the project did not obtain 
the support of 40% of the total electorate, a figure which had been set by the then 
Conseiwative British govermnent as additional requirement before it could be 
implemented. In the 1992 general elections, the issue was again on the table, but the 
Conservatives, who opposed a new referendum on devolution, won the elections and 
were returned into power. In 1997, however, the Labour Party, which was one of the 
parties to have pledged support for a new referendum in 1992 (along with the Liberal 
Democrats and the SNP), replaced the Conservatives in Westminster, and 
implemented that measuie. Seventy four % of Scots voted in favour of a Scottish 
Parliament and this latter became a reality in 1999, when the first elections for the 
Scottish Parliament took place.
The Scottish Parliament now possesses a large range of devolved powers over 
areas such as education, health, culture, and so on -  although Westminster still 
legislates for the whole of the UK on issues like taxation, defence and foreign policy 
(as well as on all English affairs) and still detennines the level of public funding in 
Scotland (through an anangement called the ‘Barnett Formula’). Thus, Scotland is 
still represented in Westminster, although there are moves to decrease its number of 
MPs in the near future. Representation in the two parliaments are decided by separate 
elections.
The research in this thesis took place between 2000 and 2003. At the time it 
started, the governing party in Westminster was Labour, with the Conservatives as 
the main opposition party and the Liberal Democrats coming third. This political 
landscape was not noticeably affected by the 2001 general elections for the 
Westminster Parliament, on which the study in Chapter 2 focused. Following the 
results of these elections (which are based on the ‘First Past the Post’ method), the 
Labour government was returned into power, with the Conservatives remaining the 
main opposition party. The Liberal Democrats remained the third most popular party, 
or the second party in the opposition.
The political representation in the Scottish Parliament at the time of this 
research was detennined by the first Scottish Parliament election in 1999. In these 
elections (which are based on a combination of propoitional representation and of the 
‘First Past the Post’ method), Laboui- won the most seats and became the senior 
pai-tner of a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition forming the Scottish Executive. The
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Scottish National Party, as mentioned above, confirmed its place as the second most 
popular party in terms of votes and won the highest number of seats in the 
opposition. The Conservatives came second in opposition. The Liberal Democrats 
were just behind the Conservatives, but became the junior partner in the governing 
coalition.
As far as the European Union is concerned, Scotland is not in itself a member 
of the EU, but it is part of the EU thiough the fact that it is part of the UK. The 
European Union is an international or supra-national organisation created by the 
Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty on Euiopean Union) signed in 1992. It is bom 
out of the European Economic Community (EEC) founded in 1958. Originally, it 
was formed by 6 countries, not including the UK, but the UK joined in the first wave 
of enlargement in 1973. As its changing name suggests, the EU has evolved from a 
trade body into an economic and political union, with political integration gradually 
taking more and more importance over the years.
However, even more than for the UK, exactly what kind of body the EU is 
remains open to interpretation. The official line is tliat it is neither a new federal state 
nor a simple coalition of separate states, but something unique which strikes a 
balance between inter-govemmental co-operation and ‘supranationalism’. In 
practice, both methods of decision-making can indeed be found in the existing 
institutions. The tension between those two approaches remains ongoing, all the 
more debated in recent years with the enlargement of the EU to Eastern European 
countries. There are forces within Europe pulling in the two different directions.
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CHAPTER II
THE STRATEGIC USE OF IDENTITY IN POLITICAL
DISCOURSE :
A STUDY OF SCOTTISH POLITICIANS
INTRODUCTION
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1, the theoretical framework of this thesis 
is mainly inspired by Reicher and Hopkins’ (2001) research on national identities, 
and in many ways the present work aims to extend their insights and findings in the 
domain of attitudes to supra-national bodies. Consequently, it is only suitable that, 
empirically, our enquiry will also start very much from their work. Thus, in this 
chapter, and in direct continuity witli their analyses, we will address die discursive 
and strategic constructions of identities and group relationships by looking at the 
discourses of ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ - more particularly Scottish politicians - 
concerned with promoting different political projects regarding the relationship of 
Scotland with Britain and the EU.
More specifically, our purpose in the present study is to look at what 
arguments are put forward by these politicians in order to sustain their political 
projects, and to show that these arguments are based on the construction of those 
aspects which our perspective predicts to be crucial in shaping attitudes towards 
superordinate groups, such as the definition of group identities, arguments of identity 
undeimining/enhancement and accounts of the relationship between ingroup and 
outgroup(s).
By doing so, we aim to achieve two main objectives. On the one hand, we 
want to show that all political projects (and the politicians who advocate them), be 
they separatist or unionist, claim to speak in the name of national identity and its
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interests. What differentiates these projects is not that some appeal to national 
identity while others do not; rather, it is the fact that they offer very different 
versions of what this identity consists of and/or how it is affected by the supra­
national bodies, i.e. different constructions of the contents and context of identity 
(see Chapter 1). Thus, given that the politicians whose discourses we will analyse 
advocated veiy different political projects, we would expect to find great variability 
and fluidity in the way that they construct those aspects of identity. Our first purpose 
is to look at the richness and complexity of these different constructions. This should 
sustain oui' claim that, in issues of separatism and integration, what matters is not 
whether or not and to what extent identity is involved, but that we need to look at the 
specifics of contents and context in order to understand how particular projects are 
supported or opposed.
On the other hand, we want to show the strategic functionality of these 
discursive constructions, i.e. how they serve to sustain the projects of the speakers 
and how the variability at the level of arguments reflects the different but constant 
project of each speaker. Accordingly, we would expect to find a perfect consistency 
between their arguments and their projects. In other words, whereas there should be 
great complexity in terms of the constructions and arguments used by speakers, there 
should be a great simplicity at the level of the relationship between the arguments 
which are used and the political projects which are sustained.
In this respect, the present study also aimed to futther and complement 
Reicher and Hopkins’ work by attempting to address the criticism of selectivity 
which is sometimes foimulated against the type of qualitative approach used by those 
authors. This was done in two ways. Firstly, rather than borrowing at will extracts 
and arguments from a large but undefined sample of speakers, our data was based on 
a circumscribed and systematic sample of politicians. That is, to be more concrete, 
the data was collected in the context of the British general election of 2001 during 
which the candidates for each party in a single constituency were interviewed (see 
method section), and we will rely only on the discourses of these candidates in order 
to establish our points. This methodological choice provided a safeguard against the 
possibility of selecting the exceptional individuals which would confirm our 
expectations while ignoring others (i.e. between-speakers selectivity).
Secondly, we also aimed to address concerns with within-speakers selectivity, 
i.e. the possibility of selecting within a single interview the arguments which confiim
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OUI* expectations while ignoring others. This was a more difficult goal to achieve, 
given that we also aimed to scmtinise in detail and in their richness the logic and 
consequences of identity arguments. As this could not be realistically performed for 
every single argument of each speaker, such detailed analysis will indeed have to be 
selective in its use of analytical examples. However, the solution we adopted was to 
add to this detailed analysis a systematic mapping of all of the speakers’ arguments 
but presented in a summarised form. We will then try to show that, if our hypothesis 
and analysis of the logic of these arguments are correct, all of these arguments are 
consonant with speakers’ political projects. The hope is that the detailed part of the 
analysis will provide the reader with the necessary tools in order to understand the 
implications of these arguments even when presented in a summarised foraiat, rather 
than in their original extended wording.
Overall structure of the analysis
The analysis will be structured as follows. First of all, in part 1, which aims to 
set the background to our analysis, we will briefly review the positions of each of the 
candidates on what the status of Scotland should be in relation to Britain and the EU. 
We will also provide a brief ovei*view of each interview, summarising the arguments 
made by each speaker individually and using as much as possible their own words. 
On the basis of this overview, but also on the basis of our theoretical perspective, we 
will then propose a classification of the different types of arguments which are used 
in order to sustain political positions.
Secondly, in part 2, which constitutes the main body of the analysis, we will 
examine in detail these different types of arguments, using selected examples and 
delineating their meaning and consequences - each section of this part being 
dedicated to a different type of argument. In particular, we will ask if the arguments 
encountered fulfil our expectations in terms of how they relate to and rely on identity 
constructions (e.g. questions of identity undei*mining/enhancement, etc.). Thus, this 
part of the analysis can be seen as a thematic analysis of the different arguments 
used, as well as a rhetorical/discursive analysis of how these argument work. 
However, we will also do slightly more than that, for, at the end of each section, we 
will summarise and systematise, this time in the light of our detailed analysis, what 
was actually argued by each speaker (if anything) on that particular level of
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argument, comparing and contrasting directly their arguments. The aim will be to 
sustain our claim regarding the functionality of arguments by showing how the inter­
individual variability in argument is systematically consonant with the inter­
individual variability in political projects.
Thirdly, in part 3, as the analysis of the functionality of arguments can be 
reinforced by evidence of intia-individual variability, we will also briefly look at a 
few selected examples of such variability in some more detail.
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METHOD 
Material
The data was collected during the British general election campaign of June 
2001. A single Scottish constituency was selected and the candidates of all major 
political parties standing for that constituency were interviewed, namely, the 
candidates for the Labour Party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Conservative 
Party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). For reasons of 
space limitation only, however, the inteiwiew with the SSP candidate, whose party is 
less important in terms of electoral support, will not be analysed here\ The full 
ti anscripts of the interviews are available from the author on request.
All the inteiwiews followed a similar semi-structured format. That is, the 
inteiwiewer had at his disposal a set of general questions (see Appendix 2.1) relating 
to the topics of interests, such as the status of Scotland within Britain and the EU, the 
impact of these body on Scotland, their attitude towards the Scottish Parliament, etc. 
However, these questions were designed mainly to serve as probes and as a set of 
loose guidelines in order to ensuie that all relevant topics were being covered. Thus, 
in practice, the interviewer went from one point to another as a function of the 
evolution of the conversation, while the questions themselves were not necessarily 
formulated in the exact wording in which they were prepared. Also, some effort was 
made for these questions not to be too leading by phrasing them very generally. For 
instance, direct references to identity were avoided until the speaker himself or 
herself raised the issue. Of course, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that the 
questions remained leading to some extent (see discussion).
All inteiwiews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, with the exception of the 
Liberal Democrat candidate interview which lasted for 15 minutes (this was due to 
the fact that, as the sitting MP and a senior paiiy figure, his time was very limited).
The interviewer also assisted and recorded a meeting, organised by the 
National Farmer Union (NFU), in which all candidates were present. In this meeting,
 ^ It should also be noted that one candidate, who was standing for tlie ‘Legalise Cannabis Alliance’, 
was not interviewed. This choice was made not only because this is a party attracting only a very 
small minority of votes, but, more importantly, because this party does not in fact pursue an 
electoralist strategy (e.g. it has candidates only in a limited number of constituencies). Rather, this
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all candidates first made a speech, which was followed by questions from members 
of the audience to which each candidate had the opportunity to react in turn.
Finally, a number of additional materials relating to the elections were also 
collected, such as party manifestos, leaflets, press releases, political broadcasts and 
newspapers. The collection of this material was mainly aimed at determining the 
general line of each paity as regards the status of Scotland in relation to Britain and 
Europe, and at providing the context of the prevalent debates in this particular 
election. As a general rule, they are not used directly in the analysis. Where we make 
exceptions to this mle, it is in order to provide a contrast to the material from within 
the interviews itself and thereby to gain a better understanding of it.
Method of analysis
The method used in order to structure and develop the second and main part 
of our analysis was as follows. After several thorough readings of the transcripts of 
the interviews, the texts were broken up in different extracts which were all coded 
using general categories, representing different types of arguments (some extracts 
could belong to more than one categoiy). The set of categories used was mainly 
determined theoretically and a priori and was reflected in the general questions 
prepared for the interviews. However, following an iterative processes, these 
categories also evolved as a function of the data itself and the process of its coding. 
We will therefore provide the details of these categories after we have been through 
the summarised descriptions of the interviews (see 1.2.5).
party is more aldn to a lobby using the elections as a platform to push tlie debate on the specific issue 
of cannabis.
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Convention
Preserving anonymity was not a strong concern for the candidates, but the 
analysis will nevertheless refer to them using the following labels: Lab (Labour), Lib 
(Liberal Democrat), S (Scottish National Party), C (Conservative). As for the 
transcription of the interviews, the following conventions have been used:
word stress
pause or hesitation 
(?) inaudible
.../further on/... or cut in the extract
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ANALYSIS
1. BACKGROUND
1.1. Positions of the interviewees
In order to provide a starting point for the analysis, the first thing to do is to 
establish the natui'e of the political attitude of our inteiviewees towards the 
constitutional status of Scotland in Britain and of Scotland/Britain in Europe, relying 
on the official line of their party line and/or their own statements in the interview.
1.1.1. Attitudes to Britain
As we have seen in the introduction, the SNP is the main party fighting for 
Scottish independence. Consequently, not only does this party, and its interviewed 
candidate, oppose the Union, but they strive for more than a devolved Scottish 
parliament. They supported its creation insofar as they saw it as a step towards 
independence, and in that sense still support it. However, support for an unchanged 
parliament is now construed by this party as support for the status quo and thus 
support for the Union.
In the middle of the political spectrum on this issue come the Liberal 
Democrat and Labour parties and candidates. Their positions are very much the 
same: they argued for the creation of the parliament (and in the latter case 
implemented it), but at the same time do not want to break up the Union. They also 
are coalition partners in the parliament (see Chapter 1). Not only are they against 
independence, but, for the time being at least, they argue against any further change 
in the division of power between parliaments, thus supporting the status quo.
As far as the conservatives are concerned, they campaigned against the 
creation of the Scottish parliament and, as the full name of the Scottish Party 
indicates (The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party), are the ones who state 
most strongly their commitment to Britain and to the Union. Although the official 
party line is now to accept the status quo and the reality of the Scottish parliament, 
i.e. a position formally similar to Labour and Liberals, their opposition to separatism
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or even to any increase in the powers of the Scottish Parliament is put with even 
more emphasis than Labour or the Liberal Democrats.
Furthermore, taking some distance from this official line (but in agreement 
with the campaign against the parliament), the interviewed Conservative candidate 
actually argued directly against the Scottish parliament: “/  was against the Scottish 
parliament, and I ’m still not convinced that i t’s gonna be a good thing, i f  you believe 
in the United Kingdom. ” Although this means that C might not be completely 
representative of his party on tliis aspect (bearing in mind, however, that one might 
ask if he would use an argument quite like that if he was mnning in an election for 
the Scottish parliament and speaking in front of a Scottish audience), this is in fact 
quite fortunate for our purpose, as it provides the logical complement to the views of 
the other candidates.
1.1.2. Attitudes to Europe
The positions towards Europe are more complex than towards the Union. To 
start with, no extremes are represented in the parties under consideration, i.e. no one, 
either considering the speakers or the official party lines, is arguing for total 
withdrawal of the EU or for the creation of an European federal state. This makes all 
positions somewhat double-sided, i.e. everybody wants some integration and some 
separation, only to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, debates about more or less 
integration or devolution depend much more on the area under consideration. It is 
possible to argue both ways, depending on the issue.
Nevertheless, if we try to summarise, perhaps in a somewhat caricatured way, 
in terms of the extent to which parties and candidates are generally more or less pro- 
European, then it would be fair to divide them in two camps, with the Conservatives 
at one end and all the others at tlie other end. This seems to be tme at least on the 
main issue relating to Europe which was argued over during the elections campaign,
i.e. the possible introduction of the Euro in Britain in the near future.
Thus, while the Conservatives might deny the label of ‘anti-European’ and do 
not argue for a total withdrawal from the EU, they are certainly the most resistant to 
European integration, as their main slogan during the campaign to ‘Keep the Pound’ 
illustrates, reflecting the fact that they opposed unconditionally the introduction of 
the Euro.
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On the other hand, the SNP, Labour and the Liberals Democrats all define 
themselves as being pro-Europe (although, as it has been said, they would all oppose 
a federal state of Europe), and support more or less the possible introduction of the 
Euro. Perhaps it could he said that both the SNP and the Liberal Democrats are more 
pro-European than Labour, on the issue of the Euro at least (as Labour has made his 
support for the Euro highly conditional on economic conditions), but this is not of 
great importance for our purposes.
1.2. summaries of the interviews
Let us now provide a summary of each interview and of the main arguments used by 
each speaker in order to sustain their political projects.
1.2.1. The SNP candidate
This candidate stresses that there are deep differences between Scotland and 
England, in terms of type of economy, history, culture, language, law, ideas of 
sovereignty, attitude to Europe and other countries, etc...These differences are such 
that ‘"''there’s no such thing as a British person’’ or as Britishness, and that she and the 
Scots do not feel British at all. Britain actually means England, for England has 
‘hijacked’ the idea of Britishness. In that respect, she suggests that the English might 
not have quite given up their old imperialist outlook.
She then argues that the specific interests and priorities of Scotland, entailed 
by her differences, ar e not listened to by Westminster, because they are not priorities 
UK-wide. She stresses how little power Scotland has in the UK to say what she 
wants or does not want. Scotland is supposed to he an equal paitner with England, 
but, because of their smaller number of MPs, the Scots cannot in fact defeat any 
measuie from the English-dominated British government, even if all Scots agree to 
oppose it. She also suggests that it is not only a question of what type of government 
is in charge in Westminster, for Laboui*, who “yow would think would be sympathetic 
to Scotland’^  also does not listen to Scotland. The problem is that any British 
government (and even Scottish politicians in that government) necessarily has to 
look after the interests of Middle England in order to win the elections, and thus has 
to ignore Scotland.
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Thus, she underlines how Scotland has suffered economically under the 
Union, and continues to suffer under the present devolution settlement, which is not a 
good deal in terms of how Scotland is funded. However, this is not only about 
economics, for she also argues that, although the basic nature of the Scot is to be 
outward-looking, the problems created by the Union have forced them to be more 
inward-looking. She put forward independence as ‘T/ze only way to cure these ills”.
She also strongly denies that she or the SNP are anti-English, and that the 
wish for independence has anything to do with not liking the English. Where there 
are signs of anti-Englishness from the Scots, it is either in good humour, or, when it 
is serious, it is due to the resentment towards of the Union rather than to anti-English 
racism. Thus, one of the things independence would do is to promote a better 
relationship with England, where hoth groups stop complaining about each other all 
the time.
In fact, at one point, she also suggests that the problem does not come from 
the English people as such, for many parts of England aie as resentful towards 
Westminster as the Scots. Radier, the problem is that Westminster thinks that 
^'what’s right for London and the South East is right for the UK as whole”. In a way, 
these English regions are even worse off than the Scots for 'Hhey don’t have the kind 
o f unifying cloth perhaps that we have, because we are a nation”.
She argues that a majority of Scots do indeed want independence but that they 
might not all vote SNP, because they might not like their left-of-centre approach. To 
these people she says that they should vote SNP at least once, in order to win 
independence, and that afteiivards “ you would be free to vote whatever government 
you like, but it will be our government, in Scotland, worJdngfor you. ”
In relation to Europe, she argues that people in other European countries are 
not necessarily all very similar to each other and to the Scots (e.g. the Irish and the 
Italians are, but not the Germans), but what they do have in common is that, like the 
Scots, but unlike the English, they are outward-looking. This is because "they’ve got 
all these land borders” and because "ever since the second World War, when the 
continent was torn apart, there‘s this great idea that we never ever want to see that 
land o f conflict again ”, which means "they had to learn to live with each other” and 
to be open to dialogue with each other.
She also repeatedly relates the issue of Britain to the issue of Europe, for 
another major negative effect of the UK precisely concerns the relation to Europe.
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Indeed, although Europe could be beneficial to Scotland, this potential benefit is 
impeded by being part of the UK. On the one hand, she advocates the economic 
benefits of Europe, in paiticular the fact that Euio would be good for the type of 
economy Scotland has and that, as a consequence, most Scots do want it. However, if 
there is a vote on it, it will be rejected thanks to the votes of the English who oppose 
it. On the other hand, the Scots, being outward looking, have always been more pro- 
European, and as a result they would like to have fruitful exchanges with Europe (as 
they had in the past before the Union). But as it is the UK which deals with Europe, 
it is the reticent, inwai'd-looking attitude towards Europe, typical of the English, 
which prevails.
This is not to say that Europe is always good for Scotland, but, more 
generally, the hasic problem is that Scotland has no voice in Europe, either to agree 
or disagree with what comes from it, given that the UK does not and cannot represent 
her interests properly. This also explains why some Scots have anti-European 
feelings, for they blame Europe for some of its negative effects when they should 
blame the UK. Moreover, not only would Scotland have more power in Europe by 
being independent, but the British Isles as a whole would also have more influence as 
they would have more votes all together. Finally, she also says that being 
independent in Europe would raise the self-confidence of Scotland and by allowing 
her "to get up off the substitute bench, and show what we can d o ”
1.2.2. The Conservative Candidate
This candidate argues mostly from a British point of view - he says that, 
given that he is of both English and Scottish descent, he feels both Scottish and 
English, but also that he feels British ahove all.
In relation to Europe, his major complaint is that the European Union erodes 
the sovereignty of the nation states, and of Britain in particular, and this can only 
lead to negative consequences.
At the general level, this is because different European countries have 
different identities, cultures and ways of life, and thus also different interests. 
Therefore trying to "dictate to each other” and impose unifonnity means that some 
will necessarily suffer for the sake of others, which could lead to "great disharmony” 
and potential conflicts between nations when "times get bad” (as in ex-USSR after
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the fall of communism). The nation states are the natural and proper locus of 
sovereignty, for people need to relate to their government and to their fellow 
nationals if they are to see this government as legitimate and accept to sacrifice their 
interest for others. But there is no common identity in Europe, as opposed to the 
States of America for instance, so people could not relate to a European state.
On top of that, Europe is led by "a lot o f unelected bureaucrats” who try to 
harmonise everything against the will of people, are too prescriptive with their 
binding tr eaties, and follow a rulehook which does not suit specific situations and the 
interests of specific countries.
Thus, for all these reasons, what Europe destroys is such universal values as 
democracy, freedom, the right to disagree, innovation, the right to have a separate 
culture, etc. On the other hand, Europeans countries could have fnhtful trade 
relations and leam from each other as long as they do not try to dictate to each other. 
Thus he argues that the EU should be limited to promote such trade relations and 
economical exchanges, but nothing more.
Applying this reasoning to Britain in particular, he thus argues that Britain 
runs the risk of having policies imposed that are unsuited to its particular interest. He 
also gives a few examples of the way the British way of life is already being eroded, 
and stressed that this loss can only worsen if more sovereignty is lost to Europe, in 
particular by giving up the Pound for the Euro. Britain needs to keep its sovereignty 
in order to be able to follow its interests and keep its way of life.
As regards Scotland being part of Britain, the situation is quite different from 
Europe (and he directly compares the two). First of all, although he acknowledges 
that Scotland has its own identity and specificity, he sti’esses that Scots have also a 
lot in common with other people in Britain -  and certainly more than with other 
Eui'opean countries -, in temis of common history, family and trade links, etc., and 
that it "it’s a nonsense to try undo that”. Secondly, he argues that Scotland has not 
lost his sovereignty in Britain -  for Scotland could be independent anytime she 
wants, if enough people vote SNP - , nor has she lost her specific national identity, 
which is respected within Britain (“zY doesn ’t mean that, because we are united with 
England, that, you know there is anything wrong in being patriotic as a Scot”).
Fuithennore, he underlines the advantages for Scotland to be in Britain, and 
thus what would be lost with independence. There is the economic benefit of a bigger 
market, but also the fact of being part of a powerful state, which means having "a
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bigger voice” on the international scene and that "we can contribute more to 
overseas as a Union”, a fact which also affects standards of living and defence.
Finally, he argues that the danger of the Scottish Parliament is that with time 
it will tend to assume a life and "an identity o f its own” and that it will create 
different systems and divisions between Scotland and England, especially if different 
parties get in power North and South. This "will make the Scottish identity reassert 
itself’, and give arguments to the SNP who can pick up on those divisions. 
Ultimately, it will "make nationalism stronger”, and "fuel the move towards 
independence”, although originally Scots do not really want independence (and 
would have rejected it if that had heen the question in the referendum on the 
Parliament). The creation of the Parliament was also unfair for the English who were 
not consulted on the devolution settlement, have now less autonomy than Scotland, 
and might end up paying more taxes as a result.
More generally, the wish for independence amongst Scots is created by 
dissatisfaction with the economy and an incompetent government (i.e. Labour), as 
was also the case before Thatcher came in power. But another danger of the 
Parliament is precisely that it will make it difficult to identify who is responsible for 
political decisions, and as a result people could end up blaming Westminster instead 
of the Scottish Parliament.
1.2.3. The Labour candidate
The Labour candidate displays considerable ambivalence about Scottish 
identity and about the relationship between Scottishness and Englishness.
First, she suggests that Scotland is far too diverse to be summarised in terms 
of simple traits. Those things which are sometimes use to represent Scottislmess -  
the kilt, traditional music, Scots language -  actually represent only one view of 
Scotland which is danger of being out of touch with what is happening in 
contemporary Scotland.
Second, although she acknowledges that "there’s a cultural and historical 
difference” between Scotland and England, she argues that "we’re not two separate 
countries” given that "there is a lot o f families in Scotland who have their relatives 
in England” and that there is "very much a shared culture” between Scotland and 
England, so much so that it is actually quite difficult to distinguish them. As a result.
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she says that she feels equally Scottish and British. She also argues that, although she 
"would like to think” that Scotland "is a more progressive, a more tolerant, a more 
socially inclusive society” and is "more European” than England, she doesn’t thinlc 
this is actually the case. Moreover, she stresses that differences between regions of 
Scotland can be sometimes be as important, if not more, than differences with 
England.
Third, she argues that, even if there might be some cultural differences, at 
bottom people Scotland and England share very much the same needs and priorities: 
"the problems o f people living in Glasgow can be much the same as the problems o f 
people living in Manchester. ” If there are any difference in priorities, “ a lot o f it’s to 
do with differences in systems, and the way in which the different countries managed 
under the last government.” Under the previous Conservatives governments, lead by 
Margaret Thatcher, Scotland and England have developed somewhat different 
systems (e.g. in terms of public services and education) because Labour was stronger 
in Scotland. Hence this is not an inherent cultural difference, but one dependent upon 
particular political circumstances.
When it comes to institutions and supra-national bodies, she argues that this 
is precisely what the Scottish Parliament was created for. That is, it answered to 
these different needs created by slightly different systems, as well as to a political 
and democratic need to make "people in Scotland being much closer to politicians, 
rather so much than an expression o f the Scottish identity.” The Scottish parliament 
does not represent Scottish identity and should not be seen as being about identity. 
The wish for a parliament  ^came out o f how Scotland fell under Conservatism’ which 
"focused the need that we didn’t really want that to happen again. ” She stresses that 
"it’s quite related to recent history”, rather than being related to the nationalist 
picture of "a gradual drive for Scotland to be independent. ”.
Thus, she argues that there is no real desire amongst Scottish people for 
greater Scottish autonomy. Wlien it seems that there is, it is because of the noise 
made by the media and the SNP -  but the fact that the SNP does not have the 
majority in the Parliament proves that the majority Scots are not very concerned by 
the issue. Under conservatism, there was a surge of support for the SNP and 
independence, and of apparent anti-Englislmess, but it was "born out o f poverty and 
frustration” created by Thatcherism, and by the feeling that Scots were ignored and 
"being ruled by a distant parliament” , an illusion also created by the Conseiwative
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governments. However, along with the Labour Party, "the Scottish parliament has 
been a long way to resolve that”.
Moreover, Scotland was not alone in its frustrations, others in many parts of 
the UK (e.g. the North of England) shared similar views. Thus, what can sometimes 
look like anti-Englishness is actually an anti ‘yuppy’ culture which people in 
Manchester felt as much as people in Glasgow. She argues that the "resentment 
comes through class more than through nationality. ” and "came out o f a feeling that 
England, you Imow had better employment, were wealthier”.
She also stresses repeatedly that Scotland does well in the UK. For Scotland, 
"there’s economical benefits, but there is also social benefits” from being part of 
Britain. Conversely, there are very real social as well as economic dangers from 
autonomy. At several points she alludes to a tendency towards being parochial, 
insular and isolationist, which is at odds with how she would like Scotland to be. She 
suggests that independence is a rather backward looking ‘old fashioned’ concept.
In terms of Europe, she denies that Scots see themselves as particularly 
European, but she argues that she would like them to, for being in Europe, as being 
in the UK with England, gives one a sense of being part of a wider society. This 
works against the danger of Scotland becoming more parochial. There is also, as for 
the UK, financial and social benefits from being in Euiope (e.g. legislation on Trade 
Unions and working rights). The problem is that people are not always aware it 
comes from Europe, and also the fact that the anti-European ‘tabloid media’ 
misrepresent Europe.
Conversely, she denies that Europe imposes policies and regulations that 
haim the UK and Scotland. She dismisses such stories as often relating to things that 
are unimportant (e.g. the metric system). Or, if there are problems, it has to do with 
regulations per se, which are "a fact o f life”, rather than anything specifically 
European about it. Moreover, the objections tend often to come from businessmen 
about policies (like the minimum wage) which actually benefit ordinary people.
She also dismisses the idea of ‘being imposed’ by Europe on the basis that the 
UK is part of it and thus able to shape what Europe is and does (and/or uses its veto 
in cases of disagreement) -  especially since Labour has a more co-operative 
approach to Europe than the isolationist Conservatives, allowing the UK to have 
more influence in Eui'ope. In that respect, she also suggests that, alone, Scotland
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would be marginal and have little influence in Europe. By contrast, the UK is 
powerful and it does speak on behalf of Scotland.
1.2.4. The Liberal Democrat Candidate
Like the Labour candidate (but to a lesser extent), the Liberal Democrat 
candidate displays some ambivalence regarding Scottislmess and its relation to 
Englishness. In terms of what defines the Scots, this candidate argues that Scots do 
have some specific traits compared to the English (e.g. less formal, more open and 
welcoming), but on the other hand he doubts that "their interests are significantly 
different from anywhere else in the United Kingdom. Family, job, recreation, things 
o f that land, I  don’t think there’s anything particular ”.
He then characterises the relationship of Scotland with England "as like being 
in bed with an elephant”. That is, it is true that when you live with a stronger partner 
and "when the other partner turns over in bed, sometimes it does so without having 
regard to the fact they may crush the partner that’s in bed with it.” Moreover, he 
suggests that, because they have long been "dominated by a much larger English 
population” in the Union, Scots have had in the past a certain sense of inferiority.
However, he also stresses that "the relationship is an evolving one”. During 
the Thatcher years, the relationship was "abrasive, antagonistic”, because Thatcher 
was bossy and dictatorial and because the Scots, being chauvinists, "don’t like being 
told what to do”, particularly by the English. He also suggests that, as a result, 
Thatcher acted as a ^recruiting sergeant’ for the SNP. However, he hopes that 
"home-rule (i.e. devolution) will provide a safety valve for that.” and "will make 
Scotland more self-confident, more self-possessed, less concerned about its 
relationship with England’.
Thus he rejects the idea that there is a need for independence, for Scotland is 
stronger and enjoys financial advantages by being in Britain. Moreover, the Scots are 
"very canny” and "cautious”, and as a result, he do not see "any real mood...in 
Scotland for a further constitutional upheaval until we have digested this and seen 
whether it is to our lildng”
In relation to Europe, he mentions that there is a "view that Scotland is more 
sympathetic towards Europe and the European Union” than the rest of the UK, 
although "it’s not always borne out by opinion polls”. There is in fact some
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resistance to Europe in Scotland, but this is affected by the UK-wide "propaganda o f  
the anti-European newspapers”. On the other hand, he rejects the ‘cultural 
perception’ that Scotland is closer to Europe than to the rest of the UK and that 
"there is any particular affinity between Scotland and any other European country” 
(although he does mention an affinity between the Scottish and European system of 
laws).
Nevertheless, being in Europe certainly benefits Scotland economically, and 
he raises the question of whether this benefit will not be threatened if the UK does 
not join the Euro (which his party supports). On the other hand, he suggests that 
Europe has had no particular positive or negative effect on the cultural life. He also 
argues that, as with Scotland in the UK, there should be a similar devolution in 
Europe, and that some of the powers which have been given to Brussels should be 
‘repatriated’, for "we should use Brussels i f  necessary, but the presumption should 
always be in favour o f the individual state”.
He also stresses that "the unit o f representation in Europe should be United 
Kingdom. I  think there’s only a limited area in which Scotland need to have a 
separate and distinct voice, principally probably on fishing. But in virtually every 
other element o f the relationship between United Kingdom parliament and the 
European Union, then Scotland is better represented by the fact that this is done on a 
UK-EU basis rather than a Scotland-EUbasis.”
1.2.5. Structure of the analysis
On the basis of our theoretical perspective, but also on the basis of our data 
which we just gave an overview of, the ar guments used by the interviewees can be 
organised into four different categories - which will determine the structure of the 
following analysis:
1. ‘Reality’ arguments: arguments over what groups/identities are real and relevant to 
the issues.
2. ‘Content’ arguments: arguments over definitions of the groups and their related 
wishes.
3. ‘Impact’ arguments: arguments over the impact of the superordinate group on the 
ingroup.
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4. ‘Relationship’ arguments: arguments over the relationship with outgroup(s) within 
the superordinate group
Let us give some preliminary explanation of these four categories. As we can 
see from the summaries, a first level of argument takes place on what can be seen as 
the most basic level of identity constructions, i.e. establishing what are the very 
identities at stake and relevant to the issues. As we will see in more detail, the main 
kernel of dispute in this respect lies in the question of what identities are real, as 
opposed to unreal or artificial. Although this reality of particular identities can often 
be taken for granted, it can also be articulated and argued over directly for at least 
two reasons. First of all, their reality is an obvious prerequisite for them to be 
relevant, and thus to argue about their content, interests and relationships. Wliere 
there are practices and/or political arguments which seem to challenge this reality, it 
might sometimes be necessary to provide an explicit account which counters this 
particular form of undermining. Secondly, however, the use of ‘reality’ arguments is 
not only preparatory or defensive. Indeed, with the help of some ideological 
resources, arguments over the ‘reality’ or ‘aitiflciality’ of identities can also 
constitute arguments for political projects in their own right. This is what justifies 
treating them as a separate category of arguments and is precisely one of the main 
points we will try to show in analysing them.
While this first category of arguments deals with the question of what is the 
very self (or selves) at stake in issues of national self-interest, the three others 
concern arguments over the nature of this self-interest and how it stands in relation to 
the outgroup(s) and the superordinate group. Thus, the second category regroups 
arguments over the definition of groups and their interests. In the main, these consist 
in arguments whereby speakers directly define the political aspirations of Scots (e.g. 
do the majority of Scots want independence or not?), or define the content of ingroup 
identity (e.g. stereotypes, values, norms) in such a way that it has direct implications 
for what political attitudes Scottish people hold or should hold (see Chapter 1). 
Speakers also often provide arguments countering evidence which might seems to 
contradict their views on what the Scots want. Overall, the implication of this type of 
argument is to make the spealcer’s project representative of (and allowing the 
fulfilment of) the ingroup’s aspirations.
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Thirdly, political projects can be sustained by defining the effects of being 
part of Britain and/or Europe on Scotland. Indeed, granted that the relevant 
categories in the issue have been settled, probably the most obvious basis for 
argument is whether union or separation is a good or a bad thing for the point of view 
of ingroup’s interests. Obviously, this includes economic considerations, but the 
arguments usually do not stop there and also define the impact of the superordinate 
group on ingroup identity. That is, political projects do not just pretend to champion 
the national interest in any narrow sense, e.g. purely in terms what can be called 
‘real’ resources and rewards (Geertz, 1993; Sheriff 1966; Sherif et al., 1961), but, at a 
deeper level, they are constructed as enhancing or else undermining the national self. 
In fact, one could ask whether the two can really be distinguished, for it can be 
argued that what is seen as the ingroup’s interests, including in terms of economy 
and real rewards, is dependent upon the definition of its identity.
Finally, political projects can be justified by arguments over the nature of the 
relationship between Scotland and the other national groups present in the common 
group, i.e. mostly England in relation to Britain, and the other European countries in 
relation to the E.U. That is, speakers can argue whether (and in what ways) the 
ingroup and outgroup(s) identities and interests converge or diverge from each other 
(incompatibility or compatibility). Combined with considerations about their power 
relationship, this determines whether they can successfully be brought together or not 
and whether or not they can enjoy a positive relationship under different political 
arrangements or projects.
To be sure, these four categories are bound to be overlapping ones, and, more 
often than not, extracts could be classified in several categories (this will be reflected 
by numerous cross-references in the analysis). Nevertheless, analytically spealdng, 
they can still be usefully distinguished.
Thus, for instance, arguments over impact (3) and over relations (4) do of 
course contain many group definitions. However in these cases what matters is not so 
much the precise natui e of group identities, but rather the way this content (whatever 
it is) is affected by being part of the superordinate group (3), or the way it relates to 
other identities (4). Another way to put it is that, in the first case, content itself and 
on its own has implications for political attitudes, whereas in the latter cases its 
implications only comes from being part of broader constructions involving other 
elements and/or other definitions.
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Likewise, the veiy purpose of arguments concerning relations (4) is, as for 
‘impact’ arguments (3), to underline the consequences, for the ingroup, of being part 
of a common group with the other subgroups with whom its relationships are 
delineated. The difference is that ‘impact’ arguments do not necessarily rely on an 
explicit account of these relationships: the national interest can be taken for granted, 
or a specific ingroup definition proposed, and then the negative or positive impact of 
imion on those aspects can be underlined. On the other hand, in ‘relationship’ 
arguments, the consequences in terms of the impact of the superordinate group on the 
national self and its interests, though undoubtedly present, can remain more implicit. 
All of this will become clearer as we go through the data.
2. ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS
2.1.What identities are real and relevant? What is the self of self-interest?
Before analysing how arguments at this level can be used to sustain political 
projects, let us first look briefly at how the relevance and reality (or unreality) of 
categories can be rhetorically achieved, by looking at instances where explicit 
argumentative work is done for that purpose.
2.1.1. How is reality constructed?
In line with SCT’s meta-contrast principle (see Chapter 1), it might be 
expected that the most common ways of establishing the reality of categories is by 
emphasising the homogeneous of nature of the groups (Turner et al., 1987) and/or by 
stressing its specificity in relation to other groups (i.e. maximising intergioup 
differences as well as minimising intragroup ones).
It is perhaps the Conservative candidate who provides the best illustrations of 
this type of argument, for amongst all others this candidate puts the most explicit 
efforts into constructing the reality of the ingroup. For him, however, it is mainly 
Britain and British identity which are argued to be real rather than Scotland and 
Scottish identity. For that reason, his argument is double-sided, as it is aimed at 
defending the reality of this British identity both against the larger superordinate 
group (Europe) and against subgroup cleavages within (i.e. Scotland/England). 
Accordingly, C emphasises both what is shared between Scots and English and what 
separates them as a whole from other European nations in order to establish the 
reality of Britain and British identity:
Extract 1
C:...what is nation, basically? I t ’s people who’ve got things in common. They live in 
a geographically identifiable place, in our case it’s easily defined, it’s the British 
Isles. But, there’s always been, you Imow, I  mean an area where, you’ve got the 
French and the Germans, and the Italians living, and that’s just, you Imow, those 
circumstances, the natural boundaries take part o f it. They change obviously.
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em...but that’s, ... a common language comes into zï, .../further or\J.. .people are 
different, basically. I  mean, you Imow we have different food, different 
languages.../.../... we are separate nations
In relation to the commonality between Scotland and England, C added further on 
that:
Extract 2
C: ... we’re on the same lump o f land, we’ve been there for, the historical 
connections have always been, you know France, and Scotland versus England or 
the rest o f it, but that’s, that’s quite distant now. But I  mean the main Commons Act 
is a more recent common history o f 300 years o f the union. And the trades and the 
links, em, family links, Unies all way down from the Crown through the parliaments 
into the families.
Overall, the closeness of Scotland and England is stressed by invoking a 
common history and culture, language, family ties, trade links, etc. and at the same 
time by stressing that this is not something shared with other European countiies. Let 
us note though that the reference to links (in terms of family and trade) suggest that 
there might be more to the story than only a question of similarity and differences, 
for links might not be equivalent to similarities between people.
Nevertheless, similarities/commonalities and differences of various kinds do 
undoubtedly play an important role in constructing real identities. However, one can 
be more specific than that. For reasons we will explain below, it can be important to 
construct the group not only as real, but more specifically as a nation. Thus, as we 
can also see from the extracts above, the arguments often use specific criteria which 
aie usually associated (or argued to be so) with nationliood: language, history, 
territory, etc. And through the use of those criteria, C does not only argue that British 
identity is real but he also explicitly claims nationhood for that identity and that 
Britain is a nation. In other words, it is not just any kind of similarity or difference
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which is used, but similarities and differences on (conventionally) national 
dimensions.
It must be pointed out, however, that insisting on the reality of one category 
does not necessarily mean that one cannot acknowledge the reality of other identities. 
Thus, for instance, when confronted with the question of Scottish specificity, C does 
not deny such specificity - a gesture which would have obvious tlireatening 
implications for Scotland. Nevertheless, there are ways in which subgroup identities 
can be accommodated while keeping the level of group identity that matters for the 
speaker both real and most relevant. For instance, differences within a group can be 
made less important than similarities. This can be done in tenus of ‘quantity’, i.e. 
using the meta-contrast principle, as in C’s argument that despite some differences 
between Scotland and England "they have more in common with each other than they 
do with continental countries. ”. The implication is that while there can indeed be real 
differences within a group (i.e. intragroup homogeneity is far from absolute), this 
does not necessarily mean that this group identity cannot be real. That is, if intra- and 
intergroup similarities and differences are balanced (i.e. the meta-contrast principle), 
Britain vs. European countries represents a relevant and truthful way of categorising 
people, and thus ‘British’ is a real identity. Alternatively, or in combination, 
differences can also be downplayed ‘qualitatively’, i.e. made peripheral or trivial as 
compared to commonalities which are made central, as the following extract shows:
Extract 3
C: Well, they have a lot in common, a lot they have in uncommon, as far as you like 
(laugh). But yes, there are, there’s a lot o f arguments about Bannockburn and 
everything else that goes on, but it’s almost an amusement.../.../...So there is, there’s 
a danger being too fixed on what’s happened in the past.../.../... And, you Imow, 
Scotland and England got on fine. When there is an outside threat, they pull together 
better. Lords fought together in wars, etc.../.../... So that’s, we’ve done things 
together, we have the common, the British commonwealth and, together, and those 
things don’t go away.
Moving to the next point, the corollary of ai'guments over reality is, as we can 
also see in extract 1 in relation to Euiupe, that deconstructing this reality and arguing
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the unreality of an identity is characteristically done by denying commonalities 
between groups. However, it is worth noting that the argument can go furtlier than 
that and posit the artificiality of an identity. Indeed, it can also be aigued that the 
voices which propose such identities as real and relevant are not only wrong but are 
in fact actively trying to impose similarity on real differences and thereby to create 
by force an illegitimate identity, as one of C’s argument against Europe (following 
directly extract 3) again illustiates:
Extract 4
C: ...and those things don’t go away. And this creation, trying to...trying to create 
something, by people who aren’t even elected and want to sit there and write things 
down and tell us how to behave, that’s where it’s wrong. I  mean. I ’m quite prepared 
to accept that, maybe, you know, a single Europe will develop in time, but you don’t 
do it by going around and saying, right, there’s a deadline, tomorrow, we’re 
suddenly gonna change our passports, change our money, and everything is gonna 
be different. I t ’s not real life, it doesn’t work in that way.../.../...And the whole thing 
has just become driven by political engineering, and it’s not what people 
want.../.../...it’s the bureaucrats that sort of, be trying to harmonise everything.
More than simply unreal, such identities then fully deserve the label of 
‘artificiality’, in the sense of being fabricated by (interested) human hands, rather 
than, say, through the natuial evolution of histoiy. This also has specific implications 
that we will see below.
Finally, another way to deconstruct specific categories is to use an alternative 
set of categories. For instance, it can be argued that class categories present a better 
way of reading reality and thus are more real than national categories. This is 
illustrated by Lab’s argument that frushutions with the UK government are not 
limited to Scotland but characterise many other parts of the UK, because it is 
fundamentally a class resentment against Conservative mle (see 1.2.3). This point 
shows that not only any particular national category, but also national categories 
altogether, should not be taken for granted.
However, the general dominance of national categories is illustrated by the 
fact that, although alternative categories are possible, they are the ones which have to
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be argued over against national categories rather than vice-versa. As Billig has 
argued (1991), the onus of argument tells much of what is the dominant common 
sense.
2.1.2 Consequences of realitv and unreality
As we have suggested above (see 1.2.5), the reality of (national) groups is not 
only a prerequisite for their relevance, and for using the kind of arguments 
concerning identity definitions and interests that we will explore in the next sections, 
but it can also be used directly as an argument sustaining particular political 
positions. At bottom, this is made possible by the fact that, as some research has 
suggested, groups to which a feeling of reality is attached tend to be likened to 
(collective) individuals or macro-subjects, with their own agency, desires, interests 
and rights (Hamilton & Sheiman, 1996; Sacchi & Castano, 2000). Thus, maldng a 
group real identifies the relevant political actor or person whose agency, interests and 
rights matters, and it becomes not only possible, but also legitimate, to make claims 
and political demands based on the those interests and rights (Roosens, 1989). 
Indeed, once the group is seen as an agent in its own right, it is possible to invoke 
culturally accepted principles which dictate or regulate the rights of moral persons, 
such as for instance the modem ideologies of individual freedom and self- 
determination or of egalitarianism. Let us now look at the different ways this can 
used to sustain different political claims.
a) Advocating separatism
Let us start with an extract from the SNP candidate, where the reality of 
Scotland is taken for gianted but nevertheless essential to the claim made. Following 
a comment that independence would allow Scotland to be an equal partner with 
England, S was asked whether that meant that the present distribution of power 
within the UK was not fair :
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Extract 5
S; I t ’s not. I  mean, i f  you look at it logically, the idea was well, you Imow, we’re 
partner, you hiow, Scotland and England are equal powers and equal partners. 
Well, how many companies, or, you Imow, businesses do you Imow where one equal 
partner has only 73 votes, and the other equal power has, what, over 500 votes. I t ’s 
not very equal. Every, you Imow, every MP from Scotland, Wales and Ireland could 
vote the same way against the government, and then still lose. Which means 
technically there is absolutely no way that we can defeat a measure.
In this passage, the distribution of power is described as unfair by involdng an 
egalitarian rule, which in our societies constitutes undoubtedly a valid principle to 
appeal to. But that judgement of unfairness is also made possible because it 
presupposes that the relevant unit to consider are the national categories of Scotland 
and England (and Wales and Ireland), rather than, say, the individuals who compose 
it. That is, it relies on a group-level rather than an individual-level rule of equity 
(Azzi, 1992, 1994). It is Scotland and England themselves, and not the individual 
Scots and English, who are the ‘partner’ in the Union; in other words, Scotland is 
viewed as an individual on its own, and it is this collective subject which should be 
equal to other national units in the Union. In case this might seem obvious, it can be 
contrasted to constructions which do indeed use individuals as the relevant unit in 
judgements of equity. If such arguments did not appear in the interviews, it is 
something that came out in the feedback we obtained from participants in our survey 
study (see Chapter 3). Indeed, commenting on questions on the distribution of power, 
some participants underlined that it was only fair in a democratic context that the 
English get more power as there are simply more of them. Thus, the reality of the 
group can be used to influence the processes of distribution of resources in a way that 
takes categories as relevant (Klein, 1999; Klein & Azzi, 2001a). Here the resource in 
question is procedural, i.e. power, and thus it amounts to a claim for more autonomy.
However, this does not mean that the reality of a group is always in itself 
sufficient to ground the specific claim which most interests us, i.e. a claim for a 
sepai'ate state. The precise nature of the rights of collective individuals are also very 
much dependent on the specific ideology attached to them, i.e. the broader theory 
concerning the nature of the groups under consideration. In particular, in a world of
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nations, it is through nationhood that statehood can be claimed (Billig, 1995; see 
Chapter 1). Thus those who makes such claims need to present the group as a (real) 
nation, with a real national identity, and not only as any group, however real it might 
be. Claims of statehood based on other groups might not be impossible, but are quite 
unlikely to be successful in the international arena of nation states, where it is the 
individual ‘nation’ which deseiwes sovereignty.
This need to be a nation in order to claim statehood appears for instance in a 
comparison that S made in the interview between Scotland and the English regions. 
At one point S underlined that, like Scotland, a lot of the English regions often 
complain about the British government; but that unfortunately for them there is a big 
difference between them and nations like Scotland:
Extract 6
not Just Scotland and Wales. Time and time again in the election, I ’ve had 
this happening to m e . . . I  bump into people from say, Durham, or Cumbria, or 
the rest o f it, and they will literally come up and say, all power to your elbow, I  hope 
you win, and when you do, will you move the border South, so we can be in Scotland, 
not E n g la n d . / . . . t h e r e ’s people in Newcastle, or County Durham, or in Liverpool, 
Tyneside, they’re really just as hacked off as the Scots. But they don’t have...the 
land of... unified cloth perhaps that we have, because we are a nation. They’re 
English regions. I  mean they are England, and perhaps you feel sorry for them 
because they haven’t the same cloth.
English regions are not nations and, though the exact reason for this is left 
ambiguous (e.g. whether because it would be illegitimate or undoable due to lack of 
unified mobilisation), what is clear is that this is why they cannot aspire to 
independence for themselves, despite being real entities and having good reasons to 
resent the British government, and why they would therefore like to do as the Scots.
By contrast, nations like Scotland and Wales do not suffer such limitations. 
Thus being a nation allows one to make claims based on the principle of national 
sovereignty, such as the following made by S in the NFU meeting: "We have a 
parliament, but it has very limited powers. We stand for completing these powers. 
Bringing them back to Scotland and equipping the Scottish people with the same
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powers as every other modern nation. ” Such a claim here is more than a claim based 
on a general ideology of freedom and self-detennination which should be applied to 
any real gi*oup. Indeed, what is claimed here is simply for Scotland to get what every 
nation deserves, and what every other nation except Scotland aheady has. Scotland is 
denied unfairly this universal good. Thus, making such a claim is only possible 
thanlcs to the broadly accepted principle of national sovereignty, and given the taken 
for granted fact that Scotland is indeed a nation.
b) Defending the existing (separate) state
If the principle of national sovereignty can be used to claim a new statehood, 
it can also be used to defend an existing one. Thus many instances of explicit use of 
the principle of national sovereignty and that the state should be co-extensive to the 
nation can be found in C’s interview as well, where they aim at protecting British 
sovereignty against European integiation. As we have seen above, for C, the existing 
European states match the reality of national identities and cover real differences and 
similarities. More than an ideological principle, it is reified in C’s discourse as a 
natural order: "No, I  mean, looJdng at the big long-term, I  don’t think that the nation­
state came around, about, by accident, I  mean we ’re in a nation-state with groupings 
that we are alright, because that’s natural. ” In that natural-like order, the state must 
correspond to nations, and the nation is self-sufficient as a principle to ground 
separation of government. Given the reality and nationhood of British identity, it is 
thus the British state (and not Europe) which is legitimate and corresponds to a 
reality. By creating a situation where "Britain’s sovereignty is being eroded”, what 
Europe is attacking is the very basic principle of the nation-state, and therefore it 
represents a illegitimate, unnatural (and even dangerous, as we will see further) 
attack on a real, almost natural order.
In sum, we can see that, despite being at odds in terms of the content of their 
political projects, both the SNP and the conservative candidates are using exactly the 
same ideological principle of national sovereignty. It is used as a resource which can 
be applied for different purposes, depending on what the relevant level of identity is 
argued to be. This can be further illustrated by the fact that, in the NFU meeting, S 
was able to say, in reference to some of C’s comments: “ Just...there is one thing 
that /the conseiwative candidate/ said that I  can agree with, absolutely completely.
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He said we have to stand up for ourselves and control our own destiny.”, before 
going on to argue for Scottish independence. The difference between those two 
candidates is of course that they apply the principle at different levels, because they 
constmct different categories as real and national, and thus we can see why it can be 
important to argue directly about what are the identities which are real and national 
and should be taken into account. Those who make claims to statehood based on the 
principle of national sovereignty need to construct the ingioup as a nation, or else to 
take for gi*anted that it is one.
c) Undermining separatism
Finally, yet another use of the reality of an identity can be to undermine 
separatism within a group which is argued to be a real nation. Thus, while C’s 
argument concerning the reality of Britain and British identity is used to oppose 
Eui'ope and its unreal identity, it is also used to argue that separatism as undermining 
something important, i.e. the reality of British identity. Indeed, when C was asked if 
he felt Scottish, he answered by the affirmative and added:
Extract 7
C:...my grandmother is Scottish, you Imow, so... And this is one o f the, one o f the, the 
difficulties for me in the United Kingdom, is that, there are so many families that are 
a cross between English and...and marriages and mixed-up, etc., and because, you 
Imow, i t’s a nonsense to try undo that, that’s taken 300years to get that way...
Given that there is a strong, authentic British identity, based on 300 years of 
history, it means that it would actually be artificial to try distinguish strongly 
between Scotland and England and to undo their Union, i.e. to separate them by 
independence {Ht’s a nonsense to try undo that’). Far from redrawing state lines in 
order to correspond to people’s real identities, what separatism does is actually to 
create artificial differences and separate identities where an overlap and a common 
identity exist (this also applies to the Scottish parliament: see C’s summary). But an 
important point to note here is that such an argument for Britain and Britishness does 
not prevent this speaker from claiming Scottishness for himself as well as speaking
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in the name of Scottishness. Quite the opposite, his claim is that it is because he is 
part Scottish that he is sensitive to the mixed reality of Britain and Scotland. He 
argues that the category of Britishness reflects a crucial aspect of the reality of 
contemporary Scotland, and therefore that any attempt to deny that, to isolate 
Scotland from Britain, does violence to that reality, and undermine a key 
characteristic of the reality of present-day Scottishness.
More defensively, C also rejects separatism by denying that Britain has 
undermined the reality and the specificity of Scotland, as we will see in point 2.3. 
What is interesting to note here, however, is that in such an argument the principle of 
national sovereignty still shows its pull indirectly, by the fact that, given that he 
acknowledges Scottish specificity and the reality/nationality of Scotland, he is also 
led to deny Scotland has lost its sovereignty within Britain, thereby acknowledging 
that it is indeed an unalienable right of nations:
Extract 8
Scotland really wants to be independent, then there’s nothing to stop them 
from exercising this sovereignty, because they are sovereign. And they simply have to 
do it by electing 40 or 50 Scottish Nationalist MPs, who can then go to Westminster 
and say, we have a mandate, and we want to negotiate independence, and do it in a 
civilised way, it can be done. So even though, there’s 300 years o f Union, that 
doesn’t mean Scotland has lost its sovereignty, and people don’t understand that.
2.1.3. Consequences of artificialitv
If there are political projects which are grounded in and reflect real, authentic 
identities, and therefore can legitimately claim the rights which such real groups and 
nations are usually granted, the other side of the coin, as we have seen, is that the 
identities hailed by opponents can be deconstructed as umeal, with the consequence 
of picturing their projects as illegitimate and illusoiy. Yet matters can be even worse. 
That is, political projects can be described as seeking to create and impose an 
artificial identity on people in order to mobilise them for the wrong cause.
Thus, for instance, in sharp contrast with C, for S British identity is defined as 
an artificial construct.
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Extract 9
S: We always have a little chuckle up here in.. An the 1997 election, John Major tried 
to save this government, talked about a thousand years o f British history. And we ’re 
sort o f going, what is this?.../.../...I should point out right here and now, when 
anyone else aslcs me about Britishness, I  say, I  never have been British, I  am not 
British, and never will be British, I  am a Scot. I  see myself first as Scottish, and then 
as part o f Europe. Scotland is a nation within Europe. So I  am Scottish, I ’m 
European, I ’m not British. There’s no such thing as a British person. They’re 
English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh.
In this extract, S denies any credibility and legitimacy to discourses which 
would be based on British identity, not only for herself and the Scots, but for 
everybody in Britain. Not only does she not feel British, but British identity does not 
exist. What is real is the level of subgroup nationality (Scottish, Welsh, etc.). So 
Britain is described as a fragmented country, with the implication that no one can 
legitimately speak for Britain as a whole. Indeed, if British identity is an illegitimate 
constmction, it is thus also illegitimate, as the example of John Major implies, to 
make a discursive use of it in order to try mobilise people and pretend to speak on 
behalf of the British people. He might be speaking for part of Britain, but certainly 
not for the Scots, who in fact cannot be fooled by it (“we always have a little chuckle 
up here...
Moreover, with this John Major example, S not only denies reality and 
legitimacy to British identity, she also underlines the artificial and interested 
character of such a creation. British identity is something that politicians like John 
Major try to put in the heads of people in order to serve their political purpose (here 
to save the British government). From there the gap is short to arguing that Britain 
not only does not represent but actually does violence to the reality of identities, and 
that Britain is not only an unreal collective self but in fact hides another self in 
disguise. That is, that British identity is actually a mask for English identity, and a 
mode of domination which undermines the right to self-determination of people, 
rather than a legitimate level of identification (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). But this is 
going too far ahead of our argument for now (see point 2.2.2). What matters here is
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that, if unreality can undemiine a project, the implication of a ‘forced creation’ 
construction is that it pushes this undermining and illegitimacy a step forward, by 
emphasising their calculated nature and the fact that they reflect alien interests.
Furthermore, if we now look at one of the consequences that C draws from 
his argument concerning the artificiality of European identity (see extracts 1 and 4), 
another possible implication of ‘artificiality’ arguments also appears. What this 
speaker argues is that, if the lack of a real identity makes a project unrealistic, trying 
to overcome it by a forcing an artificial identity on people is not only illegitimate, but 
also dangerous and potentially catastiophic. Indeed, the fact that it is forced on 
naturally divergent identities (i.e. incompatibility: see section 2.4) means that conflict 
will inevitably surface if that will is removed and/or if we are in bad times;
Extract 10
C: OK, and i f  you look at the Soviet Union, for 80 years they were run as one 
government, and for all the world was told that was united, wonderful place, but a 
lot o f us doubted that, a lot o f people who believed in it here, you Imow had the eyes 
open when it all came apart. And despite that political engineering, it was actually, 
you know they were, they were brought together by force, by political power into the 
Soviet Union. And when you remove that political power, you find that the Chechens 
are still Chechen, and the same thing in Yugoslavia, and, I  mean all the other clumsy 
and difficulties that’s happening, is because, this is just a reassertion o f people’s 
original identities that, those, they were suppressed. And I  don’t want us going to a 
system where, you know, where pretending that those differences don’t exist, because 
i f  the cement then goes for some reason, then, the disharmony comes, and that’s, I  
mean call a spade a spade, the French would burn British lamb, you Imow, and that 
sort o f thing goes all the time. Now, i f  everything is wonderful in the garden and its a 
lovely sunny day, and we can share everything, that’s great. What happens when you 
starts to go wrong, and, that’s when your basic nationalities and identities start 
coming to the fore. And I  don’t want to see us put those into conflict, and there’s no 
need to do that.
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2.1.4. Heterogeneous but real
In point 2.1.1, we insisted on the role that group homogeneity can play in 
establishing the reality of that group. However, this does not mean that homogeneity 
is a necessary condition for reality and that speaking in the name of a specific 
identity (and thus taking it for real) necessarily requires one to defines it as 
homogeneous. As evidence, let us look at how the Labour candidate defines Scottish 
identity.
In a way. Lab goes beyond the Conservative in downplaying the 
England/Scotland gap, in that she explicitly states that any direct definition of a 
Scottish character or culture is impossible, because it is fundamentally 
heterogeneous. Indeed, Scottish identity is precisely defined as being diverse:
Extract 11
Lab: ... trying to decide what Scottish identity is, and I  find quite difficult to define. I  
did, ‘cos I  was a literature graduate, and taught Scottish literature to European 
students at a summer school, I  can spend the whole three weeks trying to define what 
Scottish identity was, and by the end just going ‘oh, I  give up’ (laugh), i t’s erm, it’s 
quite complex, I  don’t know, I ’m not always that comfortable with kind o f narrow 
definitions o f identity, I  think people are much more diverse than that, I  don’t 
think...(I: Alright) I  think it’s rather, there’s also regional identity within Scotland, 
you know, em... central belt, and Highlands and Islands, there was often feelings of... 
I  mean you’ve got a bit o f tension between regions, it’s not just between Scotland and 
England. I  think that’s the regional identities there as well.
As with homogeneous definitions of Scottishness, constructions of 
heterogeneity can also have their specific consequences, which in this case are akin 
to ‘artificiality’ constructions. Indeed, the proximal consequence of Lab’s stress on 
heterogeneity is to undermine a particular vision of Scottishness - homogeneous and 
stereotypical - as artificial. Thus, in another extract. Lab describes the usual symbols 
of Scotland as commercial stereotypes, as ‘a way o f selling Scotland’, i.e. as artificial 
rather than real and authentic:
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Extract 12
Lab: ...I suppose, how you define identity, and as I  say, I  think it’s much more 
diverse, it’s difficult to define. And this...I suppose visitors in Scotland see 
representations o f what Scotland is, and that’s just a way o f selling Scotland, really, 
the land o f kilts, and all that land o f stuff, those land o f images o f Scotland don’t 
really reflect...! mean as a Scot you can have quite a good land of, a more self- 
reflexive approach towards that type o f stuff
As for the broader implication of Lab’s argument, it is also similar to 
‘artificiality’ arguments. That is, it is to discredit any project that wants to use such 
homogeneous/artificial versions of Scottish identity as the primary base to legitimise 
a political project and gather support for it. This can be illustrated with the next 
extract, which applies that logic to the issue of Scotland’s linguistic specificity:
Extiact 13
Lab: i f  you talk about identity, I  suppose language was always a kind o f key issue as 
well.../.../...I mean, writers like James Kelman and people like that, who write in 
vernacular, who write in Scots, there was this feeling of, em and that’s often 
interpreted as i f  it was, as difficult, you’d think your mother tongue wasn’t 
recogn ised . / . . .bu t  I ’m not really, within Scottish parliament, there is this kind o f  
real move towards, em...you Imow there’s a group o f MSPs in the parliament who 
campaign on Scots language, I  have problems with that. I  mean I  think we should 
support Gaelic as a language, so i t’s recognised that Gaelic wasn’t really a Scot, 
there wasn’t a Scottish wide, i t’s quite concentrated in a certain area, but I  mean I  
have no problems with supporting Gaelic medium education, and you Imow 
supporting that culture, as long as we support other diversities and cultures within 
Scotland as a whole. But Scots language, I  can’t really see, I  mean Scots language is 
an invented language that takes...! mean, look at Hugh MacDiarmad, that takes bits 
and pieces o f dialects and forms it into a kind o f (?) Scots, which I  find a bit 
irritating.../.../...you get sent e-mails at work from MSPs that are written in Scots, 
and it’s like, “well, I  don’t understand this, you’re sending me e-mails that”...You
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know, I  am Scottish, I  have a dialect, this isn’t my dialect, you Imow, who...who can 
define what Scots dialect is and to put it down and print into... that also becomes as 
restrictive as what they ’re arguing English is.
According to Lab, ‘Scots language’ cannot pretend to represent Scotland and 
to be part of its overall identity, for it is an artificial creation, made from an arbitrary 
blend of regional dialects, rather than an authentic part of Scottishness. Therefore, 
political projects which try to promote it do not express national identity but try to 
impose an artificial creation. As for Gaelic, it might be more authentic, but again it 
represents only part of Scotland, not the whole.
Thus, at first sight, this might seems to be a deconstruction of the very idea of 
Scottish identity. However, if we look more closely at Lab’s argument, we can see 
her denial of homogeneity does not in fact entail denying all reality to this identity - 
and this is the difference with the ‘artificiality’ arguments detailed in point 1.1.3.
Indeed, crucially, what also appears in the extiact is that making such 
statements is not in contradiction with feeling Scottish or equivalent to taking an 
‘anti-Scottish’ stance. On the contrary, the attempt at homogenisation is described as 
prescriptive, and therefore trying to impose uniformity indicates a lack of respect for 
the reality of Scottish identity and society, i.e. its diversity. For this speaker, it is as 
much an attack on Scottish reality than the imposition of English language is for 
others (perhaps even more, as there is an active and self-conscious process pushing 
it). ‘I  am Scottish’, Lab insists, and it is precisely for that reason that she can’t relate 
to the stereotypical images and definitions of Scotland (see also in extract \2\ I  mean 
as a Scot you can have quite a good land of, a more self-reflexive approach towards 
that type o f stuff). It is by being a (true) Scot that one Icnows such images are 
artificial and do not correspond to the real Scottish identity, while a political project 
which respects that reality must “support other diversities and cultures within 
Scotland as a whole. ” The danger of defining Scottish identity is to get trapped into 
stereotypical images of Scotland which do not respect the reality of contemporary 
Scotland. This argument also appears when she talks about traditional music, and 
says that it “has always the danger o f dying out, and needs to be supported. But there 
is very little focus on what’s happening in contemporary Scotland, and the type o f  
music that young people in Scotland today are producing, and the type o f culture,
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there’s less focus on that”. Being too fixed in the past is actually ignoring important 
aspects of Scottish identity.
Thus, what Lab does is to undermine not the very notion of Scottishness but 
the homogeneous versions, and therefore the political projects based on these 
versions. What is tlien implicitly attacked thiough such arguments is in fact the basis 
on which separatists make their appeal, a stereotypical Scottish identity which is 
declared to be artificial (and indeed Gaelic and Scots language are amongst the 
aspects used by S as symbols and evidence of Scotland’s distinct identity). Although 
she rejects the idea of identity altogether {I’m not that into national identity), this is 
because for her the term is bound with separatist nationalism. The link is made 
explicit at other points when she argues that the Scottish Parliament should not be 
seen as being about Scottish identity {it’s largely about politics, it’s not about a 
Scottish identity.../.../...! don’t think the parliament embodies Scottish identity). She 
stresses that if the parliament is (mis)understood as being about identity, and if there 
is too much focus on these stereotypical images she rejects, it is in danger of leading 
to parochialism. This in turn means that the Parliament should not be seen a part of a 
process leading to independence. Indeed, independence is explicitly associated with a 
naiTOw-minded view of Scotland, and she suggests that it is a rather backward 
looking ‘old fashioned’ concept (see section 2.3, extract 22).
This does not mean, however, that she does not propose her own definition of 
Scotland and speak in the name of the reality of Scottish identity (even if she avoids 
that term). In sum, Lab’s construction illustrates that one should be careful not to 
take attacks on particular versions of identity and on homogeneity as being 
necessarily attacks against this identity as such and its reality, for such attacks can in 
fact be done in the name of another content, which can include diversity. With that 
last point, we have moved somewhat from the basic question of what identities are 
real and started to see the importance of the specific content which is given to 
identities. We will address this point in the next section, after some conclusions 
concerning this section.
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2.1.5. Summary and conclusions
a) Reality as pre-requisite for arguments
We will now apply the analytical outlook which has been developed 
throughout this section to what each speaker argues about the reality of identities. 
However, before we do so, a preliminary comment needs to be made, which also 
applies to our further attempts at systematising our speakers’ use of other types of 
arguments (see sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). As we pointed out in the intioduction, it 
would be unpractical to support every point we will make about what each speakers 
argue with extended quotes. We have just gone through the details of some of these 
arguments, and thus these latter do not need to be repeated. As for the rest, we will 
often refer back to the summaries of the interviews (see section 1.2). The reader is 
therefore encouraged to read this in parallel to the summaries (as well as to consult 
the original transcripts should he/she wish to do so).
In relation to the present category of arguments, the first point to note is that 
all OUI* speakers, in some way or another, argue about the reality of groups and 
identities. On the other hand, however, there is great diversity in the way they do so 
and in terms of what particular levels of identity aie argued to be real, unreal, or else 
artificial.
In this respect, the starkest conti ast is undoubtedly between C and S, and their 
respective constructions present an almost perfect minor image of each other. 
Indeed, on the one hand, and as we have seen, C argues forcefully for the reality of 
British identity while S construes the very idea of Britishness as completely artificial. 
On the other hand, S argues strongly for the reality of Scottish identity by stressing 
the differences between Scotland and England ( ”...We have a different history, we 
have a different culture, we have a different economy. ”), while C, even if he does 
not deny this reality, downplays its distinctivness, precisely by using the reality of 
Britishness and the overlap between Scottish and English identities it implies. 
Finally, C strongly stresses the artificiality of any idea of European identity, while S 
does give some reality to this identity (it is quite heterogeneous, but Europeans have 
some common history and are outward-looking: see S’s summary) -  although it is 
limited and comes second to Scottisliness. Indeed she stresses that “at the end o f the 
day no matter how European you are, you want to make sure that your own people
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are not loosing out”, an argument which takes for granted that the ‘people’ which 
should be seen as their own by people in Scotland (i.e. the most real identity) are the 
Scots rather than the Europeans.
In the middle of this contrast comes Lab and Lib who both attribute a roughly 
equal degree of reality to Britishness and Scottishness. Like C, they see British 
identity and culture as being part of the Scottish reality, and therefore the distinct 
reality of Scottishness (compared to England) is for them less strong than argued by 
S (e.g. Lab arguing that there is “very much a shared culture” between Scotland and 
England). But on the other hand, rather than simply aclcnowledging that there is, 
nonetheless, a distinct Scottish identity, they also speak in the name of this distinct 
identity much more than C does -  especially Lib. They also have in common the fact 
of doubting the reality of an Euiopean identity; or at least, they argue that it is not a 
reality for the British and the Scots. As opposed to C, they do not denounce 
European identity as being artificial and constructed by illegitimate political 
interests, but British identity is definitely more of a reality for the Scots who do not 
feel very European -  although Lab wishes that Scots would feel more European 
(arguably, this might also be implicit in Lib’s argument).
Fuither evidence supporting this general pictuie is also provided by the fact 
that the levels of reality argued by speakers also coiTespond to their statements of 
personal identification (Scottish and then European, but not British for S; more 
British than Scottish for C, equally Scottish and British for Lab -  unspecified for 
Lib).
As we can see, our data show that there is a correlation between the levels of 
identities argued to be real and the political projects of each speaker, although 
perhaps not a perfect one (e.g. C acknowledging the reality of Scottish identity). 
However, this empirical conelation should be interpreted carefully. Indeed, in 
contrast to the other categories of arguments we will go through in the next sections, 
we would not in fact necessarily expect to be a perfect consonance between the 
levels of reality and the political projects of speakers, for our perspective is that 
arguing for (or taking for granted) the reality of a group identity does not necessarily 
entail arguing for separatism or increased autonomy for that group. On the contrary, 
it is crucial to our argument to sti*ess that political projects can be grounded in a 
particular national identity (therefore taking it for real) while not always seeking 
separate statehood, or even opposing it, and we will see some examples of that in the
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rest of our analysis (see section 2.3). Thus we should not be led to conclude that 
there is a necessary correlation between the assumed reality of identities (and the 
level of identification) on the one hand, and political attitudes such as separatism or 
unionism, on the other hand.
Nevertheless, such a correlation is to be empirically expected because the 
reality of a group identity is, if not a sufficient condition for separatism, at least a 
necessary pre-requisite in order to argue for separatism, while, on the other hand, this 
is not the case for unionist positions. Indeed, if this latter stance can be advocated in 
terms of the subgroup identity (i.e. that it is good for the subgroup), it can also be 
sustained purely on the basis of the reality of the superordinate identity -  a fact 
which is reflected in some, if not all, of C’s arguments in favom* of the British Union. 
Furthermore, if reality is only a prerequisite for speaking in the name of an identity, 
arguing the artificiality of an identity is, on the other hand, certainly a sufficient 
condition in order to undermine any project which invokes that identity. This 
comment leads us to our second conclusion.
b) Reality and artificiality as arguments
The second and main point to be drawn from this section, which is also 
another factor explaining the conelation between levels of reality and political 
projects, is that arguments about the reality of groups and identities can be used as 
more than a pre-requisite for other type of arguments. Sometimes, they can also form 
arguments on their own, sustaining or undermining different political projects - 
which is why we analysed them in a separate section. That is, what emerged fi'om our 
analysis is that one does not always necessarily need to argue about the specific 
content or interests of identities and/or the effect of the superordinate group or of the 
relationship with other groups on those interests in order to make a political case. 
Indeed, once a group is established as real, it acquires the status of a collective agent, 
and the rights which are usually associated with such agents can be claimed, or the 
undermining of those rights by an opposed political project can be stressed. If those 
arguments appeal to rights which are widely accepted as valid and legitimate for 
collective agents to claim, things do not necessarily need to be justified further -  
although, of course, the controversy is going to be around which agent is real, as we 
have seen above.
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In such cases, we would indeed expect a perfect consonance between the use 
of these arguments and the political projects of those who use them - although this 
does not mean that they will always be used, and certainly not that they will not also 
be accompanied by other types of arguments. Thus, we found both C (in his 
interview) and S (in her speech at the NFU meeting) using the principle of national 
sovereignty in a way which clearly supports their separatist project, vis-à-vis Europe 
and Britain, respectively. Potentially, any ideological principle regulating the rights 
of collective agents could be used, but in the context of our inquiry, the principle of 
national sovereignty and the democratic right of people to self-determination are 
bound to be strong favourites. However, there are other possibilities, and if S did not 
use that principle in her interview, she did use an aigument relying on a rule of 
group-based equity in order to support her separatist project.
The possible ‘self-sufficiency’ of reality arguments is perhaps even more 
apparent in constructions of aitificiality. The simple fact that a group is based on an 
artificial identity can be quite enough to undermine the legitimacy of any 
government which would pretend to represent that identity, and this, even before the 
negative consequences of that government on the ingroup’s way of life are stressed. 
Moreover, the very notion of artificiality implies not only the illegitimacy and 
inauthenticity of that representation, but also that there is an active attempt to impose 
it against the will of people. Therefore, it implies that people’s right to self- 
determination is undermined. Again, we have seen both C and S using those 
arguments in a way consistent with their project.
One case which is perhaps less clear-cut though, is when separatism is 
undermined on the basis of the reality of the superordinate group identity. We have 
seen C using such an argument whereby it is implied that brealdng-up the real Britain 
is to undermine something which is a part of the reality of Scotland, and this seems 
to be already an ar gument in itself in order to reject separatism. A similar argument, 
though perhaps put less explicitly, can be found in Lab’s discourse when she sti'esses 
that given the family links and that there is “very much a shared culture ” between 
Scotland and England, and because “we're not two separate countries” but “we’re 
an Island nation ”, it would be silly for the Scots to isolate themselves from the LfIC 
through independence. However, it could also be argued that such arguments 
constitute a variant of the arguments which sti'ess the undermining effect of
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separatism on the ingroup’s identity and interests. Whatever the case may be, what 
matters most is that these arguments are also consistent with their pro-Union stance.
The consonance between speakers’ arguments and their projects can be seen 
from Table 2.1 (see below), which sums up all ‘reality’ and ‘artificiality’ arguments. 
In this table, cells where ai'guments - if they are made - would be consonant with 
speakers’ political projects have been shaded; whereas the '+ ’ signs represent the 
arguments that are actually made. That is, the shaded cells are the only ones where 
one should find a ‘+’ sign - although it does not mean that all of them will have one. 
These ‘consonant’ cells are determined on the following basis: it would be consonant 
for supporters of separatism to use the ‘reality’ of the subgroup as well as the 
‘artificiality’ of the superordinate group in order to reject union; whereas it would be 
consonant for supporters of union to use the ‘reality’ of the union in order to reject 
separatism. As for advocates of devolution, they could use the ‘reality’ of the 
superordinate group to reject separatism (like unionists), but they could also use the 
‘reality’ of the subgroup against union (like separatists) - although in this latter case 
the argument should be qualified so as not to support full separation (in practice, 
however, no arguments of the latter sort were used by our speakers). By contrast with 
separatists, advocates of devolution would not be expected to use ‘artificiality’ 
arguments against union (as such argument can hardly be qualified).
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TABLE 2.1: REALITY/ARTIFICIALITY AS ARGUMENTS
C Lab Lib s
Scotland is real 
(used vs. UK)
Britain is artificial 
(used vs. UK)
Britain is real 
(used vs. separatism)
Britain is real 
(used vs. EU) ■ WlEurope is artificial 
(used vs. EU)
Europe is real 
(used vs. separatism) 0# SI
Legend:
□  : Cells where argument would be consonant with political project (vis-à-vis 
Britain)
□  : Cells where argument would be consonant with political project (vis-à-vis 
Europe)
+ : Argument actually made.
c) The ideological context o f reality argument
Moving aside from our concern for presenting a systematic picture of our 
speakers’ arguments, there is another important point which is illustrated by the use 
of arguments based more specifically on nationhood and the principle of national 
sovereignty. In the next section, we will see that, in order to understand the logic and 
consequences of political arguments, we need to consider the specific constructions 
of the contents of identities and of the social context of intergroup relations (e.g. 
power) rather than whether or not they use identity. However, the use of the principle
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of national sovereignty, as a self-sufficient argument, shows that, at a broader level, 
we also need to consider the context of a world of nation states and its ideological 
dimensions, in order to understand some of the ai'guments made, and more generally, 
we would argue, the psychology of separatism and integration.
Indeed, it is because we live in a world in which nationalist ideology is 
available that psychological needs related to identity can be expressed more 
particularly in nationhood; it is thanks to the ideological and practical dominance of 
nationalism that they often do so; and it is thanks to the principle of national 
sovereignty that those needs can further translate into a quest for statehood, rather 
than in any other foim of individual, social or political strategy to which those needs 
could also lead.
To put it otherwise, and using a slightly different vocabulary borrowed from 
the work of Geertz on nationalism: although “the need to exist and to have a 
nawe”(Geertz, 1993, p. 249) might be universal, it is thanks to nationalist ideology 
that it can transform into the wish to be a national subject and into “the desire to 
become a people rather than a population, a recognized and respected somebody in 
the world who counts and is attended to” (p. 237). Furthermore, it is thanks to the 
nationalistic natui*e of politics in our contemporary society that this “desire to be 
recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions 
‘matter’...a search for an identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly 
acJmowledge as having import, a social assertion o f the self as ‘being somebody in 
the world?’ often translate into a quest for a sovereign nation-state. Indeed, in a world 
of nation states, it is these latter which are the political units which matter and are 
acknowledged by others. To quote Geertz once more: “citizenship in a truly modern 
state has more and more become the most broadly negotiable claim to personal 
significance” (p.258).
Moreover, even if the ‘search for identity’ do not always equate with support 
for separatism and might in fact lead to support for integration in a supra-national 
body, Geertz’s comments remains equally useful. Indeed, as we will see, 
membership in supra-national bodies is often argued to be sought after precisely for 
the same reasons, i.e. because they enhance the expression, enactment and assertion 
of one’s national identity and allow one ‘to be somebody in the world’.
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2.2. What are the groups like? Definitions of group identities and interests
Having looked at the way identities are established as real and relevant, it is 
now time to look at what is actually done with those identities. To start with, let us 
consider how specific group definitions and versions of identities can be used to 
sustain political attitudes, in instances where the specific natui'e of this content 
matters and has direct consequences for how the ingroup should relate to others 
and/or to superordinate groups. The first point of this section deals with definition of 
the ingroup, whereas the second will consider definitions of the outgi'oup and/or the 
superordinate group.
2.2.1. Wliat Scots aie like and what Scots want 
a) Establishing the content o f ingroup identity
Arguments using characterisation of the ingioup in order to sustain political 
projects can take two slightly different forms. First of all, one can argue directly 
about what ingroup members want in relation to Britain and Europe, i.e. what then- 
political attitudes actually are. One’s project can then be depicted as being a mere 
expression of the wishes of the majority and the opposed project as going against 
those aspirations (e.g. S’s argument that the most of the Scots want independence, or 
C’s argument that Europe goes against what people want; see 1.2.1 and 1.2.2). 
Alternatively, a similar conclusion can also be reached more indirectly by attributing 
particular traits, values or norms to the ingroup, from which the political attitudes of 
its members are deduced. The advocated project is then presented as in tune with a 
key characteristic of Scottish identity and/or as a natural expression of it. It is what 
the true Scot should support. The opposed project is therefore made, implicitly or 
explicitly, characteristically unscottish.
Let us illustrate this latter kind of argument by using two different examples, 
which both use stereotypical traits for their purpose:
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Extract 14
Lib: I  think that the Scots are very canny, i t’s a good Scot word, they are careful, 
cautious. And we’ve had a constitutional upheaval, and I  do not see any real mood 
among Scotland, in Scotland for a further constitutional upheaval until we have 
digested this and seen whether i t’s to our liking.
Extract 15
S: Scotland has always been far more pro-Europe than the rest o f the UK, I  mean 
that goes back very many centuries ago, we were always a great European nation 
pre-Euro, with a lot o f Unies, especially with the French, the old alliance, you Imow 
Frenchmen fighting in here, and Scotsmen going providing the King’s Guard, you 
know, there’s always been that and great links with the Hanseatic states, the Baltic, 
all that died down in the century because o f the different political triangle that 
came there, but we’ve always been far more international, we’ve always looked to 
Europe.../.../...! think it’s, it’s as much a cultural thing as an economic 
thing.../.../...I t ’s the whole cultural mindset, we’ve always looked out. Scots have 
always been great travellers, we’ve always been innovators, explorers, adventurers, 
we’ve always gone out to the world, come back, there’s always been that great mix. 
England, traditionally, for whatever reason, has always been slightly more into, you 
Imow, this island breed, you know, protect our frontiers and hell mind anyone who 
comes and tries to change this.
In the first extract, which concerns the relationship to Britain, the stereotype 
‘canny’ (shrewd and careful) is used to support the devolution status quo. It argues 
against any immediate change because this is not what the canny Scottish people 
want at the moment. Both separatism as well as a return to an union without the 
present devolution settlement would go against the careful nature of Scots^.
 ^ This is not to say that particular traits have automatic and necessary consequences, i.e. are 
necessarily tied to a particular- position. They might be assumed so in the discourse, but they are 
nevertheless open to interpretation and argument as to their meaning and consequences. For instance. 
Lib also describes the Scots as ‘independent’, but ratlier than being used to argue drat Scots wants 
political independence, as the term would seem to suggest, the trait is in fact used to support
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111 the second extract, by the SNP candidate, Scots are defined as more 
international and outward-looking, in contrast to the inward-looking English, and S 
sustain this characterisation through quoting ‘empirical facts’ (Scotland’s past history 
with Europe, Scots being great travellers and explorers, etc.). Scots are also defined 
as more favourable to Euiope than the English, and this pro-European attitude is an 
expression of these fundamental characteristics of Scottish identity; it is part of their 
cultural mindset of ‘looking-out’. The implication is not only that the majority of 
Scots do support Europe, but also that Scots should support it in order to be in tune 
with their identity and express that cultural and psychological quality. Therefore, the 
implication is also that an anti-European Scot would be at odds with his/her tine 
Scottish identity, and that everything that prevents Scots being part of and having 
exchanges with Europe (i.e. the Union) also prevent Scots from enacting their 
identity and expressing this essential quality (see points 2.3 and 2.4).
h) Dealin2 with counter-evidence: distinction between the essential and the 
contingent
The implication in S’s argument that anti-European feelings would be 
unscottish also leads us to our next point. Indeed, an important aspect of arguments 
over the characterisation of the ingroup is that they often have to deal with empirical 
counter-evidence which could potentially cast doubt on their claims. For instance, 
opinion polls, protests, or the fact that the speaker’s party has not won the majority in 
previous elections could suggest that the majority of ingroup members do not in fact 
support the speaker’s political project and therefore do not accord with the speaker’s 
characterisation of the ingroup. As such a conclusion would undermine their 
argument, it ensues that speakers often addiess explicitly those potential objections.
Most often, they do so by giving up the ‘empirical’ register of mere 
description of the ingroup, and by introducing an important distinction which we 
shall encounter in other contexts. That is, typically, they make a distinction between 
the essence of ingioup identity and what characterises the ingroup only in appearance 
and contmgently (i.e. it does not truly belong to its identity). What is then argued is 
that the majority of Scots, in essence, do support the advocated project, while the
devolution, by arguing tiiat this hue Scottish trait should be understood in a cultural sense rather than 
in a political one.
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empirical counter-evidence can be discarded as mere appearance caused by 
contingent factors, which should not be taken at face value. Those aspects or 
behaviours of the ingroup which might seem to contradict the speaker’s 
characterisation of the ingroup are the result or expression of something contingent 
and unscottish, in conflict with the Scottish essence, i.e. preventing its proper 
expression. One good illustration of this is provided by Lib, who, also arguing in 
favour of Europe, accounted for anti-European feelings in the following way:
Extract 16
Lib: I  think though in Scotland there is resistance to...well, Scotland has been as 
badly affected by the propaganda o f the anti-European newspapers, as any other 
part o f the United Kingdom, although Scotland for obvious reasons has not grown 
into that rather unpleasant English nationalism which has been a feature o f the 
European Union debate south o f the border.
Though Lib acknowledges that there might be some anti-European feelings in 
Scotland, these latter do not belong to the essence of Scottish identity. Rather, it is 
the result of a contingent and external propaganda, and, moreover, not a Scottish but 
a UK-wide propaganda - with the use of this latter word implying that the arguments 
used are inational, distorting reality. Further evidence that it is not in the Scottish 
essence is provided by the fact that Scots have, to a certain extent, resisted this 
propaganda, which takes for granted that this propaganda goes against their tnie, 
original and rational aspirations. In fact, irrational anti-European feelings are 
characteristic of English nationalism, i.e. they are alien to and go against Scottish 
identity.
Thus, the distinction between the true essence of identity and superficial 
appearances, affected by external and contingent influences, proves useful in 
allowing speakers to counter opposing arguments and seemingly contradictory 
evidence. The presence of anti-European feelings amongst Scots could well mean 
that a pro-Eui'opean party would not be prototypical of the ingroup and represent the 
interest of its members. However, by reinterpreting the source of the Scottish anti- 
European feelings, the Liberal Democrat party and their position in favour of Eui ope 
can remain prototypical and able to represent Scottish’s interests. In fact, only a pro-
115
European position is faithful to what would be the true and authentic Scottish 
identity, if it was not deformed by external propaganda of anti-European newspapers.
2.2.2. What the outgroupfsVthe superordinate group are like
Obviously, characterising the superordinate group often goes hand in hand 
with defining its impact on the ingroup, while characterising the outgroup is most 
often bound with characterising its relationship with the ingroup. Accordingly, we 
will analyse m details such aspects and their implications in points 2.3 and 2.4.
However, what should be noted here, in relation to the present category of 
arguments, is that the specific content used in definitions of the outgroup(s) or of the 
superordinate group can also sometimes be important, and have in and of itself 
implications for superordinate group/subgroup relations. This contrasts, for instance, 
with some of the arguments we will see further on, where what matters is not so 
much the content of specific differences but the fact that these latter creates an 
incompatibility of interests between the groups, or where it is argued that it is the 
political context and ‘system’ which creates a negative impact on the ingroup, i.e. 
there would be such a negative impact whatever the identity of the superordinate 
group might be (e.g. because of ingroup powerlessness; see section 2.4).
A short example can be given to illustrate this point. At one point during the 
interview, S defined the English as having imperialist tendencies: “ when I  was there, 
you Imow, there was this whole idea of, you Imow, it’s somehow still the Empire. And 
I, I ’ve heard that said from Americans, whom I  talked to, that they get the impression 
that England has never quite come to grips with the fact that it doesn’t have an 
Empire anymore ”. And, in another passage, where S explained the reasons why 
Scots do not feel British, it was made explicit that these imperialist tendencies had 
implications for the impact of Britain on Scotland:
Extiact 17
S: But it’s the continual hijacldng, say, o f England, waving the Union Jack, at say an 
England football team. That’s England, you Imow, why is...or...there was always this 
perception that fo r Britain, say England. Because that waj what you were talking 
about. I  think it’s one o f the great military leaders in the Napoleonic wars who said.
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you Imow, the great job o f the British Empire is to go abroad and turn the country 
into England.
Thus, it is not only that, by being part of Britain, Scotland is assimilated to an 
alien English identity through the “sheer weight o f numbers” - an argument which is 
also used by S at some point, and which implies that it would happen whatever the 
outgroup or the superordinate group is like. Nor is it only, in terms of the relation 
with England, that this relation is negative simply because of incompatible interests -  
which does not necessarily imply attiibuting a negative content to outgi'oup identity. 
More than that, there is also an active ‘assimilationist’ imperialism at play by the 
English, which does imply directly a negative relationship to others countries - 
including Scotland - and a tendency not only to ignore others’ point of view but also 
to try to impose its own point of view on others. As we said above, however, we will 
examine the implications of this type of argument in more details in the next 
sections.
2.2.3. Summary and conclusions
a) ingroup content accounts
In this section, we have seen that speakers can sustain their political project 
by arguing that it simply represents the wishes of the majority. Furtheiinore, they can 
also argue that people should support their project in order to be in tune with their 
identity. This point shows the importance of taking into account the specific contents 
given to ingroup identity, for, depending on the nature of this content, being in tune 
with one’s identity can mean supporting integration (e.g. being pro-European) as 
well as segregation (see below).
Moreover, counter-evidence to speakers’ arguments can be discarded by 
pointing that what people tmly are and/or what truly people wants, in essence, can be 
different from what they might appear to be and/or to want, on the surface. Such 
apparent counter-evidence does not truly reflect their identity as it is contingent upon 
other factors. Far from undermining their position, the counter-evidence can then 
even be turned into an argument in its own rights. Indeed, it can be used as evidence 
that the ingioup is ‘contaminated’ by unscottish (but contingent) aspects which
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conflict with its true identity. And, as we will see further on (see section 2.3), such 
contingent and undesirable aspects can be argued to be created or enhanced by the 
opposed project, which must therefore be rejected as it prevent the expression of the 
true ingroup essence (while one’s own project should be supported in order to get rid 
of them and to allow the expression of the true identity). For the moment, however, 
what matters is the argumentative flexibility that this distinction between essence and 
appearance allows. The same ‘empirical facts’ (e.g. the level of support for the SNP), 
or the same ingroup traits, can be made sense of quite differently. Such flexibility 
allow for strategic work to be done, as we will now see by reviewing more 
systematically speakers’ arguments.
h) Overview o f speakers ' arguments
Let us now briefly go through the arguments of all speakers about what the 
Scots want in relation to Britain and Europe.
In terms of independence from Britain, the picture is quite straightforward: S 
is the only speaker to argue that most Scots want independence, while all the others 
argue that they oppose it (see 1.2 ) .
In terms of devolution, however, matters are slightly more complex, for the 
arguments are more implicit and indirect, and can also depend on what is understood 
by devolution. Thus, S does not argue directly that Scots either support or oppose 
devolution, but the fact that they support independence implies that they oppose 
being in Britain even with the Scottish Parliament, and thus, in that sense, that they 
oppose devolution. On the other hand, however, it also implies that they support the 
Scottish parliament if its powers are completed in order to reach independence. By 
contrast, C does not say that Scots oppose devolution as such, but he does say that 
Scots would have voted against it if they had understood that it was going to lead to 
independence, which he argues is indeed a real danger. As far as Lib is concerned, 
we have seen in extract 14 how he argues that Scots supports the present devolution 
settlement, and therefore that they would both oppose independence as well as 
coming back to an Union without devolution. Finally, there are no direct arguments 
in Lab’s interviews on that point but her arguments that Scots both oppose 
independence but wish for some degree of autonomy from the British government 
(e.g. to avoid Conservative rule; see 1.2.3) implies that they do support devolution.
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As regards attitudes to Europe, S argues that Scots are fundamentally pro- 
European (see extract 15), whereas C argues that European integration “is not what 
people want” (including the British and the Scots). Lib and Lab’s aigument, 
however, are more ambiguous on that point: they suggest that Scots do not 
necessarily support Europe very much, but they also suggest (explicitly in the case of 
Lab) that this is not a desirable thing.
These ambiguities tend to be clarified, however, when we consider the 
essential/contingent distinction which appears in those arguments. Thus, if Lab and 
Lib do not argue directly that Scots are fundamentally pro-European, they do argue 
that anti-European feelings are contingent upon the British media which distorts the 
facts (see extract 16 for Lib). The implication is that, should this contingency be 
removed (and thus the essence of Scots be expressed), then indeed Scots would be 
pro-Euiopean, or at least more than they presently are. Likewise, S acknowledges 
that there are also some anti-European feelings amongst Scots, but also argues that 
such feelings are contingent -  although in here case it is contingent on the fact that 
Scotland is poorly represented by the UK in Europe. Thus, on this issue, all speakers 
contrast with C for whom opposition to Europe is indeed an expression of the 
essential identity of the British and the Scots.
The reverse applies for attitudes to Britain, where it is S who is in opposition 
to everybody else. For her, it is clear that most Scots do want independence in 
essence, while the desire for independence is made contingent by all others. For C, it 
is contingent on the parliament itself and on the rhetoric of the SNP, which 
unnecessarily serves to “make nationalism stronger” and “fuel the move towards 
independence”. It is also contingent on the dissatisfaction with the economy and with 
incompetent British governments, by which he means Labour governments. Lib and 
Lab agree with C that it is contingent on particulai* British governments, except that 
the British governments towards which Scots are resentful are the ones which were 
led by the Conservatives. Moreover, rather than fostering the desire for 
independence, they both stress that the Scottish Parliament has the opposite effect. 
Thus, Lib stresses that “I t ’s often said that Mrs Thatcher waj the most compelling 
recruiting sergeant for the Scottish National Party.../.../...during the Thatcher 
period, then, there’s no doubt there was a very strong strand o f political thought 
which was.../.../...anti-Whitehall, anti-Westminster. I  hope that home-rule will 
provide a safety valve for that.” Likewise, Lab sti'esses that the resentment towards
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Britain and the ensuing wish for more autonomy ‘came out o f how Scotland fell 
under Conservatism' and that “the Scottish parliament has been a long way to 
resolve that”.
The ‘contingency’ arguments are summarised in Table 2,2 (see below). 
Taking into account this dimension in interpreting our speakers’ arguments on what 
the Scots really want, the (essential) attitudes of these latter can then be summarised 
as shown by Table 2.3 (see below). A few comments are necessary in order to 
interpret these tables -  comments which also apply to the tables which will be used 
in further sections. First of all, speakers’ arguments or accounts have been 
symbolised by using ‘+’ and ‘-‘ signs (the meaning of these depending on the table; 
see legends). The shaded cells are the cells where accounts symbolised by ‘+’ signs 
(if they are made) would be consonant with speakers’ political projects - although 
this does not mean that all of these cells should have ‘+’ accounts. There is however 
a slight difference with Table 2.1 (see 2.1.5): in order to support the hypothesis of 
perfect consonance, the crucial point here is not so much that there cannot be ‘+’ 
accounts in other cells (although this is unlikely), but that there cannot be 
accounts in the shaded cells.
Secondly, for reasons of simplicity, the position of ‘undevolved’ union in 
Europe (i.e. federal state) has been omitted in the tables, as all speakers agree in 
rejecting that option (accordingly, the unionist position which is represented in those 
tables has to be understood as a qualified, devolved union). It also has to be noted 
that the position of ‘separatism’ regarding the EU argued by C does not imply a total 
withdiawal of the EU, but for more power to be given to the nation states (basically, 
that the EU should be limited to a commercial body).
In sum, we can see from Table 2.3 that there is a remarkable consistency 
between all speakers, as they all argue that Scots’ essentially support their project, 
both vis-à-vis Britain and Europe. Furthermore, although not all of the arguments 
were stated explicitly, what matters most is that, all the arguments used, be they 
explicit or implicit, are consonant with the political projects of each speaker^.
 ^ Furthermore, some of the arguments categorised as implicit were only so insofar as they were 
phrased negatively rather than positively (e.g. what Scots do not want rather than what Scots want), or 
vice-versa.
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TABLE 2.2; CONTINGENT ATTITUDES TO THE UK AND THE EU
C Lab Lib S
Wish for 
independence
.4. -
Resistance to Europe 4"
legend:
□  : Expected to be argued as contingent (vis-à-vis Britain) 
[3 : Expected to be argued as contingent (vis-à-vis Europe) 
+ : contingent 
-: not contingent
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TABLE 2.3: ESSENTIAL ATTITUDES TO THE UK AND THE EU
Lab Lib
+ -  •Scots’ attitude to independence
Scots’ attitude to 
devolution in Britain
Scots’ attitude to Union 
(without devolution)
Scots’ attitude to 
‘separatism’ from EU
Scots’ attitude to EU
legend:
E3 : Scots expected to be in favour of project (vis-à-vis Britain)
[7] : Scots expected to be in favour of Europe (vis-à-vis Europe)
+ : Scots support the project 
-: Scots oppose the project 
+/-: Ambivalence
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments (e.g. converse of argument; see 
footnote 3)
* In relation to Europe C talks about what British people want but in a way which 
includes the Scots.
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2.3. Impact of political prolects/arrangements on ingroup identity
2.3.1. Arguing separation or more autonomy
a) The repression and dilution o f ingroup identity
We have seen in point 2.2.2 how definitions of the superordinate group can 
determine the way in which its impact on the ingroup is conceived, so let us start our 
analysis of impact arguments by looking at a separatist argument which involves 
another example of how such definitions can be used.
This is an argument made by C against Europe, and indeed, despite his views 
on the non-existence of an Euiopean identity (see section 2.1) and thus the absence 
of any definition of it, C presents a strong definition of Europe understood as the 
E.U, institutions and its leaders. It is depicted as basically lead by “a lot o f un-elected 
bureaucrats” who are “sitting down with what they think is a wonderfully academic 
perfect rule-book” which “doesn’t suit all circumstances. ”, and who have the 
tendency to be prescriptive and to put everything in binding treaties. As a result, the 
E.U is presented as being, by its very nature, insensitive to the particular cultures and 
way of life of each people:
Extract 18
C: What Europe is doing, is saying, right, you have a social [speaker slams the table] 
chapter signed there, from now on everybody has got to be, ...cannot work more than 
40 hours. Now, you Imow, what i f  we, and so what, i f  we want to work more than 40 
hours, why should somebody else tell us we can’t. I f  i t’s a good rule, we’ll do it 
ourselves. You hiow, why, why tell us not to. And it does get in big mistakes, as we 
are told you can’t call your cheese, cheese, and all these land o f thing, and our 
chocolate is not allowed to be called chocolate, because it’s got a different amount o f 
cacao in it than somebody else. What, you Imow, mind your own business, it’s our 
chocolate, we eat it the way we like it. We ’re not gonna, you Imow, gonna go out and 
tell Germany what sauerJmaut is or isn’t, you know, it’s...Imean the whole beauty o f 
having different nations is so you can have you separate cultures and do what, things
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the way.,, but i t’s the bureaucrats that sort of, be trying to harmonise everything, I  
don’t want to be harmonised. I  want to be free.
In this example, C makes quite clear that the EU threatens several aspects the 
British way of life, such as its working practices or the labelling of chocolate and 
cheese. Those are in danger of disappearing (or have already been lost) under the rule 
of the EU which is trying to impose a different, harmonised, way of life.
However, what also appears in this extract is that the problem is not just that 
the EU does not respect these specific aspects of the British way of life because on 
these particular aspects other European countries would have a different view. 
Rather, it goes further than that. Indeed, when C was asked if what he said in the 
above quote meant that the problem was that Euiope was more socialist than Britain, 
he added:
Extract 19
C: Yes I  mean, yeah, we can be, we can be out o f step politically at anytime. Em...we 
went for privatisation, we were alone when we stopped going down for privatisation. 
Now, it’s become all the range across, across Europe, and everybody is privatising, 
etc, it’s become accepted. And you wouldn’t have that land o f thing happening i f  
you’ve got...everything, you Imow, you happen to have, predominantly, say socialists 
in when a treaty is written, and it binds you on that socialist track. I f  you have a 
predominantly Conservative people when the treaty is written, then that binds you on 
that track, you Imow, that’s that binding business which is absolutely wrong. We’ve 
got to...the British parliament is sovereign, and can change anvthins: that the 
previous one has done, em...but the system to develop, developing in Europe is that, 
you Imow, once you’ve written something down, that’s it, you can’t change it ever, 
and that’s a lot o f rubbish. Because, you’ve become so inflexible, that eventually 
people will buck the system.
Though it might not be innocent, from a Tory point of view, that one of the 
primaiy examples of inappropriate policy from Europe concerns the social chapter, 
this latter is nevertheless not primarily attacked for its specific political content as
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such, but more basically for being prescriptive. The fundamental issue is that the 
E.U., by its binding nature, fails to respect any differences and thus prevents the 
ingroup from expressing its identity in its way of life, whatever the content of that 
identity might be.
This is indeed a more radical critic of Europe than one which would only 
focus on specific differences with Europe (although, for C, there are such 
differences, which only makes matters worse), for the attacks on the British way of 
life are therefore not necessarily contingent on the content of those specific 
differences - which could always change if, for instance, the political taste of the day 
in Europe or in Britain were to change. Rather, because of its tendency to harmonise 
everything and its denial of national sovereignty, which are essential traits of the 
E.U., this latter cannot but threaten national identities and their specificity. It makes 
the undermining of Britain and its identity an inevitable outcome of European 
integi'ation.
Thus, the fundamental picture we see here is one where British identity 
cannot follow its own path and cannot be fully expressed within the superordinate 
group, whatever it wishes to express. The consequence of this repression is that this 
identity and the ingroup’s way of life are in danger of being lost altogether in the 
long teim.
This is why the issues of power and sovereignty are crucial. Indeed, by far the 
most salient complaint towards Europe in C’s interview is the loss of national 
sovereignty and of (legitimate) power that it entails. We will come back to issues of 
power in point 2.4, but what should retain our attention here is that power is 
important, not just because it constitutes a good in itself, but because it guarantees 
the possibility for the ingroup to follow its interest and express its identity in 
practice, i.e. in its way of life. As C argues: “...m this election there are lots o f other 
things very important, like, you know, what should be done for the Health Service, 
what should be done for education, and everything else. But, the point is, Fd like first 
to remain in a position where we can actually make those decisions. And that, that’s 
why the sovereignty issue is the crucial.” Powerlessness (and the repression of 
identity it leads to) means not only that aspects of ingroup identity are being eroded 
right now, but, perhaps more importantly, that any aspect of this identity and of the 
ingroup’s way of life is in danger of being lost in the future
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b) enhancing separatism
Just as one can ai*gue that union will undermine ingroup identity, so one can 
make the case that separatism (or limited autonomy for advocates of devolution) 
would enhance ingroup identity. More specifically, the corollaiy of constructions of 
identity repression is that separatism is the political project which would allow the 
expression of ingroup identity and its essence. That it, it is not just that such a project 
would enhance particular aspect(s) of this identity, but, more fundamentally, that it 
will enhance the veiy ability of expressing any of its aspects. Hence it will allow the 
fulfilment of the group’s interest, whatever it might be.
This can be seen, for instance, in the main slogan of the SNP, which, at the 
time this chapter was written, was “RELEASE OUR POTENTIAL”. Likewise, in the 
NFU meeting, S argued that:
Extract 20
S: Independence can release the energy, potential and the opportunities needed to 
transform our country and develop a vibrant, exciting future for our children. We 
have a vision o f Scotland that is just, caring, an enterprising nation where 
individuals are able to get on regardless o f where they have come from.
What this says is that Scots clearly have the resources to do well, a positive 
potential which only need to be released and expressed in practice, i.e. in the actual 
way of life of the nation. Independence is the political project which would allow this 
potential to be expressed in order to build a better Scotland, in tune with the Scottish 
essence (i.e. outward-looking and enterprising).
2.3.2. Arguing unionism: The enhancement of ingroup identitv
As we argued earlier, however, separatism does not have the exclusivity in 
pretending to defend the Scottish interest. It is quite possible to speak for Scottish 
identity while seeking other or even opposed aims to statehood. Doing so involves 
using the same constructions of identity undermining or enhancement -  only with a 
mirror representation of what is undermining and what is enhancing. The point can
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be illustrated more briefly, with a quote by Lab which argues both for the enhancing 
effect of union and the undermining effect of separatism:
Extract 21
Lab: ...I’d like to think that being part o f Europe also gives you a different outlook 
on life, that you feel part o f a wider society than just Scotland. Which is maybe what 
I  think England manages to do as well...that’s again being a wee bit concern about 
the parliament leading towards a parochial, unchanged Scotland...because there is 
so much focus on the parliament, there isn’t a recognition o f what the UK 
government does, and what land o f policies introduced by UK government, and how 
that benefits several interests across the UK and become very inward looldng. That 
kind o f concerns me, a wee bit.
Thus, one of the benefits of both the union with England and within Europe is 
to give Scottish people 'a  different outlook on life\ It might be that it enhances the 
positive potential of the Scots, expressing and reinforcing their outward-looldng 
tendency; or else, to put it the other way round, it might be that it prevents the 
development of a negative tendency towards parochialism, which Scots might also 
have (see 2.3.3). The extract is not clear on this point (and it might be both), but what 
is clear is that it is a psychological improvement in terms of what people are.
The implication of that argument is that, by contrast with S’s argument in 
relation to Britain (see extract 20), it is separatism which would in fact have a 
negative impact on Scottish identity, by making Scots more inward-looking and 
parochial. The explicit target in this extract is the Scottish parliament but we have 
already suggested how the occasional attacks of Lab against the parliament are 
bound up with her argument that the Scottish Parliament should be dissociated from 
identity needs and thus from a move towards independence (see section 2.1.4). 
Thereby, the implicit target is separatism rather than the parliament itself. This is 
witnessed by the fact that one of the dangers with the Parliament is precisely that the 
merits of the UK might tend to be forgotten, i.e. to think that Scotland could do as 
well, if not better, on its own. Moreover, the linlc between inward-looking and 
backward-looking (rather than forward-looking) tendencies on the one hand and 
separatism on the other is made explicit in another extract:
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Extract 22
Lab; I  don’t agree with the debate that’s going on at the moment that is pushing for  
extra powers for the parliament at the moment, I  think it’s too soon. I  think we have a 
valuable relationship with the UK, and I  do think Scotland benefits from being part 
o f the UK, as well as what I  think England. I  think the whole, because we ’re an 
Island nation, I  think it would he silly to start, there’s lots, I  mean there’s economical 
benefits, but there is also social benefits.../.../...I  mean, I  don’t think there is a need 
for us to progress towards independence, I  think it’s quite an old-fashioned concept, 
really.../.../ ...it’s quite isolationist.../.../... When other countries are moving towards 
devolution, regional assemblies, it’s...you know working in partnership with different 
layers o f government, rather than cutting ourselves offfrom a layer o f government, I  
can’t really see the benefits o f that.
Taking both extracts 21 and 22 together, what Lab argues is then that 
separatism is both an expression of isolationist and inward-looking tendencies and in 
danger of reinforcing this tendency. The parliament itself might play this role, if it 
deviates from its original purpose and is used to push towards independence. 
However, Lab also argues that devolution is in fact a good thing when it is a matter 
of ^'worldng in partnership with different layers o f government”^  i.e. when it is 
devolution in the context of the Union.
Thus, Britain provides economic and social benefits and enhances Scottish 
identity by making people more outward-looking. However, as we have seen with S 
when she argued for the enhancing effect of separatism, what is at stake in 
enhancement arguments is often not just the enhancement of particular qualities, but 
the idea that the general ability of the group to express any aspect of its identity and 
to act on its terms will be enhanced. This appears to some extent in Lab’s argument 
insofar as it could be said that, rather than just being a good in itself, being outward- 
looking is the condition for enjoying the benefits of the UK and Eui'ope, while being 
isolationist is to cut oneself off from any potential benefit. However, in order to 
support this point, let us add another extract, where S argues in favour of Europe, and 
where this is made more explicit:
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Extract 23
S: I  think that is the biggest difference that it would make as an independent member. 
Confidence, self-belief, being able to be part o f it. At the moment, I  suppose it's like 
being, being the perpetual, perpetually on the substitute bench. You Icnow you ’re a 
good player, and you had plenty o f practice with your mates, but you never get the 
opportunity to actually go out there and show what you can do. Being an 
independent member o f the European Union would give us a chance to get up off the 
substitute bench, and show what we can do.
Of course, rather than being just about Europe, this extract is also a plea for 
independence. It refers to the fact that, for S, another undermining effect of Britain is 
precisely that it has cut down the historical, cultural and economical ties with 
Eui'ope, and that, at present, Scotland has no voice in Europe because the UK cannot 
speak for Scotland and can only misrepresent its interests (see point 2.1 and 2.2).
But the important point in relation to our present argument is the idea that 
being in Europe (as an independent member) will give self-confidence to Scotland. 
The metaphor of the substitute player on the bench implies that, at present, the 
qualities of the Scot (who is indeed a ‘good player’ and deserves to be on the field) 
are repressed and cannot be expressed. Being independent, but also being in Europe, 
is what would allow the ability and confidence to express these undeniable qualities.
In the same spirit, perhaps the main point of the argument is not even that 
traits such as confidence and self-belief can be enhanced by being in Europe. Indeed, 
the specific meaning of these teims is also important to consider. Self-confidence 
implies having the sti'ength and the means of asserting oneself, one’s identity and 
one’s aspirations. Therefore the use of these characteristics implies that 
independence is not only a question of restoring these qualities alone and for their 
own sake, but that doing so will, more generally and more fundamentally, allow 
Scotland to restore, assert, and control other aspects of its identity.
In fact, it is not guaranteed that the E.U. is a political project which will 
always serve the Scottish interest, for, as S also stresses, “Tow ’re never gonna agree 
on everything, I  think it’s quite unrealistic, that’s why I  don’t think a federal Europe 
will ever happen”. However, being part of it, and having an independent voice in it, 
will allow Scots to able to directly input” and “to say, yes that’s good, no that’s
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not so good, this is why we think it’s not so good, this is what would be better for us.” 
In other words, being part and having a voice in Eniope is a condition for being an 
agent which can express its interests, and thereby for being able to both enjoy the 
benefits of the positive impact of Europe as well as to protect its identity against any 
of its possible negative consequence.
b) Enhanced agency
In both this last SNP extract as well as in the Labour exhacts above, one 
aspect which is also implied is that one advantage of being part of a superordinate 
group is not only that it allows the ingroup to express its identity in the running of its 
internal affairs, but also tliat it allows a better expression of this identity on a larger 
scene by giving the ingroup increased power and voice in the international arena. 
That is, it allows this identity to be expressed in front of others and its import to be 
aclcnowledged by them.
This point can be shown more clearly by using another example from C’s 
inteiwiew. Although C argues that independence simply undermines that part of 
Scottish reality which is Britishness (see point 2.1.2), he also provides examples 
where the enhancing effect of the Union is sustained by more direct and concrete 
advantages. Talking about the prospect of Scottish independence, C stated:
Extract 24
C: ...I don’t think it would be to Scotland’s advantage, to do that, because we get 
more by being part o f Britain, out o f the whole global scene, and we can contribute 
more to overseas as a Union.../.../...we have a bigger voice in that...as a nation­
state Britain, you know, is one o f the second great level world powers.../.../... we do 
have a seat on the security council, we are, you know top players and have a large 
history o f that, and I  think by and large the contributions that Britain has made in 
that respect is good, and it slurs the very good reputation, people want to come here 
exactly for that reason, a model o f democracy, etc. And we gain from being able to 
lead the world, and Scotland wouldn ’t be able to play that same, same role. So i f  you 
want to be a little bit more inward looldng, and, you Icnow, go ahead, but I  think it’s
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a dream to think that w e’d maintain the same standards o f living for very long, i f  we 
didn ’t had that land o f influence,
Scotland got more power abroad by being part of the Union, but there is more 
than just the gain of power in itself, for this power is what allows Scotland, through 
its membership in Britain, to express some of her essential values in the world. The 
only example that is provided is ‘democracy’, which is presented as a universal 
value, but one assumed to be British (in fact prototypically British) and Scottish as 
well. Moreover, this is only used as an example in order to suggest that what is more 
fundamentally at stake is simply the capacity to express any value.
The implication is also that breaking up the Union, far from allowing 
Scotland’s self-expression of its identity, will in actual fact prevent Scotland from 
expressing (through Britain) those values which are also hers within the world. In 
direct opposition to S’s argument, but in agreement with Lab on this point, it will 
make Scotland more inward-looking.
Thus, the key role of power appears again, albeit in a slightly different way 
than before. It might not be surprising, after all, that in a world of nations, one of the 
main attraction of joining with others within a supra-national body is the greater 
power such a group provides on the international scene. But what the extract also 
shows, once again, is how power is not just merely sought after as a good in itself, 
but is a crucial locus of argument at least in part because of its link with identity 
issues. Indeed, one of the main attractions of such power comes from the fact that it 
is argued to enliance the capacity to express ingroup identity and to follow the 
interests of that identity.
Moreover, adding this qualification also helps to explain why there might be 
resistance to supra-national bodies, despite the promise of greater power. For, rather 
obviously, whether the objectively stronger power of the supra-national body is seen 
as actually enhancing this capacity will depend upon the construed ability of the 
ingroup to voice its identity within the supra-national body, and thus to see the supra­
national body as representing the ingroup and its interests (i.e. to see this power as 
our power). We will deal with this aspect more in detail in point 2.4.
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c) denial o f undermining-
The other side of these pro-Union or anti-independence arguments is to deny 
the fact that Scotland and Scottish identity has been diluted in the UK, and we will 
use C again in order to illustrate that point. In fact, two slightly different ways in 
which he denies undermining can be distinguished here. First of all, the implication 
of some of the arguments we have seen above about the commonalties and linlcs 
between Scotland and England, and the existence of a strong British identity, is that, 
in such a context, the question of identity dilution and the possible imposition of an 
alien culture or way of life does not pose itself. Britain is an inti’insic part of Scottish 
society and it is on the contiary independence which is going to dilute Scottish 
identity because it is going to break linlcs which are important for Scots and Scottish 
identity. It is also going to make people more inward-looking.
However, when Scottish specificity is acknowledged, as C also sometimes 
does, then there is a need to develop arguments aimed at explicitly denying a loss of 
this identity. Thus C states that ^''Scotland hasn’t lost its identity ” in the Union, and 
argue that “if doesn ’t mean that, because we are united with England, that, you know 
there is anything wrong in being patriotic as a Scot, the Scots have their own Rugby 
teams and Football team so you don‘t lose your national identity in the process. ”
2.3.3. The enliancement or repression of negative traits
There are still two important points to make in relation to 
undermining/enhancement arguments. First of all, our starting hypothesis, which we 
have illustiated in this section, was that opposition to political projects or 
arrangements should be linked to the idea that this project leads to a repression and to 
the potential loss of valued and positive aspects of ingroup identity. However, it 
should be noted that such projects can also be argued to create or enhance negative 
aspects of ingroup identity. Likewise, if a proposed project can be argued to enhance 
positive aspects, it can also be argued to repress negative ones.
As regards the creation of negative aspects by an opposed project, this might 
be what is implied in Lab’s argument, when she suggests that a separatist outlook on 
the parliament is in danger to make people more inward-looking and parochial. 
However, such a construction appears with more clarity in one of Lib’s argument in
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support of devolution, when he stresses that the Scots "''have often had a sense o f  
inferiority because they were dominated by a much larger English population in 
what is a Union, not a federation.../.,./...But I  hope that home rule will have an 
effect, will make Scotland more self-confident, more self-possessed, less concerned 
about its relationship with England. ”
Of course, what this says is that, rather than being an endemic, inherent and 
essential feature of Scottish identity, the negative trait, he. the ‘sense of inferiority’, 
was created by the domination of the English in the Union. It was the contingent 
result of a specific intergroup context marked by a difference in power, in a political 
context which was not even one of federation - which would have allowed for a 
certain degree of Scottish autonomy. In other words, it is contingent upon the 
opposed political arrangement (an Union without parliament). Thus, the implication 
is that changing the power context would allow one to ‘cure’ or get rid of this 
‘complex of inferiority’, i.e. to change Scottish identity for the better and to allow the 
full expression of its positive aspects. This last point is made by the use of terms such 
‘self-confident’ and ‘self-possessed’ which has already been commented upon, and 
thus the point does not need to be repeated here.
However, arguments speaking in the name of the ingroup interest can also 
make use of negative ti aits which are not described as contingent, but as being in the 
essence of ingroup identity. What is then argued is that the opposed political project, 
if it does not create such negative traits, has this time the effect of contributing to 
enhancing them and to encouraging their expression, whereas the proposed project is 
argued to repress this negativity. In order to illustrate this point, we need to anticipate 
arguments we shall expand on in section 2.4, by using an extract by Lib which 
mainly describes the relationship between England and Scotland:
Exti'act 25
Lib: I  think the relations, the relationship is an evolving one. I  think during, during 
the time o f Mrs Thatcher the relationship between Scotland and England was 
abrasive, antagonistic. It's often said that Mrs Thatcher was the most compelling 
recruiting sergeant for the Scottish National Party, because she was three things: she 
was bossy, dictatorial, she was English, and she was a woman, and...to so...to be a 
dictatorial English woman was something the Scots find rather difficult to cope with.
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The Scots are chauvinist, still I  think to a very substantial extent, they don’t like 
being told what to do, and they particularly don’t like being told what to do by a 
partner in Great Britain o f whom they have some apprehension. So during the 
Thatcher period, then, there’s no doubt there was a very strong strand o f political 
thought which was, i f  not anti-English, at least anti the existing... anti-White hall, 
anti-Westminster. I  hope that home rule will provide a safety valve for that.
What is interesting to note is that negative traits (here chauvinism) can be 
used to defend a position in favour of more autonomy. Indeed, such data seems to 
runs against the idea that this type of claim (and, more generally, speaking in the 
name of ingroup identity) should necessarily be linked with a pervasive ingroup 
favouritism. If, for instance, such a definition of the ingroup had been measured by 
or was likened to an answer on a trait scale (i.e. if it had been taken out of its 
argumentative context), it could well be taken as evidence of ingi’oup denigration. 
Moreover, if abrasive relations with England and the wish for separatism are not in 
the essence of Scots, but contingent upon Thatcher’s rule (see also section 2.2 and 
2.4), chauvinism is indeed described as being in the essence of Scottish people. Even 
worse than this. Lib seems to imply that Scots are somewhat prejudiced against 
women (or at least English authoritarian ones!). Thus the use of negative traits is not 
limited to contingent traits, and it cannot be argued that a ‘positivity bias’ is 
nevertheless maintained at the essential level.
However, if this definition is taken in the context of the broader construction 
developed by Lib, we can easily see how it makes sense. That is, the negativity of 
this definition should be understood in relation to how the proposed political project 
is assumed to impact on this tiait. The use of negative and essential stereotypes to 
support autonomy (here, a moderate one) is possible because the proposed political 
project claims to be able to bring some positive change in this identity, to eradicate 
the negative trait, or at least to repress its expression and their undesirable 
consequences. If devolution is hoped to provide a safety valve against any potential 
future English dictatorial oppression, it is equally hoped to play the same role for the 
rather enduring tendency of Scots towards chauvinism. In other words, what matters 
in such a definition is not so much its description of the present state, but its place in 
a picture of how things should be.
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The second important point to note concerns the differences in arguments 
between advocates of full separatism and advocates of devolution. Of coui’se, one 
obvious difference between them is that these latter can argue that there are both 
negative and positive effects of being part of the Union and also that they stress the 
imdennining impact of separatism. But there is also a difference in the way they 
construct the negative effects of the Union, when they argue in that direction. That is, 
what they argue is that the negative impact on Scottish identity is in fact contingent 
on some other factor, which can be confounded with the Union, rather than being due 
to the Union as such (i.e. a necessary consequence of being in the Union). Thus, in 
Lib’s extracts, both the Scots ‘sense of inferiority’ and the expression of their 
chauvinism are not to be blamed on the union as such, but on a contingent political 
context (the domination of the English and the rule of the Conservatives), which can 
then be both solved by devolution, rather than making independence necessary.
2.3.4. Summarv and conclusions
a) Impact accounts
In this section, our main purpose has been to show that political projects 
concerning union or sepaiation are argued over by constructing the impact of these 
projects on the national self, i.e. whether it undermines or enhances this self and its 
interests. More specifically, however, as people are not merely concerned with 
possessing a positive and distinct identity ‘cognitively’, but are also concerned by 
having the means to express and enact this identity in practice (see Chapter 1), we 
have seen that arguments of identity undermining tends to focus on the repression of 
this expression by the opposed political project, whereas arguments of identity 
enliancement tend to stress the realisation and expression of ingroup identity by the 
proposed project.
Indeed, what our speakers aigue is not so much that the opposed political 
project undermines any particular ingroup interest or aspect of its identity, but, more 
fundamentally, that it undermines its very ability to pursue any of its interests and to 
act on the terms of its identity and values; or, in other words, its capacity to express 
its self in practice. This also raises the threat of loss of identity; however, it is not so 
much the actual loss of any particular aspect which is the most threatening, but the
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fact that the repression of ingroup identity entails a process whereby every aspect of 
ingroup identity could potentially be lost in the long term. Likewise, an enhancing 
political project (whether it is a separatist or unionist one) does not so much relate to 
any particular ingroup aspect or interest as to the general capacity to realise and 
express any ingroup norms and values in practice.
Furthermore, oui' analysis has also lead us to bring a slight nuance to our 
original argument. Indeed, although we have argued that identity 
undermining/enhancement could be used to defend quite different political projects, 
we have also implied that opposed political projects or arrangements will always be 
argued to lead to an undermining of identity and the advocated one to an 
enliancement of this identity. However, we have seen that speakers can also argue for 
a project that entails a repression of ingroup identity or oppose a project which 
facilitates the expression of that identity. Of course, the trick is that it simply depends 
on the valence of the content attributed to that identity, i.e. speakers will argue for a 
project that leads to loss or repression of negative aspects, and/or oppose one which 
enhances them. But what it shows is precisely that this content must be taken into 
account, and also that it ought to be put within its argumentative context in order to 
understand its consequences. Thus, for instance, while it might not be empirically the 
most common case, ‘ingroup derogation’ can be used to defend autonomy.
This can also be seen as reinforcing oui* point concerning the strategic nature 
of identity constructions. Indeed, we can that see the strategic variability of identity 
constructions is in fact not limited to arguments for different projects using 
constructions of the same identity process with a different target in mind, i.e. 
applying undermining to the opposed political anangement project and enhancement 
to the supported one. The same project can be sustained by the fact that it enhances 
positive aspects or undermines negative ones, allowing for ‘extra’ flexibility in 
arguments (e.g. negative aspects can be acknowledged and even capitalised upon in 
order to argue for autonomy).
b) Overview o f speakers ’ areruments
Let us now provide an overview of the arguments of all spealcers concerning 
the impact of Britain and Europe on Scotland.
136
In relation to Britain, we have seen how C, in line with his unionist project, 
argues that the UK has an enhancing impact on Scotland (see exh'act 24) and also 
denies explicitly that it has undermined Scottish identity and prevent the expression 
of Scottish patriotism (see section 2.3.2). By contrast, the separatist S stresses that 
Britain has been damaging to the Scottish economy (e.g. on manufacturing, on the 
steel and coal industiy, etc.) and that as a result it has made the Scots more inward- 
looking, corrupting or repressing their "basic nature’ which is to be giegarious and 
outward-looldng (“we’ve been forced, perhaps, over the last years, to look inwards, 
again, because o f the problems that have started to face us”, referring to these 
problems created by the Union). Although she does not argue that the specific 
Scottish culture and way of life has been lost under the Union, she does stress that it 
is not represented at the UK-level and thus cannot be expressed properly. She argues 
that ""the only way to cure these ills, is to get control about our destiny again ” and 
that independence would allow a release of the repressed potential of the Scots. She 
also turns the argument the other way round and denies that the Union has had an 
enhancing effect on positive aspects of Scotland (e.g. on the ship building industiy in 
Scotland and on the Scottish Enlightenment).
As for the advocates of devolution, Lib and Lab, they underline that the UK 
can have both positive and negative effects on Scotland, but while the positive side 
can be unconditional, they both always argue, as we have seen above, that the 
negative is contingent upon specific political circumstances rather than being due to 
the UK as such. Under Thatcherism and the Conservatives, and without a Scottish 
Parliament (one of whose effect will precisely be to protect Scotland from 
Conservative mle), the UK has indeed had some negative impact on Scottishness, 
either by undermining positive aspects (e.g. self-confidence) or by enhancing 
negative ones (e.g. chauvinism). However, the UK also brings many good thing (e.g. 
as we have seen, for Lab, it provides economical and social benefits and makes Scots 
more outward-looldng) and it is the role of devolution to ensure that it is possible to 
enjoy the essentially positive side of the UK while avoiding its contingent negative 
ones.
Lab also argues directly that independence will make Scottish people more 
inward-looking. This could be interpreted either as stating that independence 
undermines the expression of a positive aspect of identity (outward-looldng 
tendencies) or as enhancing a negative aspect of identity (inward-looking) -  what is
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in the essence of the Scots on that point is not detailed (C also links separatism with 
being inward looking, but in his case it is not clear whether separatism is an 
expression of that aspect or whether it will enhance it). As for Lib, he does not 
explicitly point to the dangers of independence, but of course it is implicit that 
independence will have a negative effect insofar as it would withdraw the benefits of 
being in the UK.
Both C and Lab further argue that even devolution and the Scottish 
Parliament can have negative effects. However, the difference between the two is 
that for Lab this is conditional, i.e. i f  it is seen as leading to independence, so that 
what it means is that it is not devolution as such which is undermining but 
separatism; whereas for C, as devolution is already a separatist move which is very 
likely to take the road of independence anyway, there is little distinction between the 
two.
In relation to Europe, it is, as we have seen, C who stresses the undermining 
impact of the EU on the British/Scottish way of life. By contrast, all others 
candidates argue that Europe can have a positive impact on Scotland, although their 
arguments do not always come unqualified.
S stresses how the fact that the UK has severed the ties between Scotland and 
Europe prevents the Scots from expressing their outward-looking and pro-European 
nature. She argues that Europe can have both negative and positive effects, but the 
negative mostly arise out of the misrepresentation of Scotland by the UK in Europe, 
so in fact this argument defends Europe by denying that Europe as such is essentially 
undennining. Like Lib and Lab’s arguments concerning devolution in Britain, it is 
the role of independence to ensuie that the positive can be enjoyed and the 
potentially negative resisted.
Lab equally stresses the benefits from Europe, which, amongst other things, 
contribute to make Scots more outward-looking (as does the union with England). As 
mentioned in the summary of her argument (see 1.2.3), she denies that Europe has 
diluted any important aspect of the British/Scottish way of life, by arguing that the 
aspects which are claimed to be diluted are trivial (e.g. metric system). But, although 
she explicitly denies that Europe has had any negative impact, she recognises that 
there are several aspects of Europe which need reforms. However, the best way to 
deal with that as well as enjoying the potential benefits of Europe is to have a British 
government which is open to dialogue with Europe, unlike the Conservatives. Thus,
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like S, the beneficial impact of Europe on Scotland is contingent, but for her it is 
contingent on which particular political pai1y runs the UK, not of being part of the 
UK as such.
As for Lib, he argues that Europe ""most definitely” benefits Scotland, but his 
argument seems to suggests that he sees this impact purely in economical terms. 
Indeed, he denies that Europe has had any negative or positive impact on the cultural 
side of life in Scotland.
Speakers’ arguments are summarised in Table 2.4 for the impact of political 
projects/arrangements relating to the UK and in Table 2.5 for the impact of political 
projects/arrangements relating to the EU. Following the above discussion, the impact 
of being part of the UK and the EU can be divided into ‘contingent’ (i.e. impact not 
due to UK/EU as such) and ‘essential’ impacts, as this distinction is necessary in 
order to interpret some of the arguments (in particular those made by advocates of 
devolution). As before, we have omitted arguments relating to Europe as a federal 
state (as all speakers agree on tliis point), and therefore the impact of the EU refers to 
a ‘devolved’ EU (see 2.2). What comes out quite clearly from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 is 
that, as with previous level of arguments, all speakers’ accoimt are consonant with 
their political project.
TABLE 2.4; IMPACT OF UK ON SCOTLAND
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C Lab Lib s
Contingent impact of the UK - -
Essential impact of the UK -
Impact of devolution - + i /-
Impact of separatism - -
legend
□  : Impact expected to be argued positive 
+ : Enhance positive aspects (or undermine negative aspects). 
- : Undermine positive aspects (or enhance negative aspects). 
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments
TABLE 2.5: IMPACT OF EUROPE ON SCOTLAND
C Lab Lib S
Contingent impact of the EU +/- -
Essential Impact of the EU -
Impact of ‘separatism’ - - -
legend
E3 : Impact expected to be argued positive 
+ : Enhance positive aspects (or undermine negative aspects).
- : Undermine positive aspects (or enhance negative aspects).
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments. In the case of Lib, it indicates 
that his argument is made purely at the economic level.
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2.4. Group relationships under different political arrangements
The arguments which belong to our fourth and final category are quite close 
to the arguments which we have just seen in the preceding section, as they also dwell 
upon the consequences of membership in Britain and in Europe for the Scots. 
However, the difference is that they do so by relying on a more articulated picture of 
the relationships with outgroups. That is, ingroup and outgroup identities and 
interests are made more specific, and argued to be either convergent or divergent. 
Combined with constructions of the power relationship between the groups, this 
deteimines whether they can successfully been brought together under the same 
political arrangement.
2.4.1. Arguing separatism: incompatibilitv and powerlessness
Let us start by illustrating how separatist arguments rely on constructions of 
incompatibility and powerlessness in order to create a picture of undermining of the 
national self. In fact, we could begin by referring back to an extract by oui* SNP 
candidate already used in section 2.2 (extiact 15). In that extract, we could see S 
establishing a difference between an inward-looldng England and an outward- 
looking Scotland. If this was used in order to explain the more pro-European 
attitudes of the Scots, a further implication of that argument, suggested by S, is that 
because Scotland is represented by the UK in Europe, it is the inward-looking and 
ratlier anti-European attitude of the English (or the British, which for S is the same), 
who see themselves ""as somehow separate from the rest o f Europe”, which prevails 
in dealing with Europe -  thus preventing Scotland from expressing its outward- 
looking identity and pursue its interests in Europe. Indeed, criticising ""the 
lackadaisical attitude to Europe from Westminster”, S argues that:
Extract 26
S: Well, the British way has always, has always ...been more "I’m alright Jack’ , I  
mean, it was, you know right through the Thatcher and the Major days, it was almost 
like they were standing on the outside throwing stones, saying we don’t like this, we 
don’t like that.../.../..J mean, there’s always such a battle, such a fight, such a
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resentment Whereas we feel, the only...you know, the only way to make Europe work 
is to be in there.../.../...unless you have a more pro-active co-operative approach 
towards Europe, then when there’s something you really need to put your foot down 
on and say [she snaps her fingers] no, you ’re not gonna get the understanding, the 
co-operation, you ’re not gonna be able to have a meaningful dialogue with any o f 
the other members states, because they’re just so used to you, I  think to use an 
English term, being a stroppy bugger.
This different attitude to Europe, and the different interests it represents, is 
why for instance John Major ""sold out the fishing rights in order to get an opt-out 
from the social chapter”, given that ""UK-wide, the farming and the fishing sector 
make up such a small percentage o f GDP, they’ve never really been very high on the 
priority”. But ‘"in Scotland they are very important, we want to be able to fight for  
them”. Still in relation to Europe, S also provides another concrete example of 
incompatibility of interests between Scotland and England:
Extract 27
S: Scotland has always been far more pro-Europe than the rest o f the UK.../.../...The 
big issue, you know, it’s the single currency. Most people in Scotland want it, most 
people in the rest o f the UK don’t. I f  we have a referendum under the Blair 
government, the UK as whole, will probably at the moment vote against, but 
Scotland will vote for, and that again will cause resentment, because our economy 
works on a different basis than the English one, we’re ma...we’re based on tourism, 
manufacturing and the service sector, which is being hammered by the high pound 
and the high interest rates, and we would really benefit from joining the single 
curi^ency.
The practical incompatibility is especially clear in the case of the Euro 
because it is a clear-cut zero-sum game: either we join or not, but it is not possible to 
have both at the same time. And given the nature of Scotland’s economy, the Euro 
would profit her, whereas it is implied that this might not be the case for England. Or 
at least, what is certain is that the English will vote against it, and that, given their
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dominance in Britain, it is their view and their different interest which will prevail 
and be imposed on Scotland, preventing her from following her interests. Thus, it is 
the enactment of English identity which makes impossible the enactment of Scottish 
identity. Not only is an anti-Eui'opean stance unscottish (see section 2.2), it is in fact 
characteristic of the English point of view, and thus the Union is acting on the terms 
of an alien identity, which will always prevail because Scotland is powerless. It is 
this combination of incompatibility and lack of power which undermines Scotland’s 
identity and interests.
The lack of power of Scotland in Britain, in the eyes of S, has already been 
illustrated in section 2.1.2. (extract 5): ""every MP from Scotland, Wales and Ireland 
could vote the same way against the government, and then still lose. Which means 
technically there is absolutely no way that we can defeat a measure...”. This states 
that not only is Scotland not listened to by Westminster, but moreover that it has not 
the power to make itself heard and to resist British rule when British policies do not 
suit Scotland. But the fact that incompatibility, on its own, is not sufficient, and 
needs the power dimension in order to lead to an undeimining of ingroup identity, is 
illustrated by another example used by S in order to underline Scotland’s 
powerlessness. This example focus on the Poll Tax inti'oduced by the Conservatives 
under Thatcher, and S ai’gues that the Conservatives ""introduced the Poll Tax in 
Scotland, a year before they introduced it in England, o f course there were massive 
riots, which were completely ignored, and we had a year o f the Poll tax, the Poll Tax 
was introduced in England, lo and behold there was riots on the streets o f London 
and the Poll Tax was scrapped within eighteen months. ”. The point is that, while it 
is possible for the British government to implement policies judged inadequate by 
the English as well as by the Scots, the crucial difference is that the English, unlike 
the Scots, have the power to resist such policies. Thus, it is not just incompatibility, 
but also powerlessness, which justifies seeking independence, because it makes 
‘inside resistance’ ineffective.
Moreover, although S suggests that the Conservatives have been particularly 
harmful to Scotland, she also argues that the problem of being ignored does not lie 
with any particular British government. Indeed, even when you have a Labour 
government ""which you would think would be sympathetic to Scotland”, in fact 
""they ’re not listening, because they ’re doing things that are completely against the 
land ofpolitical ideas and community ethos always went here.../.../...so again you’re
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seeing that even where the government that you would have got would have been 
more in tune with the Scottish thinldng, we have very little power to say that’s not 
what we want.” Rather than being contingent on the particular political profile of the 
party in charge in Westminster, the problem of being ignored and having alien 
policies imposed lies in the very essence of the Union and its political system.
This point, and the reasons why this is so, are made more explicit when S 
implies that irrespective of the individual character of politicians (i.e. whatever the 
party they belong to and even if they are Scottish), the very nature of the British 
political system means that whoever goes to Westminster will betray Scotland:
Extract 28
S .■ I  think i t’s the seduction o f Westminster, you Imow. That they’re wanting to, you 
Imow, to be this big fish in the big pond, and...because they recognise that i f  they go 
to Westminster, and i f  they... and i f  they get, you Imow, i f  they win the government, 
you Imow...if they don’t look after the vested interests down there, i f  they don’t play 
the game by the rules, then they ’re not going to survive. Because in order to win a 
general election, you have to win the English folk.../.../...you’ve got to play to them, 
you’ve got to put in the policies, you’ve got to look to the economy o f what is politely 
called Middle England, which means you’ve got cut adrift from your own 
constituency base, you’ve got to cut away your own background, in order to appeal 
to these people.
What this extract says is that the very system of the Union fosters 
incompatibility and creates a zero-sum game, which can only go against Scotland’s 
interest. Either politicians listen to the English interests or to Scottish ones; in 
practice, however, only the former can happen, for listening to England is necessary 
to win the elections. Those Scottish politicians who would try to stay in touch with 
Scottish people would simply be side-lined. Thus the very fact of being a 
Westminster politician requires one to follow English interests and therefore to go 
against Scottish interests. It is not only that politicians are ‘corrupted’ to English 
interests, it is that they can only be corrupted. The desirability of independence is 
therefore not contingent upon the Conservatives or another particular political party 
being in power, but is necessary in any case.
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What this also shows, however, is that the problem does not lie in the 
differences per se with the English but in the fact of having to live together under the 
same political arrangement, which raises the practical issues of having to take 
common decisions and to share procedural power. Thus, in this type of separatist 
argument, it is not necessarily the outgroup (the English) which is attacked, but 
rather the British state which binds the ingroup and the outgroup together. Indeed S 
explicitly denies that the Scots and the SNP members are anti-English, and add that 
“We just don’t want to be ruled by them, which is completely different to hating 
them.” In fact, if anything, it is the Union which poisons the relationship with 
England, whereas separatism would promote a better partnership: “There is, you ’re 
always going to get that niggle, and I  think that’s because o f the resentment, I  think 
that’s one o f the thing that independence would cure. Because the resentment would 
go, we would be able to become really good neighbours, equal partners, rather than 
this...y  ou know, you’re always complaining about us, we’re always complaining 
about you.../.../...But i t’s come out all the time, all the time, you just hate the 
English, which is untrue. We just don’t want to be ruled by them, which is completely 
different to hating them. ”
2.4.2. Arguing devolution: some incompatibilitv but power
If, as we have just seen, incompatibility and lack of power are both necessary 
to lead to undermining and separatism, this also means that it is possible to recognise 
differences, and even a certain degree of potential antagonism between groups 
without advocating total separation. More than that, this antagonism can even 
sometimes be taken as evidence of closeness between groups. To illusti ate that point, 
let us look at how Lib describes the Scotland-England relationship, through the use 
of a powerful metaphor:
Extract 29
Lib: The relation between Scotland and England, how do you define this 
relationship? Well i t’s famously described by an eminent Scottish author called Sir 
Ludovic Kennedy, as like being in bed with an elephant. Essentially, you have a
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symbiotic, emotional and other relationship, but the other partner is infinitely bigger 
and stronger, and is occasionally, just to continue the metaphor, when the other 
partner turns over in bed, sometimes it does so without having regard to the fact that 
they crush (laugh slightly), they may crush the partner that’s in bed with it.
At first sight, the metaphor might seem to describe a rather negative 
relationship with England, where Scotland occasionally ends up being crushed. 
However, though a certain degree of antagonism is indeed present, a closer look 
reveals that this negativity is veiy much qualified. The metaphor as interpreted here 
canies the implication that while it is true that England might harm Scotland, this 
does not happen every time that England ‘turns over in bed’ (i.e. behaves according 
to its desire or interests), and when it does happen it is without any really bad 
intentions on its part. It is just a consequence of its bigger size and power, a fact that 
England, like an elephant who does not choose his biological makeup, is not really 
responsible for.
Lib also insists on the fact that, however potentially harmful for Scotland, the 
relation is first of all a relations between partners, and a symbiotic and emotional 
one: after all, being in bed with someone else can cany this implication that there we 
have an intimate (maybe even a marital) relationship. In fact, it could be argued that 
it is implied here that such a close relationship is the very condition that make 
possible the ‘crushing’, for if the two groups were not partners, they would not even 
share the same bed at all.
In order to better understand how much the conflictual aspect of the 
relationship is softened in this extract, let us leave for once the core material of our 
data and contrast the extract with another use of this same metaphor, where it is used 
to make the case for independence . This other interpretation of the metaphor can be 
found in a separatist pamphlet by P.H. Scott, which takes its very title fi'om it: “In 
bed with an elephant: The Scottish experience” (Scott, 1985). According to this 
author, for Scotland to live with England is also “like a man having to share a bed 
with an elephant. ” (p. 5). But his explanation of the metaphor is quite different to the 
one presented above and leads to different implications:
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Extract 30
It is an experience which can be dangerous or very uncomfortable and lead to 
pressures which are difficult to avoid or resist. The elephant can use its sheer bulk 
and weight to flatten resistance altogether. This can happen even by accident or 
without any malicious intention. I f  there is a conflict o f interests or o f tastes, weight 
is liable to predominate. This sort o f experience is common whenever a country has a 
neighbour much larger and wealthier than itself, (p.5)...|further on|...//f was the 
misfortune o f Scotland to have on her border a country which was not only larger, 
and therefore more powerful, but which was, for centuries, particularly aggressive 
and expansionist, (p.6)
In this case, there is no reference whatsoever to a partnership or an emotional 
relationship with the elephant. The situation of ‘being in the same bed’ does not 
imply that it is because Scotland and England are partners, but simply flows fiom the 
fact that they are neighbours, a situation where all element of choice is removed (a 
fact indicated by Scott’s wording: it is “like a man having to share a bed with an 
elephant... ”)
Secondly, although Scott argues that the ‘crushing’ can also happen even by 
accident, in fact this statement carries as a correlate the implication that it can also 
happen intentionally, and the definition of England as aggressive and expansionist 
suggests that this what England has been doing, at least in the past. Again, this is 
subtly different from Lib’s version, where the hypothetical element was about 
whether there will be any crushing at all (which only happens occasionally), while 
the fact that this happens without malicious intentions was not put into question.
Finally, Scott’s version also implies that the ‘crushing’, even when 
unintentional, is nevertheless inevitable because conflicts of interests between the 
countries will necessarily arises at some point (especially with an expansionist 
neighbour). In fact, the ‘crushing’ is not just about cmshing the other who is in the 
bed, it is about crushing its resistance, which takes for granted that the elephant will 
use its power not in every situation, regardless of the interests of the other (which 
might be similar or different), but precisely when the other is in disagreement. As a 
result, the whole point of the pamphlet is to argue that independence is the only 
possible solution.
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By contrast, to come back to Lib’s interpretation, its implications seems to be 
that a solution should be found and changes be made in the organisation of the 
relationship, but that change is like solving an internal quarrel in a close relationship, 
where the very existence of the relationship is not put at stake. This is not put 
explicitly in this extract, but we have seen above that Lib’s solution for the Scottish- 
English abrasive relationship is not in independence but in a devolved parliament 
(see extract 25). Though there might be some incompatibility, what was said then is 
that the abrasive relationship should disappear with devolution and the end of 
Thatcher’s rule. In other words, undermining was dependent on Scots’ 
powerlessness, but with devolution giving back this power to the Scots, these latter 
can resist and get on with the Elephant, and possibly even benefit only from its 
strength (i.e. enhancement by the Union, see section 2.3). Or, to put it otherwise, 
devolution might not erase differences of identities and interests, but it takes away 
the practical incompatibility. True incompatibility is contingent on the opposed 
project of a non-devolved Scotland.
Thus, if Lib is somewhat similai* to S in establishing some differences and 
tensions between the two groups, the implication they draw from this state of affairs 
is quite different, mainly because what is identified as the source and nature of 
incompatibility and tension is quite different. This is an all important difference for, 
rather obviously, it is the source and nature of incompatible difference which 
identifies the solution, i.e. the political project to be defended. If it is contingent on 
aspects which are not essential but external to the Union itself (for Lib, the 
Conseiwatives and centralised power, or, in the case of Labour, Conservatives and 
poveity), the solution is to stay in the Union but get rid of conservatives and have a 
devolved system. By contrast, if, as in S’s case, it is the Union in itself rather than 
any party or other contingency which is the cause of problems, the solution must be 
independence.
2.4.3. Ai'guing for the Union
a) compatibility or complementarity
What about supporting union and integration on the basis of constructions of 
intergroup relations? As we have just seen, emphasising ingroup power, even within
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a potentially incompatible context, can go towards that aim to some extent. However, 
things can go further than such a defensive argument.
Thus, one possibility, exemplified by C, is to emphasise similarities and 
common identity so that the question of the relation between English and Scottish 
people simply does not pose itself in intergroup teims. It is assumed they are all part 
of a single group which cannot be divided without doing violence to reality and 
people’s feelings (see section 2.1.2). In that context, it is in fact separation which can 
potentially create incompatible interests, as C’s argument on the effects of the 
Scottish parliament demonstrates (see C’s summary in 1.2.2).
Alternatively, when some differences between the Scots and English are 
explicitly acknowledged, these latter, as we have already seen (see section 2.1.1), can 
be made superficial and secondary to shared interests. It is worth repeating here the 
extiact which made that point:
Extract 3
C: Well, they have a lot in common, a lot they have in uncommon, as far as you like 
(laugh). But yes, there are, there’s a lot o f arguments about Bannockburn and 
everything else that goes on, but it’s almost an amusement.../.../...So there is, there’s 
a danger being too fixed on what’s happened in the past.../.../..,And, you know, 
Scotland and England got on fine. When there is an outside threat, they pull together 
better. Lords fought together in wars, etc.../.../...So that’s, we’ve done things 
together, we have the common, the British common and, together, and those things 
don’tgo away...
When there is a common outside threat, that is when things become serious 
rather than the ‘amusement’ of arguing over differences, those latter are overcome 
and Scotland and England help to reinforce each other. This very fact shows that, 
beyond the superficial quarrels, at bottom they do share compatible interests; it is 
also evidence of their deep bond and their essentially good relationship which comes 
out when needed. Moreover, not only do differences not entail incompatible 
interests, but the fact of having two different groups is in fact a positive thing, for it 
provides mutual strengthening.
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Such a case for complementarity between gi'oups is perhaps made clearer by 
S in relation to Europe. We have aheady seen earlier (see section 2.2, extract 15) 
that, for S, Scotland has enjoyed in the past (i.e. before the Union) positive 
relationships, economic and cultural exchanges with other European countries. In the 
next extiuct, S argues that Scotland could enjoy again the benefits of closer 
relationships with those countries, but this does not mean that such positive 
relationships simply flow from similarity. In fact, S explicitly denies that all 
Europeans are very similar to Scots (‘7  didn’t say we were similaf’). However, what 
they do share, i.e. the only really necessary similarity to make it work, is the fact that, 
unlike the English, they have a certain opemiess to others and a willingness to 
discuss and interact, '''because, you Imow, they’ve got all these land borders, they had 
to learn to live with each other’\  For that reason, in contrast to the UK, the 
differences, which do exist with other European countries, do not especially equate 
to incompatibility. It could even be the opposite:
Extract 31
S.' ,..the sort o f the fancy term for it used these days is cross-fertilisation, and 
exchange o f ideas, and I  don’t think that can ever be a bad thing. You Imow, no one 
nation and no one idea is perfect, you can always learn from others ’ experiences. I  
never see any harm in that, because that’s the way to avoid conflict, that’s the way to 
learn to live together. I t ’s when you close yourself offfrom other cultures, when you 
close yourself off from other people and other countries, and get set in your 
ways.../.../...that is the slow route to conflict.../.../... I  think that, that is the good 
thing about Europe.../.../...You don’t have to behave like them, but as long as you 
can get along with each other. And I  think that’s the good thing about the exchange 
o f cultures and views.../.../ ...You’re never gonna agree on everything, I  think it’s 
quite unrealistic, that’s why I  don’t think a federal Europe will ever 
happen.../.../...But I  think, it’s a good thing on the whole.
Though the other is indeed different, this is not necessarily a bad thing and 
can even have positive effects, where you can learn from others. More importantly 
perhaps, S denies that there should be incompatibility and conflict between different 
groups, provided that they are open and outward-looking. In fact, it would be a
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‘separatist’ attitude towards Europe which would potentially create incompatibility 
and conflict -  although, at the same time, the sovereignty of the nations should be 
preseiwed, for a federal state would create a contingent situation where 
incompatibility would come to the fore again.
b) Power
Unionist positions also typically "underline that the ingroup has a significant 
voice within the larger group and is thus able to influence the direction it takes. Thus, 
in parallel to the above extract, S also denies that Scotland, provided it is 
independent, would be powerless within Eruope, and would in fact increase its 
weight by being out of the UK: "Well I  mean I  think, I  think you see that since the 
Nice summit, and the Treaty there, much more, more weight, and much more 
prominence is given to the small nations.../.../...You know, the small countries are 
not sidelined within Europe. You look at Denmark, they held up Maastricht for quite 
some time, until they got the deal they wanted. The whole point is, at present, we 
have no power at all, ”
Likewise, coming back to C’s argument that the Union with England is 
beneficial to Scotland, this is also made possible because he argues that Scotland is 
far from being powerless in Britain. Indeed, although he acknowledges that Scotland 
has less power than England in Britain, C stresses that this power is nevertheless 
significant and can make a difference: "But we’re still in a situation where, you 
Imow, we have the perfect right to kick out, or help to kick out a government o f  
Westminster i f  we want to. And it’s possible for that to happen, based on what 
happens in Scotland. So, although our ability, Scotland’s ability to control that is 
less than England’s ability, but nonetheless there is a significant amount, you can’t 
have a Labour government without the support o f in England, without the support o f  
Labour seats in Scotland, so it’s a pretty significant player in that Union so we can 
help steer its direction”. Furthermore, and perhaps more crucially, C argues that 
Scotland has not lost the ‘essence’ of its power, i.e. its sovereignty (see extract 8: " if  
Scotland really wants to be independent, then there’s nothing to stop them from  
exercising this sovereignty, because they are sovereign "), even if such sovereignty is 
not actualised in a separate state, and even if Scotland had no parliament.
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2.4.4 Summary and conclusions
a) Relationship accounts
What we have analysed in this section are arguments which end up in 
providing the same conclusions as in section 2.3, i.e. that ingroup identity and 
interests are either undermined or enhanced by being part of Britain or Europe. 
However, because these arguments define explicitly the relationships between groups 
inside those bodies, their analysis allowed us to malce some important additional 
points.
The first point is that what is important in the way intergroup relationships are 
constructed is not so much whether identities and interests are described as similar or 
different, but, more fundamentally, whether they are made incompatible, compatible 
or even complementary. In other words, whether being part of a common political 
project permits the enhancement of both groups identities and interests, or else leads 
to a situation where following one’s group aspirations will be at the detriments of the 
others’. Depending on constructions of power, this determines whether the ingroup is 
practically able or not to enact its identity and to follow its interests in the context of 
a Union.
Of course, empirically, there might be (and one would even expect to be) a 
correlation between the incompatibility/compatibility aspect and the fact that 
interests are similai* or different in nature. But the point is that this is not a necessity. 
For what matters here is the practical meaning given to those similarities and 
differences, and, as a consequence, there aie cases where differences can be seen as a 
positive asset (theoretically, there could as well be cases where similarities are 
construed as a negative one, but this did not come out in the data). What we have 
seen is that incompatibility or compatibility are not a question of comparing of the 
nature of the groups in the abstract, i.e. independent of the (practical) political 
context. Rather, the nature of the relationship between identities and interests is 
defined as dependent upon particular political arrangements which determine to what 
extent common decisions are to be taken or not, as well as how decisional power is 
distributed. What is then argued is, at bottom, that positive relations and 
compatibility depend on one’s own political project/aiTangement, whereas negative 
ones and incompatibility are created by the opposed project/arrangement. In other
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words, this inseparability makes the point that what we are dealing with is a question 
of incompatibility/compatibility in practice more than a question of 
incompatibility/compatibility between the chaiacteristics of the gioups per se, as if 
their essences were themselves incompatible in all circumstances.
However, if there is one crucial point which comes out from this section, as 
well as from section 2.3, it is probably that it has shown us the key role of questions 
of power - but also how the issue of power has to be understood in relation to identity 
concerns. Indeed, arguments concerning power are almost omnipresent; but, on the 
other hand, the concerns of these nationalist arguments is not some sort of 
machiavellian quest for power for its own sake. What matters for them is the 
possession of power understood as a capacity for agency and as the ability to express 
the national self and to pursue its specific interests. The argued attraction or threat 
posed by the superordinate groups is then deteimined by the extent to which this 
group is seen to undermine or to enhance this capacity and thereby the ability for the 
ingroup to impact on the course of actions and decisions at the superordinate level as 
well as to live by its identity in practice.
Moreover, in section 2.3, we have also seen that power can be important in a 
slightly different respect, i.e. the argued attraction of a superdordinate gi’oup can also 
be that it helps one being a more significant player amongst the world of nations, and 
thus allows the ingroup to express its identity on the world stage. Overall then, the 
inclusion in a superordinate group can be sought after in the name of ingroup identity 
because it can go hand in hand and even support the quest for identity, i.e. the 'need 
to exist and to have a name ’ and to be 'a recognized and respected somebody in the 
world’ (Geertz, 1993; see conclusions on section 2.1). However, this inclusion in an 
objectively more powerful group can also be argued to go against this quest for 
identity (i.e. to raise the threat of identity undermining), because of the need for a 
people to see its government as embodying their identity. As Geertz put it, the main 
task of nationalist ideologizing "consists in defining, or trying to define, a collective 
subject to whom the actions o f the state can be internally connected, in creating, or 
trying to create, an experiential 'we ’ from whose will the activities o f government 
seems to spontaneously to flow...It is a question o f immediacy, o f experiencing what 
the state 'does’ as proceeding naturally from a familiar and intelligible 'we’” (1993, 
p.240 and p.317). However, when the potentially incompatible interests of other 
groups are seen as dominating the mnning of the superordinate group, what becomes
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missing, as is illustrated by S’s argument that Scotland will be powerless in Europe 
as long as it is part of Britain, is the sense that the supra-national group represents 
‘oui* voice ‘, and in fact that the power of this group is ‘our ‘ power. As our own SSP 
candidate put it in his interview:
But i f  you don’t, i f  you don’t actually feel that power is being 
exercised on your behalf, then you don’t have the power, do you? I  
mean power is a peculiar thing, isn ’t it? I  mean, a lot o f it is what you 
think o f it I  mean, you may actually objectively get more out o f being 
part o f a larger, a larger formation.../., ./...but i f  you don’t think 
you’ve got any more, then you’ve actually got less, haven’t you? As 
far as a feeling o f powerlessness is concerned. And so I  think 
that.../.../...the key thing will be the extent to which you feel there’s 
some way in which your will is being expressed, and in that sense, 
there ’II be more people feeling power and they will be more confident 
in trying to, trying to express their, their aspirations.
Thus, the inclusion in an objectively more powerful group can potentially 
lead to an increased subjective sense of powerlessness and of incapacity to express 
the group’s aspirations.
b) Overview o f speakers’ arguments
In relation to Britain, we have seen in this section how S argues that Scotland 
and England have incompatible interests and priorities and that Scotland is powerless 
in Britain to make its specific interests matters, with the consequence that this 
specific Scottish interest is undermined in Britain. By contrast, C not only denies that 
there is such incompatibility but suggests that on the contrary Scotland and England 
may reinforce each other (see extract 3, repeated in this section 2.4) - when he does 
not simply take it for granted that, as Britain, Scotland and England want the same 
things. In terms of power, we have also seen how for C Scotland is far from being 
powerless in Britain. In fact, C implies that Scotland has now too much power with 
the Scottish parliament, as the devolution settlement was unfair for English who
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didn’t had a say in the matter and do not enjoy the same kind of autonomy for 
themselves (see C’s summary in 1.2.2).
As for Lab, she argues that people Scotland and England share very much the 
same needs and priorities ( '^the problems o f people living in Glasgow can be much 
the same as the problems ofpeople living in Manchester... ”)> i-®- ^ similarity which 
implies a compatibility of interests. If there are some differences, they are due 
differences in systems (which is why the parliament was established) and not to 
inherent cultural differences, i.e. there is no essential incompatibility between the 
Scots and the English. She also stresses that the feeling that Scots are powerless and 
"being ruled by a distant parliament” was an illusion also created by the 
Conservative government and that "the Scottish parliament has been a long way to 
resolve that” (see Lab’s summaiy in 1.2.3). If she does not argue that there is 
complementarity between Scots and English, she does argues for such 
complementarity between the Scottish Parliament and UK government (e.g., on the 
issue of poveity, "it’s only by the two parliaments in the process o f working together, 
that you can tackle those Idnd ofproblems.”')
Likewise, Lib stresses that Scots and English have basically the same 
interests (‘7  doubt i f  their interests are significantly different from anywhere else in 
the United Kingdom...”', see Lib’s summary in 1.2.4). Although, as we have seen, 
Lib argues that there can be some incompatibility between the two countries, it is one 
which was very much contingent upon the Conservatives and upon the lack of power 
of Scotland which has been resolved by the Scottish parliament (i.e. Scotland is not 
powerless in a devolved Union).
Overall, then. Lab and Lib tend to agiee more with C than with S, and share 
the same conclusion that being in the UK essentially benefits Scotland’s interest. 
However, the difference with C is that they acknowledge that there might be some 
legitimate feelings of incompatibility and powerlessness, but those are made 
contingent upon the Conservatives being in power and upon the absence of 
devolution.
In relation to Eui'ope, C’s argument on the consequences of the absence of 
European identity (see extracts 1, 4 and 10) relies on and malces clearly the point that 
there is a strong incompatibility between Britain (including Scotland) and the other 
European countiies, and his main concern vis-à-vis Europe is the loss of power for 
Britain it entails, which has already gone too far. Thus, directly following the above
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quote about the control Scotland has in Britain, C added: "But in the European 
context, you start getting to the stage where, because we ’re different peoples, you ’re 
not going to be able to have a kind o f identity and that Idnd o f control I f  everyone in 
Britain agreed, within a federal Europe on, you Imow a particular point, and then 
say that’s important to us, we want to do that, everyone here said that, but the rest o f  
Europe didn ’t want to do that from a federal state, that would be it, we couldn’t do it. 
And that’s that Idnd o f loss o f identity, that I  think it’s unnecessary to go down that 
route. ” This quote illustrates quite well how incompatibility and powerlessness 
combines to create a concern for the repression and the loss of ingioup identity.
By contrast, we have seen how S argues that there is no inherent 
incompatibility between Scotland and the other European countries and that, on the 
contrary, differences might sometimes lead to 'cross-fertilisation'’ and to 'exchange 
o f ideas’ vAiQiQ 'you can always learn from others’ experiences’ extract 31). It is 
ti*ue that she does acknowledges that these differences might also sometimes be 
incompatible: "You’re never gonna agree on everything I  think it’s quite unrealistic” 
which is "why I  don’t think a federal Europe will ever happen. 'Cos I  don’t think 
anyone will ever completely integrate in such a manner that would make it feasible”, 
but, provided that Scotland is independent, its interests will be heard and respected in 
Europe. In fact, S argues that Scotland has little power at the moment in Europe but 
that is because it has no power in the UK and therefore is misrepresented at the 
European level. Thus, Scotland will have more power in Europe by being 
independent.
Like S, and in opposition with C, Lab argues for complementarity with 
European countries, which works in both directions: "I think there’s a lot to be 
learned from the relationships with other c o u n t r i e s . . . t h e  way in which 
countries like France balance working life and how they see the family and how they 
treat worldng mothers, and all those Idnd o f issues, I  think, I  suppose, I  mean I ’m 
thinldng that the UK can learn about from those countries, and that type ofEuropean 
thought on those issues.../.../...But at the same time it’s...Idnd of, I  mean there’s still 
not a high level o f women political representation in Europe either, within, in a lot o f 
European countries. And Scotland is one o f the best examples o f what can be 
achieved within the Scottish parliament and the representation o f women, so there’s 
maybe, they can learn that from us, I  suppose. ” One difference with S, however, is 
that this complementarity also plays at the UK level.
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As for Lib, although he argues that Europe benefits Scotland (see section 2.3), 
he does not really put fbiivard any argument stating more explicitly the compatibility 
or incompatibility with European countries.
Where both Lab and Lib disagree with S, and agree with C, is that they argue 
that the UK gives Scotland a stronger voice in Europe, and that Scotland would 
therefore have less power in Europe by being independent. Thus Lab underlines that: 
"I don’t have a problem with the UK being at the big table so it speaks on behalf o f 
Scotland.,./.../ ...because UK is, UK is such a major player within Europe. I  think for  
Scotland to be a small independent nation, especially with the enlargement o f 
Europe, the SNP fantasies that we ’re gonna be this, you hiow strong country who 
will be better heard, I  think are a wee bit misplaced. I  don’t see why Scotland would 
be better heard than other smaller countries...”. Likewise, Lib stresses that 
"Scotland is better represented by the fact that this is done on a UK-EU basis rather 
than a Scotland-EU basis” (see Lib’s summary in 1.2.4), The same point is implied 
in C’s argument, although it is not made specifically in relation to Europe but in 
relation to the international scene in general (see extract 24). All these arguments 
rely on and illustrate the fact that the UK can spealc for Scotland, i.e. the power of the 
UK is also the power of Scotland.
Speakers’ argument on relationships and power are summed up in Tables 2.6 
and 2.7. In Table 2.7, two lines represent Scotland’s power in the EU, depending on 
whether Scotland is independent from the UK or not. As with previous level of 
arguments (see 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3), both tables show that all speakers’ account are 
consonant with their political project.
TABLE 2.6: RELATIONSHIPS AND POWER IN THE UK
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C Lab Lib s
Relationship with England under 
Union (without devolution) + +/- - -
Relationship with England under 
Union (with Devolution) - -
Relationship with England under 
Independence
Power of Scotland in UK - -
Power of Scotland in UK with 
devolution 44- + -
Power of independent Scotland
Legend
E3 : Project under which it is expected that the relationship will be positive / that the 
ingroup has power
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments 
Relationship
+ : Compatibility or complementarity 
- : Incompatibility
Power
- : Powerless 
+: Has power 
++: Too much power
+/-: Lab does not argue that Scotland was powerless under the Union because of the 
lack of devolution as such, but because of the Conservatives.
TABLE 2.7: RELATIONSHIPS AND POWER IN THE EU
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C Lab Lib s
Relationship with other European 
countries under Union -
Relationship with other European 
countries under ‘separatism’ -
Power of Scotland as UK in the 
EU - 15^ 1# -
Power of independent Scotland in 
the EU -- - - ■ :
Power of Scotland (as UK) 
‘separate ’ from EU
Legend
E3 : Project under which it is expected that the relationship will be positive / that the 
ingroup has power
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments 
Relationship
+ : Compatibility or complementarity 
- : Incompatibility
Power
- : Powerless 
+: Has power
- - : C argues that Scotland as UK is powerless in the EU, but would be even more so 
if independent.
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2.5. Summary of all level of argumentation
Having been through all possible different levels of argumentation, we can 
now provide an overview of what is argued by each speaker at each of these different 
levels, and how their accounts and arguments relate to all possible political projects 
or arrangements (see Table 2.8 for the UK and Table 2.9 for the EU).
TABLE 2.8: ARGUMENTS TOWARDS UK
C Lab Lib s
UD s U UD S U UD S u UD s
1. Reality/artificiality as 
arguments (see 2.1.5.b)
- - # 3 - - +
2. Content accounts 
(see 2.2.4) - - - . + 
■
- - +
3. Impact accounts 
(see 2.3.4) - -
+ - - - +
4. Relationship accounts 
(see 2.4.4) - K- % - : - - +
Legend
□  : Political project advocated by speaker 
U : Union without devolution 
UD : Devolution or Union with devolution 
S : Separatism (independence)
+ : Argument supporting or account consonant with the project 
- : Argument undermining or account dissonant with the project 
+/- : Ambivalence
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments
TABLE 2.9; ARGUMENTS TOWARDS EUROPE
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C Lab Lib s*
u U S U s s
1. Reality/artificiality as 
arguments (see 2.1.5.b) - •2. Content accounts 
(see 2.2.4) - . -T
3. Impact accounts 
(see 2.3.4) - 4* + -
« -
4. Relationship accounts 
(see 2.4.4) - + ' + 1-
Legend
□  : Political project advocated by speaker 
U : ‘Devolved’ Union (i.e. not federal state)
S : ‘Separatism’ from EU (though not withdrawal)
+ : Argument supporting or account consonant with the project 
- ; Argument undermining or account dissonant with the project 
Faded fonts indicate implicit or indirect arguments.
* S’s accounts of impact and relationship reported in the table are provided that 
Scotland is independent.
As can be seen from Tables 2.8 and 2.9, although speakers do not always 
argue at every level and in relation to each possible project, all the accounts which 
they do provide are consonant with their position, both in the context of the UK and 
the EU. As we have illustrated extensively, what makes this possible is the fact they 
rely on very different constructions of identities and of the intergroup context; 
because they are different in their specifics, these accounts sustain different political 
projects, despite the fact that they all appeal to identity. We can even see that it is 
possible for the same speaker (in this case, for C and S), to use systematically 
opposed constructions, depending on whether it is question of Britain or of Europe.
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Nevertheless, beyond this variability at the level of speakers’ accounts, what 
we find is a remarkable consistency at the level of the relationship between their 
accounts and arguments on the one hand and their projects on the other. More than 
that, it is in fact the very possibility of variability in identity constructions which 
permits this consistency. In sum, this finding provides support for our hypothesis that 
these accounts are active constructions used strategically in order to gather support 
for their political project.
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3. INTRA-INDIVIDUAL VARIABILIY
So far we have grounded oui* claim for the strategic dimension of identity 
constructions in the presence of inter-speaker variability and the pattern of 
consonance of this variability with the political projects advocated by the different 
discourses. However, such evidence is still open to one potential criticism. That is, it 
could be argued that this variability only reflects cognitivo-perceptual differences 
between our politicians. Rather than being involved in strategic business, what they 
would do is simply to describe their views, as explanations for their political 
attitudes. Thus, it could be their perceptions of gioup identities and their 
relationships which would explain, cognitively, their political attitudes, rather than 
vice-versa.
This is a valid point to raise and, before answering it, it must be first be 
acknowledged that such a perspective must be true to some extent. Indeed, we cannot 
escape the question of what are the reasons for leading politicians to defend 
particular political positions in the fii'st place, and the answer must lie at least in part 
in their view of social reality (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). In our view, there is 
little doubt, for instance, that most supporters of independence, whether they are 
politicians or not, do really believe that Britain has a negative impact over Scotland 
and Scottishness, and vice-versa for supporters of Union (see Chapter 3) -  and this, 
however much they might perhaps over-emphasise it discursively beyond their 
personal belief.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that politicians’ discourses on identities are 
only a reflection of their perceptions, cognitions and beliefs, and a first answer to that 
criticism lies in the fact that such a view would have great difficulty in explaining the 
perfect consistency between arguments and projects which we found in our data. An 
overall correlation between the two would indeed be expected, but a few inconsistent 
arguments could also be present, only in a lesser proportion. In fact, it would be quite 
imlikely if they were none, for social attitudes are rarely (if ever) perfectly neat and 
clear-cut phenomenon. Thus, this sustains the idea that there must be at least some 
strategic dimension to our politicians’ arguments.
Secondly, while it is true that, on the basis of oui* data, we cannot answer the 
question of how much is cognitive and str ategic in their arguments (a question which 
would be, in any case, at best quite a difficult one to answer), what we can do, as an
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empirical answer to the criticism, is to show that there is definitely a strategic 
dimension involved in them, even if it might not be the only one. Concretely 
speaking, this means that we can tiy to complement our evidence of inter-individual 
variability by evidence of intra-individual variability. Indeed, if we could show the 
same politicians using quite different and contrasting views in order to sustain the 
same political project, it would lend even stronger support to the idea that it is the 
latter which helps to shape the former. Given that the present analysis has already 
been rather long, however, we will limit ourselves to give a couple of illustrative 
examples amongst many which would have been possible.
According to discourse analysis (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), intra-individual variability is likely to appear as a function of 
changes in the communicational context, such as changes in the type of audience, 
diachi'onic changes in the strategic context (e.g. pre or post-elections discourses), 
etc.. These changes can make different arguments more or less appropriate in order 
to achieve the same goal. In our case, however, the only analytically available source 
of variability lay in potential changes in the immediate rhetorical context of 
arguments. That is, in order to sustain the constant broad political objective, different 
arguments with different proximal puiposes can be used, depending for instance on 
which specific issue is at stake or which implicit or explicit counter-argument these 
arguments aim to answer (e.g. an advocate of devolution arguing against 
independence or against an Union without a devolved parliament).
To illustrate that point, let us look at our first example of within-speaker 
variability. As we illustrated in section 2.4, at several points during the interview 
with S, this candidate underlined the different, incompatible interests and priorities of 
England and Scotland (e.g. on the Euro, on fishing) and the fact that Westminster 
follows these different English interests which do not suit Scottish interests. 
However, this account contrasts with a point she makes in another of her arguments:
Extract 32
S: So...we have a different history, we have a different culture, we have a different 
economy. Now...that’s why we would be better off as an equal partner with England, 
within the whole European concept. I  mean, i t’s also common sense, you Imow, at the 
moment, what...the UK has 29 votes. Now, i f  we became independent, we get 7 votes.
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these probably reduced by 2 or 3 votes. But we ‘d end up, the British Isles, having 
more influence in Europe, than we have now, because there ’d be more votes, more 
ministers, but I  am sure there are, the vast majority o f issues within Europe we would 
agree, we would have similar needs and priorities as the ones for the UK.
Although that extract starts by another reminder of the differences between 
Scotland and England, it ends up arguing that Scots would in fact have very similar 
interests to the rest of the UK in relation to Europe. This is not necessarily to say that 
there is a contradiction between the two arguments -  and this also goes for the other 
examples we will see below. Indeed, as Billig (1987) points out, the question of 
whether there is a contradiction between arguments or not can in itself be a matter of 
argument, and, should the candidate have been accused of being inconsistent or 
contradictory, she might quite well come up with an answer allowing her to reconcile 
the two assertions.
Nevertheless, it remains that there is a striking change of argumentative 
emphasis, and that this change can be understood both as a function of the specific 
rhetorical purposes of the two different arguments and the constant political project 
sustained by S. On the one hand, the incompatibility arguments malce the point that 
only independence from Britain can allow Scots to pursue their legitimate interests. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the similarity argument could be to counter the 
idea, advanced by C and Lab for instance, that by brealcing up with Britain, Scotland 
would lose its place as a major international player, including its influence in Europe. 
In particular, it is argued that being independent in Europe is not going to lead to a 
loss of power within Europe, quite the opposite (see also section 2.4.3.b where S 
implies that Scotland’s power in Euiope can only increase by being independent, as 
the fact that it is represented by the UK means that "at present, we have no power at 
all”); nor is it going to lead to conflicts of interests with the English neighbour (as 
they would have similar interests on the majority of issues in relation to Europe; see 
also section 2.4.1 where S ai*gues that it is by being independent that Scotland would 
have a better relationship with England). The purpose could also be to convince 
outgroup members of the rationale for Scottish independence, by showing how they 
can also benefit from it (Klein & Licata, 2003) - although this has to remain a 
hypothesis. In any case, what matters is that, beyond this variability, what remains 
constant is that both arguments are clearly used to sustain independence.
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A second example of intra-individual variability can be taken from Lab’s 
interview. Let us contrast the two following extracts, paying particular attention to 
how the attitude of Scots towards public services is defined in both of them:
Exti'act 33
Lab: I  think when the, before the parliament was established, there was this big 
feeling that Scotland is a more progressive, a more tolerant, a more socially 
inclusive society, it treasures its public services more, you Imow there was this whole 
idea that we were this, more European, all these land o f descriptions. I ’d like to think 
that Scotland was, but I  don’t think it is. I  think the Scottish parliament, the concern 
o f the Scottish parliament is that Scotland is actually become more insular, more 
parochial, rather than being forward looking.
Extract 34
Lab; But I  think the Conservative government was.../.,./... extremely damaging to the 
Union, the years under Thatcher. You Imow that it did bring frustration and 
resentment, that caused problems and the introduction o f things like the Poll Tax, 
and, because Scotland holds its public services quite dear, cuts to the public services 
all that land o f thing, was quite difficult. I  think it’s a reaction against the 
Westminster government rather than a reaction against the English, so to speak.
In the first extract, the stereotype tliat Scotland would treasure its public 
services more (implicitly, in comparison with England) is explicitly denied, whereas, 
in the second extract, this same idea is used in order to explain why the Conservative 
government was harmful to Scotland in particular. Again, this change of emphasis 
can be understood both as a function of Lab’s constant political project and the 
specific rhetorical purposes of the two different arguments. The first extract 
constitutes an argument against independence which denies the usual stereotypes on 
which separatist discourses sometimes rely, including Scotland’s attitude to public 
services. It is part of her argument associating independence with parochialism and 
with a nanow vision of Scottish identity (see section 2.1.4. and 2.3.2). The second
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argument, which followed a question about the relations between England and 
Scotland, is also an argument against independence (and in favour of devolution), but 
in a different rhetorical context. It aims to explain the counter-evidence of Scottish 
resentment against the UK, given that the UK is argued to be good for Scotland. By 
stressing that it is the Conseiwatives who have hurt Scotland and not the UK as such, 
and that the resentment is against that particular government rather than against the 
English, it thus allows Lab to reject the necessity of independence, for the proper 
way to deal with this problem is therefore to have a Scottish Parliament, but not 
independence: "I mean I  think the need for a Scottish parliament really draws out o f 
the 18 years o f Conservative government, and out o f the Thatcher government. I  
think that kind o f focused the need that we didn’t really want that to happen again. 
But I  think it all .. I  think it’s quite related to recent history, rather than.../.../...a 
gradual drive for Scotland to be independent. ” (see Lab’s summary in 1.2.3).
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DISCUSSION 
1, Overview of the results and conclusions
In the first chapter, we argued for an interactionist view of social 
psychological phenomena which takes into account both psychological and social 
factors in order to predict social attitudes and behavioui*. In this respect, one of the 
main puiposes of the present analysis was to show how such a view is necessary, 
empirically speaking, in order to make sense of the phenomenon of attitudes towards 
national integration/separation, at least at the discursive and argumentative level. 
Indeed, although the political discouises we have seen appeal to notions which might 
be psychologically universal, such as the concern for ingroup identity, we have 
shown how we also need to talce into account the specific constructions of the 
content of identities and of the social context which accompanies those appeals if we 
are to understand their implications, i.e. how the arguments which are made actually 
sustain or oppose particulai* political positions. Rather than having a separation 
between those who would appeal to national identity and the others, we have seen 
how all our speakers use national identity, but also how they give very it different 
contents and very different definitions of the social context, as a function of their 
political project. Thus, as we stressed in Chapter 1, if the locus of identification and 
the concern for ingroup identity do not in and of themselves explain differences in 
political projects or attitudes, this is not because identity is unimportant, but on the 
contrary because it is pervasive (Paterson et ah, 2001). It is used by all political 
projects which underline different (or even opposed) ways of being Scottish (or 
British) and to protect/enhance this identity and the ingroup’s interests, norms, values 
and way of hfe.
More specifically, we have analysed different types of arguments in which 
the importance of content and context play in different ways. In section 2.2., we have 
seen how the attribution of specific contents to ingioup identity can be used as 
arguments aiming to mobilise support for both separation or integration. Through 
such definitions, speakers’ political projects are constmcted as representing the 
aspirations of the ingroup. Moreover, by making a distinction between the essence of 
identity and what is only contingent and external appearance, speakers can maintain 
their definitions (as well as the representativeness of their party and project) in the
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face of possible counter-evidence. Should their definitions be accepted by the 
audience, the prediction would be that a higher degree of identification would not 
necessarily lead to increased support for separatism, but that the direction of support 
would depend on their specific content.
Secondly, in sections 2.3 and 2.4, we have seen that political projects 
concerning union or separation can be argued over by constmcting the impact of 
these projects on the national self, i.e. whether they undermine or enhance this self 
and its interests. The same general notions of identity undennining or enhancement, 
which aie assumed to correspond to existing psychological processes in the audience, 
can be used to defend different political positions, i.e. unionism as well as 
separatism, depending on how they are applied. A political project of integration can 
be argued to enhance the national self and separation to undermine it, as well as the 
opposite. If the general process is that what or who endangers the self is viewed 
negatively and reacted against (and vice-versa), it is the specifics of constructions 
which determine the natuie of this who or what. That is, the political project which 
should be supported depends on how the impact of specific superordinate groups on 
ingroup identity is defined.
As we have seen in 2.3, such constructions of impact can rely on defining the 
specific nature of the superordinate group itself. They also rely, implicitly or 
explicitly, on how ingroup identity and the nature of the national interest are defined 
- for this is what is argued to be affected positively or negatively by the different 
political projects. Thus ingroup identity content matters at this level of argument as 
well, but here its meaning and consequences have to be understood in relation 
speakers’ broader construction of how the different political projects impacts on this 
content. The best illustration of this was provided by the data showing that speakers 
can attiibute negative traits to the ingroup (often contingent, but not necessarily so). 
Such apparent ingroup derogation makes sense when it is related to speakers’ 
political projects. That is, the national self can be described negatively in the present, 
because it is described in comparison to a future ideal (i.e. in comparison to what it 
can and should be) which the propose political project will bring about, while the 
opposed project will maintain or reinforce such negative traits. In other words, 
negative aspects are argued to be undeimined by the advocated project, and enhanced 
by the opposed project (van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984; Spears, Jetten, & 
Doosje, 2001).
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Arguments over the impact of political projects can also rely on a more 
explicit account of how ingroup identity and interests stand in relation to other 
subgroups. The constructions we saw in section 2.3 put their argumentative stress on 
underlining the natui'e of the impact, so that these latter aspects were often taken for 
granted. However, in section 2.4, we have seen how ‘impact’ constructions can also 
involve more explicit definitions of the relationship between the ingroup and the 
outgroup(s), in terms of the practical incompatibility or compatibility of their identity 
and the interests they define, as well as in terms of power. In turn, the definition of 
group relationships as compatible or incompatible can rely on the active 
constructions of specific identity contents, or those content can be taken for granted. 
Thus, while power arguments show the importance of how the social context is 
construed, compatibility/incompatibility arguments shows once again the importance 
of content, but also that, in this type of argument, specific contents need to be 
considered in relationship to other contents in order to understand their implications.
Finally, we have seen in section 2.1 that in order to understand some of the 
arguments encountered, we also needed to consider the ideological context in which 
they take place, i.e. the specific ideology of nationalism. This suggests that the fact 
that concerns for the ingroup national identity can ti'anslate into attitudes of political 
separatism or unionism might also depend on that specific nationalist context, i.e. 
that national identity is at stake rather than any other souice of identification. It is 
quite possible that, in other contexts, different attitudinal or behavioural responses 
might be deemed more appropriate. As Geertz (1993) suggests, "there are many 
other competing loyalties.../.../...in any state - ties to class, party, business, 
profession, or whatever. But groups formed o f such ties are never considered as 
possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood. Conflicts 
among them occur only within a more or less fully accepted terminal community 
whose political integrity they do not, as a rule, put into question.” (p.261). One of the 
particularities of disputes over national identity, which makes them more than just 
another instance of intergroup conflict, is then that they can involve more than 
groups trying to get their way against the conflicting interests of the outgroup. More 
fundamentally, through the fights for separatism or integration, they involve a 
struggle to define the very terms and political context within which intergroup 
relations, competition, and the pursuing of group’s interests take place.
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Overall, although the present analysis replicated many of the findings of 
Reicher and Hopkins’ research (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001; Reicher et al., 1997b), it has also extended diem in several ways. First of all, it 
has provided a more systematic classification of the different types or levels of 
arguments used by separatist and unionist political projects, illustrating their 
differences but also their relationship with one another, as well as their common 
purpose (i.e. in ternis of political mobilisation).
Secondly, our analysis has investigated in more depth the arguments 
concerning the reality/artificiality of identities as well as the consequences of these 
arguments. Moreover, by doing so, it has stressed the role that nationalist ideology 
can play at this level. In turn, this has illustrated the more general point that 
nationalist ideology and the political context of the nation states are necessary to 
understand the political projects centied on national identity. Amongst other things, it 
explains why seeking separate statehood is an available option as an identity-related 
collective strategy of social change in the area of national identities.
Thirdly, it has helped clarify and/or to put more emphasis on some specific 
points concerning other level of arguments. For instance, we have paid particular 
attention to the fact that identity undennining/enhancement arguments generally take 
the more specific form of identity repression vs. identity realisation. This has allowed 
us to stress the fact that what underlies these arguments is a concern for the 
expression of identity in practice, rather than being limited to a concern about 
‘having’ a positive and distinct identity at the intra-psychic level. Likewise, our 
analysis has also helped to clarify and systematise the inteiplay between 
incompatibility and power constructions in arguing about the positive or negative 
impact of superordinate gioups. Yet other examples are the distinction we made 
between the necessary and contingent aspects of identity, as well as the use of 
positive vs. negative traits and its related distinction between actual and ideal 
identity. Without taking into account these rhetorical devices, the full meaning of 
some arguments cannot be understood.
Finally, oui* analysis has attempted to provide a systematic mapping of our 
speakers’ arguments at each different level of argumentation. The conclusion of this 
attempt can be dealt with briefly, as it has already been repeated several times 
throughout the analysis. That is, we found a perfect consonance between speakers’ 
arguments and their political project at every level. This finding confirmed the
171
Strategic dimensions of such arguments. Our analysis has also shown that political 
projects or attitudes to Britain and to Europe can differ for the same speaker, and 
that, as a result, the constructions surrounding each of these body systematically vary 
in order to sustain these different positions.
Apart from the potential criticism of selectivity which we mentioned in the 
introduction, the results of this systematic review of speakers’ argument also helps us 
in defusing another possible objection. Indeed, discourse analysis looking at the 
functionality of discursive constructions could be criticised for the fact that the 
strategic purposes followed by speakers, which are assumed to explain the meaning 
of the arguments, are often deduced from the arguments themselves. In theory, as 
with the norm explanation of the MGP (see Chapter 1), this would leave open the 
possibility of postulating at will any ad hoc purposes in order to suit any argument 
which is encountered. The interpretation could then also be accused of being 
tautological and to be no more than a description of the data (as in the famous 
example that a soporific makes people sleep because it has sleeping properties). 
However, in our analysis, the arguments encountered were all interpreted in the light 
of the broad and constant political objectives of our speakers, which were determined 
a priori, and our concern for the systematic mapping of these arguments means that 
we could not discard those arguments which would not fit with that objective. 
Furthermore, these broad political objectives were not deduced only from our 
speakers’ discourse but also relied on an ‘independent’ source, namely their paity 
line.
Lastly, before we start considering the limits of our analysis, another of its 
strengths is worth pointing out. That is, our findings can be argued to have a high 
external validity, given that the data was collected within a quasi-natural context, 
where ‘participants’ were for tlie most part themselves in charge of the meanings. In 
the context of a social psychology dominated by laboratory experiments where 
meanings tend to be imposed on participants, and where concerns are therefore 
sometimes raised about the extent to which the results of these experiments can be 
generalised outside the artificial conditions of the laboratory, this is no small 
advantage. Should our further studies, which will use more orthodox methodologies, 
be criticised on that point, the present analysis would provide a case for the 
applicability of our general approach and finding in understanding the ‘real’ world 
outside the research context.
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It must be acknowledged, however, that this was only a ‘quasi’ natural 
framework, i.e. the data was collected in the context of interviews rather than, say, 
from the naturally occurring discourses of these politicians addressed to the general 
public. It is true that these inteiwiews were not stiongly structured and worked with 
rather general questions, but it is also tme that we cannot be definitive about the 
spontaneous occurrence and characteristics of identity constructions in natural 
political contexts, for the answers of our politicians must have been framed to some 
extent by the questions. However, we do not believe that they were entirely so and 
that this can fully account for the characteristics of these constmctions. Some 
evidence from our data can help to support this view. For instance, it is true that 
questions asking the interviewees to describe the Scots and the English, if they leave 
open the particular way of doing so, do indeed presuppose the use of national 
categories in order to answer them, and even might tend to suggest that the question 
of differences between them is at least a relevant one. Nevertheless, in contrast to 
what would happen with questionnaires, speakers were quite able to resist such 
questions and to refuse to answer in the terms they were posed if they wished to do 
so, as the use of class categories in some of Lab’s arguments in order to deconstruct 
national ones shows (see 1.2.3 and 2.1.1). Thus, the fact that national identities, and 
arguments over them, were nevertheless generally dominant in the discourses cannot 
entirely be reduced to the influence of the interview questions,
2. Limits and future directions
The major limits of this study, however, are also bound up with its specific 
methodological choice. First of all, there is the fact that our data was based on the 
very specific case of politicians. Not only does this make it a sample from an elite 
population, but it could also be argued that, due to their position, politicians might 
have specific concerns not shared by ordinary people, or not to the same extent. For 
instance, the cynic might say that politicians live in a different realm out of touch 
with the reality of ordinary people and that the concerns of these latter might be of a 
different nature altogether. On the other hand, the elitist might say that they hold a 
more sophisticated view of the social world, and that perhaps ordinary people would 
react in the more stereotypically narrow-minded way, where a higher degree of 
ingroup identification would indeed directly lead to more support for separatism
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(thereby undermining our content-based perspective). In all cases a gap is open 
between the politicians and the rest of the population. Therefore, a central question 
remains unanswered: are non-politicians concerned with the same type of issues 
(such as identity undermining/enhancement) and are these concerns indeed 
associated with their political stances towards supra-national bodies?
Furthermore, even should we assume that there is no qualitative difference 
between politicians and ordinary people, it can still be argued that, in this chapter, we 
have focused on the relationship between identity accounts and political attitudes at 
the argumentative level. Although we would assume, in line with the politicians 
making these arguments, that these latter can have a psychological impact because 
they correspond to psychological processes in the audience, our own claim at this 
level has not yet been directly and empirically established. Does the same logic and 
the same relationships found in those arguments play at the cognitive and 
motivational level? In other words, do identity definitions and constmals of the social 
context have a psychological impact affecting people’s political attitudes and beliefs, 
in the way which is assumed by political arguments, as well as being strategically 
used to sustain these projects? This is of course is not to say that all arguments are 
always efficient in doing so, but that, if the accounts of identity and social context in 
a specific argument ar e accepted, then this should lead to the consequences aimed at 
by the argument (i.e. to support the project it sustains), and that such an effect should 
be underpinned by psychological processes of identity. It might perhaps sound 
unlikely that politicians (or at least successful ones) would spend so much effort in 
arguing over identity and the way it is affected by supra-national bodies if it did not 
have such potential psychological impact and did not affect the attitudes in the 
general population; nevertheless, this remains a theoretical argument, and our 
discursive data does not allow us to reject the possibility that politicians might be 
wrong in what they think is moving people’s opinions and attitudes.
Thirdly, our evidence so far has been of a qualitative nature. Amongst other 
things, this methodological choice has allowed us to do justice to the complexities 
and richness of arguments and to make a number of points which might have missed 
with more traditional quantitative methods of enquiry. For instance, as noted above, 
we have seen how some identity accounts (such as stereotypical traits) needed to be 
put in their rhetorical context and be tied to broader constructions if we are to 
understand their meanings and consequences. However, if, as the questions raised by
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the limits of our analysis suggest, we are aiming to make a more general claim about 
the importance of identity accounts in relation to political attitudes amongst the 
general population, then we need to reinforce our qualitative data with quantitative 
data.
These limits will be addressed in the next studies, and, at the very least, the 
analysis presented in this chapter has set the relevance of the concepts which will 
receive our attention in those studies, as well as provided preliminary evidence as to 
the nature of the relationship which might exist between them (in line with the 
hypothesis made in Chapter 1).
Thus, in the survey study presented in the next chapter, we will focus on the 
quantitative relationship between conceptions of identity undermining, 
incompatibility and powerlessness on the one hand, and support for separatism on the 
other. More specifically, following the present findings, we will investigate two main 
hypothesis. One the one hand, we will ask whether the relationship between 
identification and support for separatism is moderated by perceptions of identity 
undermining, such that only when high identifiers also have a high sense of identity 
undermining should they support separatism more than low identifiers. On the other 
hand, we will test the idea that perceptions of incompatibility and powerlessness are 
also important in explaining support for separatism, but only insofar as they create 
perception of identity undermining; this means that these variables should be a strong 
predictor of identity undermining and that this latter should mediate their effect on 
support for separatism.
In Chapter 4, we will present an experiment attempting to manipulate directly 
perceptions of identity undermining and measuring the effect of this manipulation on 
support for separatism. This will constitute a more direct test of whether these 
perceptions can have a psychological impact on political attitudes.
Finally, two of the limitations raised above also apply to our point concerning 
the strategic nature of identity constructions. That is, we have shown that these latter 
can be used strategically by politicians and using qualitative (though systematic) 
evidence. However, our view is that strategic business on identity is not the 
monopoly of politicians (even if they might show a particular interest in doing so). 
Should that be the case, our approach would indeed be elitist, offering a picture 
whereby politicians consciously construct versions of the world which the public 
passively consume and act upon. Thus, in order to counter that view, in Chapter 5,
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we will attempt to show the impact of strategic factors on group judgements, 
amongst ‘ordinaiy’ people. Moreover, as there is no reason why the strategic could 
only be investigated through qualitative means, we will do so using experimental and 
quantitative means.
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CHAPTER III
IDENTITY UNDERMINING AND SEPARTISM :
A SURVEY OF SCOTS’ ATTITUDES TO BRITAIN AND
THE E.U.
INTRODUCTION
In relation to the main tenets of onr model, the findings from oni" first study 
may be summarised as follows. We have seen that the difference between speakers 
and their respective political projects could not be explamed simply by distinguishing 
between those who use identity and make related claims and those who do not, for all 
speakers work with identity constructions. Rather, as predicted, differences in 
political projects (or attitudes) are clearly associated with accounts of identity 
undermining (conceived of as the repression or dilution of ingroup identity) or else 
identity enhancement, such that support and opposition to supra-national bodies are 
both sustained by claims of representing and protecting the interests of ingroup 
identity and of realising the national self.
Our first study has also shown how the establishment of these constructions 
depicting the undermining or enliancement of identity relies on the use of vaiying 
definitions of identities and their relationships. Yet as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) 
point out:
To analyse the cultural battles over the definition o f national identity 
without understanding how people come to assume and inhabit such 
identities, and how the identity then shapes what they do, may be an 
interesting exercise in its own right, but it does not get us very far in 
understanding nationalism, (p.3).
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In some respects, onr analysis already went beyond this potential limitation. 
Rather than being simply an account of the variability in identity constructions, 
aiming only at emphasising their fluidity and controversial character, our 
understanding of this variability was shaped by and related to our theoretical 
understanding of what should be the consequences of identity definition in teims of 
social action. It is these potential consequences on social actors (which are 
underpinned by general identity processes), as well as the constant political projects 
pursued by speakers, which give meaning to the variable arguments and their 
particular forms as these speakers tiy to direct social action through specific identity 
constructions.
Nevertheless, if we are to fulfil the demands of the above statement, we must 
still go further than that. For one thing, we would need to investigate more directly 
the consequences of identity definitions and of the psychological identity processes 
involved in political attitudes. That is, we ought to provide direct evidence that these 
definitions and processes actually impact on people’s political attitudes in the way 
postulated by our model -  otherwise our speakers might just have been arguing in 
vain. In other words, this means that we need to address the other side of our model, 
and to ask whether accounts of ingioup identity and its relationship with the 
superordinate group can be more than rhetorical tools in the service of political 
attitudes, and whether they can also act as beliefs which play a key role in explaining 
those attitudes.
The study presented in this chapter, as well as the experimental study 
presented in the next chapter, were designed towards achieving this puipose. More 
particularly, the present study, which used a web-based suiwey design, focused on 
Scottish people’s concern about the undeimining of Scottish identity, and the 
relationship between this concern and their attitudes to Britain and to the EU. It 
measured views on identity undermining and on the intergroup context (i.e. lack of 
ingroup power and incompatibility with the English), and, analytically speaking, 
these views were treated as perceptions or beliefs which, in combination with the 
degree of identification, were expected to deteimine participants’ political attitudes.
In addition, and as stated at the end of the last chapter, this study also aimed 
to address two further limitations of the discui'sive study. First of all, it aimed to 
reinforce oui' qualitative evidence by quantitative data. Secondly, it aimed to show
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that the importance of our concepts can be generalised beyond the world of 
politicians. Accordingly, the study used a sample composed mainly of university 
students. Though the aim was not to recruit a sample which would have been 
exhaustively representative of the Scottish population in terms of class, age, 
geographical location, etc., this sample did fulfil the main criterion of being 
constituted of participants not formally committed to politics.
Hypotheses
Drawing upon our theoretical model, the following predictions were made. 
First of all, perceptions of the undeimining of ingroup identity within a supra­
national body (i.e. Britain or Europe) was expected to moderate the relationship 
between national (Scottish) identification and attitudes towards this body (HI). More 
specifically, this means that:
a) When identity undermining is high, there should be a positive relationship 
between ingroup identification and separatist political attitudes. The more people 
identify with the ingroup, the more they should oppose membership in the supra­
national body and support increased autonomy and/or independence.
b) When identity undermining is low, there should be no relation between 
identification and political attitudes, i.e. high identifiers should not differ from low 
identifiers in their political attitudes.
Secondly, insofar as perceptions of identity undennining in a supra-national 
body can vary according to the nature of the body under consideration, it is quite 
conceivable that support for membership in different supra-national bodies (British 
state vs. European Union) may be uncorrelated or negatively correlated (H2). In fact, 
in the case of Scottish people’s attitudes towards the UK and the EU, if their attitudes 
reflect official political parties lines (see Chapter 2), we might expect a moderate 
negative conelation.
Thirdly, our theoretical model also provides us with hypotheses about the 
origins of feelings of identity undermining. That is, feelings of identity undermining 
should be dependent on perceptions of incompatibility with the outgroup and lack of 
power of the ingroup (H3a). Furthennore, because powerlessness and 
incompatibility are assumed to influence political attitudes insofar as they detennine 
perceptions of identity undermining, the impact of those two variables (combined
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together) on political attitudes and intergroup attitudes should be mediated by 
perceptions of identity undermining (H3b). In order to limit the questionnaire’s 
length, however, those concepts were measui*ed only in relation to Britain (and the 
English) and thus were not tested in relation to attitudes to Europe.
Finally, we were also interested to look at the effect of identity undermining 
in relation to intergroup attitudes. Indeed, it is in that context that the content-free 
view of SIT has most often been either put forward or criticised, most notably around 
the hypothesis of a straightforward link between ingroup identification and ingroup 
bias (Turner, 1999; see Chapter 1). By contrast, oui' own hypothesis regarding this 
link minors our prediction for political attitudes. That is, we would expect identity 
undermining to moderate this relationship in such a way that identification will lead 
to ingroup bias only when the degree of identity imdermining is high (H4)
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METHOD 
Questionnaire design.
The questionnaire contained the following scales, designed to test our hypotheses 
(see Appendix 3.2 for full details):
L Independent variable:
a) Scottish identification: strength of Scottish national identification (4 items); this 
scale was composed of a compilation of identification items which have been used in 
earlier research (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & 
Turner, 1999; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; reviewed in Haslam, 2001).
I I  Intervening variables:
b) Incompatibility: perception of compatibility/incompatibility between Scottish and 
English people (6 items).
c) Powerlessness: perception of the lack of Scotland’s power within Britain, in 
comparison with England and English people (6 items).
d) Identity undermining in Britain: the perceived extent to which Scottish national 
identity is undermined by inclusion within the Britain (6 items).
e) Identity undennining in Europe: the perceived extent to which Scottish national 
identity is undermined by inclusion within the E.U. (6 items).
III. Dependent variables:
f) Political attitude towards Britain - sepaiatism vs. unionism (9 items):
This scale measured the support for independence or for the Union in Britain, with or 
without a Scottish parliament. Indeed, given the present political context of 
devolution, where the abolition of the Scottish parliament does not figure in any of 
the major political parties’ agendas (including the Conseiwatives; see Chapter 2), it 
was anticipated that such a position might be too sti'ong even for the many supporters 
of the Union. Accordingly some of the union items included the proviso that this 
support was conditional on Scotland keeping its devolved parliament.
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g) Political attitude towards Eui'ope - separatism vs. unionism (9 items):
This scale measured support of or opposition to membership and integration in the 
Eui'opean Union. The separatist position was operationalised as a position arguing 
for Scotland to withdraw from the Eui'opean Union. Some of the unionist items 
measuied the support for Eui'ope as a new federal super-state. However, given that - 
as with attitudes to Britain - this position is not supported by any major political 
paiiy in Scotland and Britain, some of the items also measured support for the EU on 
the condition that the latter would respect the sovereignty of the existing nation 
states.
h) Intergroup attitudes:
- Stereotypes of the Scots, the English and the Europeans: participants were asked to 
rate each of these groups on a set of 6 different qualities (e.g. hard-working, creative, 
unfriendly, etc.), half of which were positive in connotation and the other half 
negative. Negative items were reverse coded in such a way that participants’ answers 
reflected the degree to which they positively evaluated each group. Two composite 
scores of ingroup bias were then computed by subtracting the rating of the English or 
of the Europeans from those of the Scots.
- Attitudes to the Scots, the English and the Europeans: participants were asked more 
directly about their attitudes to these three groups (i.e. how much they like, admire 
and tiust them). As for stereotypes, a composite score of ingroup bias was computed 
by subtracting the rating of the English or of the Europeans from those of the Scots. 
Both intergroup attitudes scales were taken and adapted from Gonzalez (2000).
All items in the scales were Likert-type items with 7 points (from ‘strongly 
disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, or from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’). About half of the 
items in the incompatibility, poweiiessness, and identity undermining scales were 
formulated in a negative way and, accordingly, they were reverse coded in the 
analysis of results. Similar scales relating to Britain and Europe used similar items, 
with the exception of the political attitude scales where some variation in the items 
was inevitable. A summary of the above measures with sample items is provided in 
Table 3.1 (see below).
The questionnaire also contained additional measures which were not directly 
relevant to testing our main hypotheses (as stated above) and which were therefore
182
omitted from further analysis. Full details of these measures as well as of the items 
used in the scales described above can be found in Appendix 3.2.
TABLE 3,1 
Summaiy of measures and sample items
Measures Examples of item
a) Scottish identification
1. Being Scottish is very important for me.
2 . 1 feel strong ties with other Scottish people.
b) Incompatibility
1. The Scottish way o f  life is basically out o f  tune with the 
English way o f  life.
2. Scottish and English people are like pieces o f  a jigsaw  
puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together well, (reverse 
coded)
c) Powerlessness
1. The Scottish interest plays a part in determining British 
government decisions, (reverse coded)
2. When push comes to shove, the English always get their way 
in British policy.
d) and e) Identity 
undermining in Britain/in 
Europe
1. By being part o f  (Britain/the E.U.), Scottish values are 
corroded by alien values which are imposed on them.
2. Being part o f  (the UK/the European Union) has undermined 
the Scottish way o f  life.
f) Political attitude 
towards Britain 
(separatism vs. unionism)
1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate 
from the rest o f  the UK.
2. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part o f  
the UK.
3. Scotland should remain part o f  the U K  but without a separate 
parliament
g) Political attitude 
towards Europe 
(separatism vs. unionism)
1. Scotland would be best o ff being totally independent o f  the 
European Union.
2. Scotland should remain part o f  the European Union, but the 
nation states should retain their sovereignty and their veto on 
important matters
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3 . 1 support the idea o f  an European Union as a new  state in 
which the old nation-states would cease to exist as such
h) Intergroup attitudes: 
Stereotypes of the 
English, the Europeans 
and the Scots
I think that (the English/the Europeans/the Scots) are in general 
(Hard working, Unsociable, Intelligent, e tc ...)
h) Intergi'oup attitudes: 
Attitudes to the Scots, the 
English and the 
Europeans:
H ow much do you (like/admire/trust) (the English/the 
Europeans/the Scots)?
Pilot study
Apart from the identification and the intergroup scales, the other scales 
mentioned above were not borrowed from existing research but were created anew 
for the purposes of the present research. Accordingly, they were first submitted to 
piloting in order to ensure they constituted valid and reliable measures (by the same 
token, this pilot also allowed to test if the reliability of the existing scales could be 
confirmed). A pilot questionnaire was therefore designed, which contained more 
items than the final questionnaire described above (usually 50 to 100 % more, 
depending on the scale), so that a process of item selection would be possible.
First, a pool of items was generated through conversational exchanges with 
Scottish people, by adapting statements by Scottish politicians reported in Reicher 
and Hopkins’ analyses of political speeches (Reicher & Hopldns, 2001), or simply by 
inventing new ones. Those items were then submitted to a first selection based on 
face validity and clarity of the questions, before the pilot questionnaire was designed 
and distributed to volunteers for completion.
21 participants (13 males, 8 females), aged between 18 to 56 (M = 30.6), 
were recmited among the student and staff body of the university of St Andrews and 
asked to fill this pilot questionnaire. They were told that the study was about Scottish 
people’s attitudes towards Britain and Europe. Besides answering the questions, they 
were also encouraged to fr-eely comment on their clarity and their validity.
184
Cronbach’s alphas were calculated for each of the measures. On the whole, 
the results of this were quite good: for the scales which will be used in the following 
analyses, and with two exceptions, all alpha scores were higher than .80, ranging 
from .80 to .89.
The two exceptions were the ‘attitudes to the English’ and ‘political attitude 
to Europe’ scales, whose alphas were unsatisfactory {a = .57 and a\ = .59 
respectively). In the case of ‘attitudes to the English’, part-whole correlations 
indicated that this was clearly due to one particular item which was then 
subsequently withdrawn from the scale (together with its equivalent in the ‘attitudes 
to the Scots’ and ‘attitudes to the Europeans’ scales). As for ‘political attitude to 
Europe’, part-whole correlations indicated that the low alpha was mainly due to the 
items which measui'ed support for the EU on the condition that the nation states kept 
their sovereignty. It seemed that these items were, in fact, measui'ing more a 
separatist stance rather than an unionist one. Indeed, recomputing the scale reliability 
with those items considered to measure support for separatism (i.e. not reverse coded 
as previously) yielded an alpha of .86. Accordingly, it was decided to ti*eat them as 
such for the subsequent survey study.
As for the remaining scales, though they yielded good alphas, it was 
nevertheless necessary to make a second selection of items, in order to make the 
questionnaire more manageable in tenus of length, thereby ensuring that the attention 
of the participants would not diminish dramatically towards the end. This was done 
according to several criteria. First of all, part-whole correlations between each item 
and its respective scale were calculated. Any item that failed to correlate significantly 
at p<.01 with the scale was immediately discarded. For those which did correlate 
significantly, the items were selected by trying to keep those with the highest 
correlations, but which also met three other criteria. Those other criteria were: a) 
keeping a balance between normal and reverse-coded items; b) keeping similar items 
in the different versions of the same scales applied to different targets (Britain vs. 
Europe), for which conelation with their respective scales sometimes differed; c) 
discarding those items which participants’ feedback pointed to as being ambiguous. 
Despite these criteria, it was possible to ensure that the great majority of the 
remaining items in the final questionnaire (see Appendix 3.2) had a correlation with 
their respective scale of above 0,7.
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Procedure and participants in the survey.
Participants were recruited amongst the student body of the Universities of St 
Andrews and Aberdeen, and invited to take part in a web-based suiwey. In St 
Andrews, the survey was advertised to students by way of e-mail; the advert was 
inserted into one of the messages sent periodically by the Student Union to all 
students about general student events. In Aberdeen, it was advertised on the 
university website, within the campus news, an abstract of which also appeared when 
computers were started in classrooms (see Appendix 3.1 for the text of the advert).
The research was presented as an opinion survey on Scottish people’s 
attitudes towards Britain and Europe. Students interested in participating were 
invited to click on a link which directed them to an electronic version of the 
questionnaire. Based on the pilot study results, it had been estimated that filling in 
this questionnaire would take about 20 minutes of their time. 234 questionnaires 
were received back by way of e-mail, but 5 of them were discarded because they 
were only very partially filled in (i.e. less than 50 % of questions answered), and 2 
more because the participants admitted to not being Scottish. This left us with 227 
participants (115 males, 107 females, 5 participants did not report their gender), aged 
between 17 to 60 (M= 21.8).
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RESULTS
The following analysis of results will be structured as follows. The first 
section will re-appraise the reliability of our scales with the newly collected data. 
Then, section 2 will test hypothesis HI concerning the moderating role of identity 
undennining in the relationship between identification and participants’ attitude to 
Britain, while section 3 will test the same hypothesis in relation to participants’ 
attitude towards Europe. Section 4 will appraise the relationship between attitudes to 
Britain and to Europe (H2). Section 5 will check the hypotheses concerning the 
impact of powerlessness and incompatibility on identity undermining, and the role of 
the latter in mediating the effects of powerlessness and incompatibility on political 
attitudes to Britain (H3). Finally, section 6 will look at the effect of identification and 
identity undermining on ingroup bias (H4).
1. Scale reliability
Cronbach’s alphas were computed for each scale in order to evaluate their 
internal reliability. The results were quite satisfactory: for the scales which will be 
used in the following analyses, alpha scores ranged from .80 to .93, thus indicating 
that all scales had a high internal consistency. Only one post-hoc modification was 
made, regarding the incompatibility scale. Although this scale had a more than 
satisfactory overall alpha (a = .82), one item in the scale (item 1) was withdrawn 
from the analysis because it failed to show any substantial correlation with the other 
items in the scale. Subsequent analyses were performed on the reduced scale.
2. Political attitude to Britain
The aim of this section is to test our main hypothesis HI in relation to 
participants’ attitude towards Britain, i.e. that identity undermining in Britain would 
moderate the impact of Scottish identification on this attitude. According to Baron 
and Kenny (1986), moderation relationships between variables can be conceptualised 
as interaction effects: that is, the effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
one is conceived of as being dependent upon the level of another independent 
variable. In line with their guidelines to test such an effect, when using continuous
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variables, a multiple linear regression (MR) was run with Scottish identification, 
identity undermining, and the product of those two variables (representing the 
interaction) as predictor variables, and with separatism (vs. unionism) as the 
dependent variable. Aiken and West (1991) also recommend that predictor variables 
should first be centred in multiple regression involving interactions, and thus such a 
transformation was performed beforehand (this operation will be repeated for all 
further moderation analyses).
The results of this MR analysis showed significant average effects for both 
Scottish identification (B = .301, SE = .067, f  = ,258, t 222 = 4.50, p  < .001) and 
identity undermining (B = .628, SE = .059, (5 -  .574, 1222 -  10.70,7? < .001). These 
effects, however, were qualified by a significant interaction between the two 
predictor vaiiables {B = .117, SE ^  .045, t 222 = 2.59, p  = .010), thus providing 
preliminary support for our hypothesis. However, it remained to be seen whether this 
significant interaction was working in the expected direction.
Aiken and West (1991) have detailed the procedure to follow in order to 
interpret significant interactions in multiple regressions. Briefly stated, it consists in 
calculating a set of regression slopes (‘simple slopes’) representing an estimation of 
the relationship between the IV and the DV at different levels of the moderator 
(‘conditional values’ or CVs), in order to appraise how the relationship between the 
IV and the DV evolves as a function of the moderator. The usual practice, which we 
will follow here, is to choose as CVs the mean, one standard deviation below the 
mean, and one standard deviation above the mean of the moderator (Cohen & Cohen, 
1983). However, we also computed the simple slopes at 2 SDs below and above the 
mean of the moderator, in order to illustrate more fully the evolution of the 
relationship between identification and political attitude across the range of identity 
undermining\ For reason of convenience, these five conditional values of identity 
undermining used in the analyses were labelled as ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, 
‘high’ and ‘very high’. The results of our analysis are summarised in Table 3.2 (see 
below).
1 This was done only for illustrative purposes, because the technique used can only represent linear 
interactions - that is, the relationship between the IV and the DV changing uniformly as a function of the 
moderator - , meaning that simple slopes will always differ by the same amount when they are computed 
at similar intervals. Therefore, computing these additional simple slopes does not provide any new 
information as such.
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As those results show, the pattern of the interaction matched our expectation. 
At a very low CV of identity undermining, the relationship between identification 
and separatism was not significant at all (fi -  -.002, ns). However, as the level of 
undermining increased, this relationship became significant and increased 
dramatically in strength accordingly (e.g. on the mean, = .258, /? < .001; at high CV 
of undermining: f  = .388,7? < 001).
TABLE 3.2
Relationship between Scottish identification and support for separatism as a function
of level of undermining in Britain
Conditional values of identity undermining in Britain 
Very low Low Medium High Very high
(=1.50) (=2.80) (=4.10) (= 5.40) (= 6.70
B -.003 .149 .301 .453 .605
SE .111 .070 .067 .104 .155
P -.002 .128 .258 .388 .519
t(222) T&6 2.12 4.50 4.35 3.90
P .979 ,035 <001 <001 <001
Simple slopes
(regression of 
separatism on 
identification)
B = unstandardised regression coefficients 
p = standardised regression coefficients
3. Political attitude to Europe
To test our hypothesis HI in relation to political attitude to Europe, a similar 
MR procedure to the one in section 2 was run, using Scottish identification, identity 
undermining (both centred) and their product as predictors of participants’ attitude to 
Europe. The interaction in this analysis failed to be significant {B = -.063, SE = .039, 
 ^221 = 1.61,7? = .109). There were, however, significant and positive average effects 
for both Scottish identification {B = A60, SE -  .045, j3 =  .207, 1221 “  3.59,7 ?  <.001) 
and identity undermining {B = ,380, SE ~ .046, P = .473, /221 =8.18,7? <001).
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Thus, these results failed to confirm our interaction hypothesis HI in relation 
to political attitude to Europe. Nevertheless, they showed that identity undermining 
was a significant predictor of support for separatism, even once the effect of 
identification was controlled for.
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4, Relationships between attitudes to Britain and to Europe
To test our hypothesis H2, i.e. that attitudes to Britain and to Eui'ope can be 
uncorrelated or even correlate negatively, a Pearson’s correlation coefficient was 
computed between support for separatism towards Britain and towards Europe. It 
was found that there was no significant congélation between the two variables (r = 
.087, p  = .190), a fact which provided support for our hypothesis - though only in its 
weaker form.
However, it could still be objected that a content-free inteipretation of SIT 
would only predict a positive correlation between separatist attitudes to different 
superordinate groups in the case of high identifiers. In order to reject that possibility, 
participants were divided into three groups (low, medium, and high identifiers), 
according to their level of identification (by means of a split on the third and two- 
third percentiles), and conelations between political attitudes to Britain and Europe 
were calculated separately for each of those groups.
This analysis revealed very few changes compared to the overall correlation. 
In the medium (n = 64) and the high (n = 80) identification groups, the correlation 
between attitudes to Britain and to Euiope was still not significant (respectively, r = - 
.009, ns and r = .075, p  = .507). The only change occurred for low identifiers (n = 
82) where a marginally significant correlation was found {r = -.197, p  =.077), but this 
correlation was in fact negative. Thus, if anything, this analysis provided further 
support for our hypothesis, while contradicting the prediction of a content-free link 
between identification and separatism.
5. Identity undermining in Britain: predictors and mediation
The first part of H3, concerning incompatibility and powerlessness, stated 
that these two variables should be significant predictors of identity undeimining. In 
order to test this hypothesis, identity undermining in Britain was regressed on both 
incompatibility and powerlessness in the same regression equation. Confirming our 
expectations, both regressions coefficients were significant (for incompatibility, p  = 
.371, 1224 = 6.16,7? < .001; for powerlessness, p  = .345,1224 = 5.73,7? < -001)
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The second part of H3 was that the effect of incompatibility and 
powerlessness on political attitudes should be mediated by perceptions of identity 
undermining. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable can be considered as 
a mediator between an independent and a dependent variable when the three 
following conditions are met: a) the IV significantly predicts the mediator; b) the 
mediator significantly predicts the DV, even when the effect of the IV on the DV is 
controlled; c) the IV significantly predicts the DV when it is considered on its own, 
but this relation becomes non significant, or is at least significantly reduced, when 
the effect of the mediator on the DV is controlled.
In the present case, identity undermining was our potential mediator, and 
separatism the dependent variable. As far as the IV is concerned, our model 
prescribes that this variable should be a combination of incompatibility and 
powerlessness. Accordingly, a new variable, composed of the product of 
incompatibility and powerlessness, was computed in order to be used as the 
independent variable in the analysis^. It should be clear, however, that the term 
‘incompatibility*powerlessness’, which will be used to designate this new variable, 
does not represent the interaction between the two variables but simply their 
multiplication.
Following the recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986), the conditions 
stated above in order to establish mediation were checked by computing a series of 
regression equations. First, the potential mediator was regressed on the IV; second, 
the DV was regressed on the IV; and third, the DV was also regressed on both the IV 
and the mediator. The results of these analyses are summarised in Figure 3.1 (see 
below), which represents the mediation model together with the (3 weights of all 
possible paths. Figures without brackets represent weights in the equations where the 
IV was entered alone, while figures in brackets represent weights in the equation 
where both the IV and the mediator were entered together and thus controlled for 
each other.
As it can be seen from Figure 3.1, the results supported our mediation 
hypothesis. First of all, the IV (incompatibility*powerlessness) significantly 
predicted perceptions of identity undermining (fi = .604, t 225 =11.37, p  < .001).
2 It should be pointed out, however, that the mediation analyses which will be presented here were also 
run with botli powerlessness and incompatibility alone as independent variable and tliat such analyses 
yielded highly similar results to the ones reported here, in terms of level of significance.
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Secondly, identity undermining significantly predicted separatism even when the 
effect of the IV was contiolled for = .572,1224 = 9.72, p  < .001). Thndly, although 
the impact of the IV on separatism, once controlled for identity imdermining, was 
still significant = .203, t 224 = 3.45, p  = .001), it was nevertheless substantially 
reduced compared to when it was entered alone in the equation {fi = 548,1225 = 9.83, 
p < .001), and substantially weaker than the controlled effect of identity undeimining 
on separatism.
FIGURE 3.1
Identity undermining as a mediator between powerlessness/incompatibility and
political attitude to Britain
.548*** (.203***)
IDENTITY
UNDERMINING
POWERLESSNESS * 
INCOMPATIBILITY SEPARATISM
All figures represent P Weights 
Figures in brackets: effect controlled.
The success of this mediation analysis was more formally confirmed by the 
use of SobeFs test (Sobel, 1982), which provides a significance test for the indirect 
effect of the IV on the DV via the mediator, and thus indirectly assesses if the 
reduction in the link between the IV and the DV is significant (MacKinnon, Warsi, & 
Dwyer, 1995). This test was highly significant (z = 7.40; p  <.0001). Given that the 
link between the IV and the DV, once controlled for the mediator, nevertheless 
remained significant, we can therefore conclude that there was partial mediation of 
the effect of powerlessness and incompatibility on separatism by identity 
undeimining. This suggests that these variables affect political attitudes in large part 
because they affect and relate to identity perceptions.
6. Intergroup attitudes and ingroup bias
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In order to test our hypothesis H4 regarding intergroup attitudes, similar MR 
procedures to the ones in section 2 and 3 were run but with intergroup attitudes 
(rather than political attitudes) as dependent variables.
To start with the British context, the analyses revealed a significant 
interaction of identification and identity undermining on the first measure of ingroup 
bias, calculated on the basis of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes (B = .116, SE 
=.051, t 218 = 2.29, p  = .023). Thus, simple slopes at different CVs of identity 
undermining were subsequently calculated. The results of these analyses can be seen 
in Table 3.3.
TABLE 3.3
Relationship between Scottish identification and ingroup bias (stereotypes measure) 
as a function of level of undermining in Britain
Conditional values of identity undermining in Britain 
Veiy low Low Medium High Very high
(= 1.50) (=2.80) (= 4.10) (= 5.40) (= 6.70
B -.019 .138 .289 .440 .592
SE .125 .079 .076 .118 .175
P -.014 .139 .291 .444 .596
t(218) .109 1.73 3.82 3.71 3.37
P .914 .084 <001 <001 <001
Simple slopes 
(regression of 
ingroup bias on 
identification)
As can be seen from Table 3.3, the pattern of interaction did confirm our 
expectation. At a very low level of identity undermining, the relationship between 
identification and ingroup bias was non significant (J3 = -.014, j:? = .914), but this 
relationship became significant and increased in strength as the level of identity 
undermining increased. It was marginally significant at a low level of identity 
undermining (fi = .139, p  = .084) but fully significant on the mean {fi = .291, ^ <.001) 
and at high (fi = .44, p  < .001) and very high = .596, p < .001) levels of identity 
undermining.
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On the second score of ingroup bias, computed on the basis of attitudes to the 
Scots and the English, the MR analysis did not yield a significant interaction {B = 
.075, SE = 063,  ^219 = 1.19, jp = .235). There were, however, significant average 
effects of both identification (B = .630, SE -  .094, p  = .433, 1219 = 6.70, p  < .001) 
and identity undermining {B = .443, SE = .083, y? = .326,1219 = 5.41, y? < .001).
As far as the European context is concerned, MR analyses revealed no 
significant interaction of identification and identity undermining on either the first 
measure of ingroup bias {B -  .025, SE =.044, ? 216 = .58, p  = .565) or the second one 
{B = .05, SE = .051, t 219 = .98, p  = .327). As above, there were nevertheless 
significant average effects of both predictors on both measures (for the ‘stereotypes’ 
measure, identification: R = .154, = .050, p  = .199,1216 = 3.07, p  = .002; identity
undeimining: R = .183, 5E" = .052, p  = .228,1216 = 3.49,;? = .001; for the ‘attitudes’ 
measure: identification: B = .381, SE = .059, p  = .369,1216 == 6.51, p  < .001; identity 
undeimining: B = .386, SE = .061,^  = .361, ^216 = 6.34,;? < .001).
Thus, taking together the British and the European contexts, full support for 
our moderation hypothesis was found only in one case out of four (i.e. on one of the 
four dependent measures). However, as for political attitude to Europe, the key role 
of identity undermining in predicting intergroup attitudes was nevertheless confinned 
in all cases.
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DISCUSSION
1. Summary o f  the results
As far as the Scotland-Britain relationship is concerned, the general picture 
which emerged fiom the results of this survey provided strong support for our 
perspective and hypotheses. First of all, and most importantly, concerning 
participants’ political attitude to Britain, the expected interaction between 
identification and identity undermining was found, and this interaction behaved 
according to the logic of our model. Secondly, a similar interaction was also found 
on one of the measures of ingroup bias, where increased identification led to an 
increase in ingroup bias only when the level of identity undermining was moderate to 
high. Finally, concerning the antecedents of identity undermining in Britain, oui" 
hypothesis that this would be dependent upon perceptions of incompatibility with the 
outgroup and of lack of ingroup power within the supra-national group was 
confirmed, and the hypothesis that identity undermining would mediate the effects of 
those two variables on separatism was also strongly supported.
Of course, the significant interaction we found on political attitude does not 
preclude the possibility that, overall, there might be more high identifiers within 
those who advocate separatism than amongst unionists (Abrams, 1994). In our study, 
this was reflected by the significant average effect of identification on separatism. 
Such a result is not surprising, and perhaps should even be expected, given the 
asymmetry between separatist and unionists positions to which we pointed to in 
Chapter 2. That is, while both separatist and unionist positions can be advocated on 
the basis of ingroup identity, unionist positions can also be advocated in the name of 
the superordinate identity. This means that subgroup identification is a necessary pre­
requisite to a separatist stance, but not to an unionist one. At the subgroup level, we 
would expect separatists to be high identifiers, while unionist can potentially be low 
as well as high identifiers. However, oui* point, which is supported by oui* data, is that 
there is no logical and inevitable relationship between the two, and that supporting 
union in a superordinate group is not necessarily at the exclusion of ingroup 
(subordinate) identification. Again, for those who do identify with the subgroup, all 
depends on how the impact of the superordinate group on that subgroup is perceived.
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Likewise, a potential concern relating to the results of our interaction analysis 
could be the significant conelation (7* = ,494, p  < .001) which was found between 
ingroup identification and identity undeimining in Britain. However, even if it would 
have been very compelling for our purposes to find those two variables acting totally 
independently of each other, our claim is not that such a relationship can never exist. 
Rather, what we are claiming is that there is not a logical relationship between the 
two variables, i.e. that high identification does not lead automatically to a feeling of 
undermining and therefore to separatist tendencies in the field of political attitudes. 
In fact, a more detailed analysis of this result confirmed this idea by showing that 
this correlation was mainly due to a tendency of low identifiers to score low on 
identity undeimining, rather than being due to the opposite tendency of high 
identifiers to score high on identity undermining. Indeed, correlations between 
identification and undermining in Britain calculated separately for the three groups of 
low, medium, and high identifiers (see section 4 of the results) revealed that only in 
the low group was this correlation significant (for low identifiers, r =.355, < .001;
for medium, r  =151., ns\ for high, r =177, ns).
Thus, in the British context, the general message coming out of our data is 
quite clear. That is, it is far too simplistic to deduce political (and intergroup) 
attitudes from identification alone, and identity undermining is at least one of the 
crucial variables that must be considered in the equation. This is not to say that 
identification is not an important factor, or even a less important one than identity 
undermining. Indeed, the interaction results could as well have been interpreted the 
other way round, i.e. as showing that identification plays a crucial role in moderating 
the effects of identity undermining. Moreover, the very concept of identity 
undermining underlines the importance of identity processes. However, what we 
have tried to achieve with this research, and by choosing to interpret the results in 
that way, is simply to provide a powerful reminder that identification processes per 
se do not lead to specific attitudinal results unless we know what feeds into those 
processes, and take into account other factors related to the meaning of identities and 
identity relationship, of which identity undermining constitutes, after all, only one 
example (although in our view a particularly important one).
As regards political attitudes to Europe, however, our results were less clear 
and did not support our interaction hypothesis, on both political attitude and 
intergroup attitudes. There might be several reasons for this. First of all, given that
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Scotland is a member of the EU through its membership in Britain, it could be that 
concerns relating to British identity and its potential undermining in Europe might 
have been more relevant to some of the participants than questions regarding 
Scottisliness - or at least such British-related concerns might have interfered with 
their concerns for Scottish identity (see also Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). However, 
as the survey did not include measures of identity undermining in relation to British 
identity in Eur ope, it was not possible to test this post-hoc explanation.
Secondly, it is also possible that our measure of political attitude to Europe 
needs to be revised. Indeed, we have already mentioned that the political option of an 
European federal state is not a very relevant one in the Scottish political context; but 
it is also true that the opposite position of withdrawal from the EU is not frequently 
advocated either, and, by contrast to independence from Britain, does not represent 
such a politically available and credible option (see Chapter 2). This was reflected in 
OUT" data, since the mean score for the items measming support for independence 
from Europe within the political attitude scale was quite low { M -  2.57, SD ~ 1.47), 
as was the mean for the items measuring support for a federal state (M = 2.49, SD — 
1.47). All in all, this did not leave much room for an interaction to appear on both 
these subset of items.
As for the items measuring support for the EU with the provision of respect 
for national sovereignty, these might have yielded more balanced scores, but 
although their inclusion as separatist items in the scale was justified on the basis of 
reliability analyses, their relationship with either total separatism or total unionism 
was, in fact, not enthely clear. Indeed, though as a whole they correlated negatively 
with the ‘federal state’ items (r = -.384, p  < .001), they also correlated negatively 
with the ‘independence’ ones (r = -.217, p  = 001). In other words, participants’ 
answers on those items might have been determined by two opposite and interfering 
pulls of arguing against too much integration and arguing in favour of some limited 
form of integration, and, though one of these pulls might have been stronger, it still 
means that the meaning of these answers was not entirely clear.
Thus, should we wish to run further research in this area, there would be a 
need to develop a more sensitive measure which would reflect the fact that the 
political debate around Europe is perhaps less clear-cut than the one around Britain, 
and is more about determining the extent to which there should be more or less
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integration in Europe, in what forms and in what areas, rather than whether or not 
there should be integration at all.
Nevertheless, it remains that identity undermining was found to be a 
significant predictor of political attitude to Europe, at least as much (if not more) 
than identification alone, and this even when the effect of the latter variable was 
accounted for. This is especially meaningful given that, in the case of Europe, the 
correlation between identification and identity undermining (in Europe) was only 
marginally significant (r =.115,p = ,086), and in fact quite weak in absolute terms. It 
means that we would know at least as much of participants’ attitude to Europe by 
looking at their perception of identity undermining than by simply looking at their 
degree of identification. Thus, even if the results failed to provide support for our 
interaction hypothesis in the Eui'opean context, they nonetheless demonstrated the 
importance of this concept in understanding political attitudes.
2. Limitations and future directions
Despite our positive results, this survey, as with every piece of research, has a 
number of limitations which must also be pointed out. First of all, the data relating to 
the identification scores must be treated with some caution. Indeed, as the median of 
Scottish identification scores {median = 5.875) indicates, the distribution of this 
variable was negatively skewed, denoting a general tendency for participants to score 
quite high on that scale. It is not impossible that this pattern might reflect a general 
tendency in the Scottish population, but it might also be due, in part, to the procedure 
which was used to recruit participants, for their motivation to answer the 
questionnaire could have stemmed fr om their involvement with issues of Scottish 
identity, especially in a situation where this recruitment was made by way of e-mails 
and advertising on websites (although it must be noted that the identification median 
in the pilot study, were the recruiting procedure was different, was also quite high: 
median = 5.5).
Practically, this means that the survey is best considered as mainly depicting 
the response patterns of medium to very high identifiers, whereas no sound 
conclusions can be di*awn about low and very low identifiers (these labels were used 
in the analysis of results, but only in a relative way). Indeed, only 33 participants out 
of 227 scored on the midpoint or below on this scale - although it could also be
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argued that scoring below the midpoint can be considered as more than expressing 
low identification, namely as an active rejection of this identity.
But if this is clearly a limitation of the data, it also suggests another way of 
looking at it which brings further support to our general claim. Indeed, if we consider 
that, with very few exceptions, all participants were fairly high identifiers, then it is 
even more surprising that we still managed to obtain the expected interaction on 
political attitude to Britain, despite the reduced vaiiability in identification scores. 
Even in that context, we can see that, for these medium to high identifiers, their 
political attitude to Britain clearly was very much dependent on their level of identity 
undermining. In that respect, whether or not this holds for low identifiers is relatively 
less important in order to make the point that identification is not sufficient on its 
own to predict political attitudes, and to sti'ess the importance of the meanings 
associated with identity relationships. Furthermore, the median statistic for the scores 
of identity undeimining in Britain {median = 4) shows that the distribution on this 
latter variable was quite balanced, proving that high identification can lead to low as 
well as to high levels of identity undermining (see also the pattern of correlations 
mentioned above between identification and identity undermining).
Nonetheless, another concern relating to the representativeness of oui’ sample 
must also be mentioned. Participants were almost all recruited from a young, student 
population, which, of course, raises questions about the generalisability of the results 
to other parts of the Scottish population. Although, as mentioned in the introduction, 
our aim in this study was not especially to achieve a thorough representation of this 
population as a whole, fiu’ther research should address this issue.
There ai e three remaining limitations to this research which we would like to 
underline here and which also point to directions for future research. First of all, 
although we went some way towards exploring the antecedents of identity 
undermining through the concepts of incompatibility and power, more could still be 
done in order to understand how feelings of identity undermining relate to the 
meaning of identities, of their relationships, and of perceptions of socio-structural 
features. On the one hand, there might be other socio-structural features which might 
be worth considering, such as the legitimacy of power distribution or the 
permeability of intergroup boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Chapter 1). On the 
other hand, for the sake of a survey design implying quantification and closed 
questions, measuring incompatibility involved formalising the relationship between
200
identities into a somewhat dichotomised concept. In order to address onr concern 
with identity contents more directly, it would be necessary to show that such 
perceptions, and hence feelings of identity undermining, are rooted in the interplay of 
concrete and specific meanings associated with identities and their practical 
implications. Though this point was addressed in the discursive study of Chapter 2, it 
remains to be addressed quantitatively, and this concern should be part of any further 
research in this area.
Secondly, one obvious lacuna is that the present research only addressed 
concerns for identity undermining, whereas our theoretical framework also suggests 
the hypothesis that, when people go further than denying identity undermining but 
actually think that ingroup identity is enhanced by being part of a superordinate 
group, then an increase in long-term identification or in the contextual salience of 
ingroup identity should lead to a stronger support for membership in that 
superordinate group. Further research will be needed to address this point. If 
evidence could be found for the relevance of identity enhancement, it would allow to 
demonstrate an even stronger moderating relationship (i.e. that depending on content, 
identification can lead not only to different but to antithetical results).
Finally, given the correlational nature of oui* data, any assumption about the 
causal links between variables and about the directions of such links must remain 
highly hypothetical. The status of ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ that was attributed 
to our variables in the analyses was drawn fiom our theoretical reasoning, and if the 
empirical data seemed to be consistent with those assumptions, they cannot be used 
as conclusive evidence supporting them. This triggers the need for further 
investigations of an experimental nature, where identity undermining and meanings 
of identities would be directly manipulated in order to see if it is possible to influence 
political attitudes in this way. This is where oui* attention is going to tuin to in the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
CHANGING ATTITUDES TO SUPERORDINATE
GROUPS :
AN EXPERIMENT ON THE IMPACT OF BRITAIN ON
SCOTLAND
INTRODUCTION
It has been stated many times by now, but let us summarise again the core 
idea of this thesis’ research. To put it simply, we believe that political attitudes are 
influenced by the way in which being part of a superordinate group is seen to impact 
on ingroup identity, its norms, values, its way of life, and its capacity to express 
those norms and values. In Chapter 2, we worked on the assumption that this is 
precisely the reason why the nature of this impact is argued about by those who wish 
to shape political attitudes, while in Chapter 3 we provided evidence of a quantitative 
relationship between how this impact is perceived and political attitudes, thereby 
suggesting that such beliefs have indeed an influence on people’s attitudes. However, 
given the conelational nature of this last study, this influence still remains to be 
shown directly. The usual way to achieve this is through experimental manipulation.
Thus, this chapter will present the results of an experimental study in which 
the main purpose was to make a first step within that line of enquiry, by 
manipulating directly perceptions and feelings of identity undermining or 
enhancement in order to appraise if and how this can affect political attitudes - which 
is, after all, what our politicians in Chapter 2 try to achieve.
To be more specific, the present research attempted to manipulate those 
feelings through confronting people with a specific and veiy concrete example of 
Scottishness being undennined or enhanced by the fact of being in Britain. That is,
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our participants were given an account of a policy emanating fiom the British 
government which, depending on the experimental condition, was said to affect 
Scottish identity in different ways. In a first condition (neutral)^ there was no explicit 
reference to its specific impact on and relation to Scottish identity. In a second 
condition (dissonant), however, the policy was described as being dissonant with a 
key Scottish value and aspect of the Scottish way of life, while in a third condition 
(consonant), it was presented as protecting this way of life and therefore consonant 
with Scottish identity. Our expectation was that the change in the presentation of the 
policy would affect not only attitudes towards that particular policy, but would also 
make salient for participants the undermining or enhancing effect of Britain in 
general, and would thereby also affect their more general political attitude towards 
Britain. To put it in another way, our reasoning was that there would be a 
generalisation from the effect of the policy to the effect of being part of Britain in 
general.
Hypotheses
On this basis, our hypotheses were as follows. First of all, we expected that 
the experimental manipulation would impact on attitudes towards the policy itself,
i.e. that participants in the dissonant condition would disagree more with the policy 
than participants in other conditions, while participants in the consonant condition 
would agree more with the policy than participants in other conditions (HI). Though 
this hypothesis was not key to our main argument, it constituted a preliminary test of 
whether the ‘manipulation’ arguments based on identity consideration would have an 
impact at least on the specific level of attitude towards the policy, i.e. whether they 
would succeed in inducing a more positive or negative perception of it.
Our second, and main, hypothesis was that, at a more general level, the 
manipulation would also impact on the political attitude towards Britain. More 
precisely, it was hypothesised (H2a) that participants in the dissonant condition 
should show a stronger separatist (or less unionist) attitude than participants in both 
other conditions, whereas participants in the consonant condition should show the 
strongest support for the Union (or the least support for separatism). Furthermore, it 
was expected that any differences in political attitude between conditions should be 
due to change of perceptions concerning the relationship of Scotland with Britain and
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whether Scottish identity is enhanced or undennined by being part of Britain. In 
other words, the manipulation should impact on perceptions of identity 
undermining/enhancement, and the effect of the manipulation on political attitudes 
should be mediated by these perceptions (H2b).
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METHOD 
Participants.
Participants were recmited amongst the student body of Elmwood College in 
Cupar (Scotland). 70 participants took part in the experiment, but 19 participants had 
to be excluded as they were not of Scottish nationality, answered (ambiguously) that 
they were British when their nationality was asked, or else failed to answer the 
question on their nationality altogether. A further 4 participants were excluded 
because they failed to answer to more than one dependent variable. Of the remaining 
47 participants, 10 were male and 37 female {age range 16-48 years, M  = 23.32, 
median =17)
Design.
The design was based on the manipulation of one between-subjects factor 
(account of the policy), with three levels: neutral (# =  12) vs. dissonant (# =  17) vs. 
consonant (iV= 18).
Procedure.
The experiment was run in 5 sessions, dining class time (one session per 
class, groups of 7 to 21). Participants in all conditions were first told that they were 
going to take part in a study about attitudes towards policies in Britain. They were 
told that they were going to be given a questionnaire which contained a written 
account of a particular British policy, concerning access to the countryside, the text 
used being talcen (allegedly) from the BBC news Website. Then, they would have to 
answer some questions about their reactions to and opinions about that policy. They 
were also specifically asked to read the policy account veiy carefully, as there would 
be some memory questions at tlie end of the questionnaire.
At that point, the questionnaires were distributed. The assignment of 
participants to one of the 3 conditions was determined by the type of questionnaire 
they received. Questionnaires were distributed randomly within each session by the 
experimenter, who was blind to the type of questiomiaire he was disti ibuting. The
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first page of the questiomiaire gave some general instructions, after which came the 
account of the policy. Having read that text, participants then filled in a number of 
dependent measures (see below) including, critically, their attitudes to Britain and the 
Union. Once all participants had finished, the questionnaires were collected and 
participants were given a full debriefing in which the experimenter explained the real 
purpose of the experiment and answered any of the participants’ questions.
Material: the policy and its presentation
In teims of content, the policy proposed a licensing system which would 
restrict and control access to the countryside tliroughout Britain, for outdoor 
activities such as walking or cycling (see Appendix 4.1 for the full texts of the three 
different versions). Needless to say, this policy as well as its account were not real 
but were designed for the purposes of the experiment.
The account first established who was proposing the policy, i.e. it was said to 
emanate from “aw All-Party Environment Select Committee o f the Westminster 
Parliament. This ‘all-party’ reference was designed in order to avoid the policy 
being associated with the particular political party in power at Westminster at the 
time of the study (i.e. the Labom* Party) which, rather than Britain itself, could then 
be held responsible for the policy. It also allowed explicit outlining of the fact that 
the policy was very likely to be applied soon given that it had political consensus.
The text then described the content of the policy, i.e. the details of the 
licensing system, and outlined briefly some of its advantages and disadvantages. On 
the one hand, it was said that “zY has been argued that such steps are absolutely 
crucial i f  we are to maintain the environment and to protect w i l d l i f e . . . T h e  
proposals will make the countiyside a much more attractive place for everyone to 
enjoy. ”. On the other hand, it was also said that '"Others have suggested that the 
proposals are an attack on one o f our basic freedoms: the freedom to enjoy our 
national countryside. They are a means by which landowners can restrict the ability 
o f ordinary people to access the land... ”
Such an account was designed, and piloted (on a sample of the student body 
at the university of St Andi*ews, W= 18), in order to be balanced in terms of pros and 
cons, that is, yielding, on its own (i.e. without the additional manipulation, see 
below) a balanced mixture of agreement/disagreement on the policy rather than
206
polarised answers in one direction or the other. Thus, one of the pilot question was 
""how much do you disagree or agree with this policy”, and the mean of participants’ 
answers on that question were approaching the middle of the scale (on a scale of 0 to 
10, M = 4.5,60 = 2,46).
This part of the text was present in all conditions, and, in the neutral 
condition, the text actually ended there. However, in both other conditions, a 
paragraph was added which introduced the manipulation. Basically, this took the 
form of quotations by two ingroup members (so that their arguments would sound 
convincing) taking a position in favour of or against the policy because of its 
consonance or dissonance with Scottish identity.
In relation to that point, the specific topic of the policy was actually chosen 
because the Scottish countryside is, stereotypically, an important aspect of Scottish 
identity, and attachment to the countiyside an important value of Scottishness. This 
fact ensured that participants should feel concerned by the issue. However the topic 
was also chosen because it was possible and plausible to argue both that the policy 
was consonant with or dissonant with this important value. Thus, in the dissonant 
condition, the additional manipulation paragraph read like this:
In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has 
been argued that the proposal would destroy something that is central 
to Scottish life and to what it means to be Scottish. In the words o f one 
Scottish campaigner: “Scotland is a big and beautiful country with a 
small population and so we have always had a special relationship 
with the land. Many o f our symbols are o f the land -  the hills and the 
moors and the lochs and the glens. Our countryside is unique, in terms 
o f landscape, vegetation, and wildlife. It is Imown and admired 
throughout the world. It is a precious heritage which should be 
available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy. So if  you keep us from 
the land you take away an important part o f who we are. What's 
more, since we understand and we care about the land, we certainly 
don't need a law to tell us to respect it”. Indeed, another Scottish 
activist has said: “this proposal takes no account o f the situation in 
Scotland; i f  it goes through, it would mean changing our traditions 
and undermining an essential part o f the Scottish way o f life ”.
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While in the consonant condition, the paragraph read like this:
In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has 
been argued that the proposal would support something that is central 
to Scottish life and to what it means to be Scottish.../srnn& as above/....
So i f  you damage the land you destroy an important part o f who we 
are. What’s more, since we understand and we care about the land, 
we, more than anyone, appreciate the need to take steps to protect it”.
Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: “this proposal is sensitive 
to the situation in Scotland, i f  it goes through, it would enhance our 
traditions and protect an essential part o f the Scottish way o f life ”.
As we can see, both manipulation paragiaphs first established the countryside 
and the concern for the land as unique and keys aspect of Scottish identity. However, 
in the dissonant condition, the practical consequence of such a value was that the 
unique and precious Scottish countryside should be available for everybody in 
Scotland to enjoy, and that preventing such access was therefore dissonant with the 
Scottish value of attachment to the land. By contrast, in the consonant condition, the 
consequence of the same value was that Scottish people care about protecting this 
unique and precious countryside and thus the policy was construed as expressing and 
being consonant with this value. In other words, the ingroup members being quoted 
were siding with one of the two the general arguments outlined in the common part 
of the text, but this time in the name of a specific Scottish value and based on the 
more specific Scottish concerns. In both cases the value was the same, for using 
different values would have run the risk of having one being seen as more important 
than the other. Wliat changed is how this value should apply in the particular case 
under consideration, and therefore how it should translate in attitudes towards the 
proposed policy. The fact that the same specific aspect (Scottish countryside) and 
value (attachment, care for it) were used in both cases also allowed for the design of 
the texts to be as similar as possible, with the exception of the variations required for 
the manipulation.
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Dependent measures
The experimental questionnaire comprised the following measures, described 
in the order they were presented to participants (see Appendix 4.1 for full details). 
First of all, participants had to answer a few questions on their reaction to the policy 
itself:
a) Attitude to the policy (4 items): Participants were asked to indicate how much they 
agreed/disagreed with the policy and with the idea of more control on access to the 
land, and whether they thought the policy would protect the land or undermine the 
ability to enjoy it
Then the main dependent variable was inserted:
b) Political attitude to Britain - Separatism vs. Unionism (10 items): This scale was 
composed of the same 9 items used in the suiwey study, plus a single additional item 
which asked participants to indicate whether they wished the Scottish parliament to 
be given more or less power in the future (the extremes of the scale being defined as 
total union in Britain vs. independence). This item was added with the purpose of 
increasing the discriminatory power of the scale.
Afterwai'ds came measures assessing the perception of the relationship between 
Scotland and Britain. These measures used items taken up from the scales of the 
suiwey study (see Chapter 3):
c) Identity undermining (2 items): the undermining effect of Britain on Scottish 
identity. In particular, the 2 items used were “Being part o f Britain has allowed 
Scotland to keep its specific and separate zWew z^(y."(reverse coded) and “Being part 
o f the UK has undermined the Scottish way o f life.” (‘strongly agi'ee’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’)
d) Powerlessness (2 items): The (lack of) power of Scotland within Britain compared 
with the English. In particular, the 2 items used were: “The Scottish interest plays a 
part in determining British government decisions.” and “Decisions in Britain are
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based on what the English want irrespective o f what others want.” (‘strongly agree’ 
to ‘strongly disagree’).
The rest of the questionnaire was composed of various measures fulfilling different 
pui-poses. This included a manipulation check on the account of the policy itself:
e) Memory questions', towards the end of the questionnaire, 5 multiple choice 
memory questions (4 in the neutral condition) were asked on details of the policy 
account (e.g. who is proposing the policy, etc.), in order to ensure it was read and 
understood properly. Most importantly for what follows, the fifth question, which 
was only present in both experimental conditions, for it concerned the additional 
manipulation paragraph, asked "according to the text, what is the effect o f the policy 
on the way o f life\ with the available answers including that it will undermine vs. it 
will protect the Scottish way of life.
There were also other variables which, should our main hypothesis (H2a) be 
confirmed, would potentially need to be tested and controlled for possible alternative 
explanations. Thus, the following measures were added:
f) Presentation o f the policy. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they 
thought that the presentation of the policy was fair, convincing, and clear (3 items).
g) Nationality and National identification'. Participants were asked to indicate their 
nationality and then to fill in a scale of Scottish identification (non Scottish 
participants were instmcted to answer the questions according to their own 
nationality). This scale was identical to the one used in the survey study (4 items).
h) Political orientation'. Participants were asked to indicate how much they defined 
themselves as left-wing or right-wing, and the parties they intended to vote for in the 
next Scottish and Westminster elections.
All scales were composed of likert-type items running from 0 to 10, except 
the Scottish parliament item in the Political Attitude scale which ran from 0 to 20, 
and the memory questions. Scores on the Scottish parliament item were subsequently 
divided by two in order to make them in the same range as the other items of the 
scale.
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The questionnaire also contained additional measures which were not directly 
relevant to testing our main hypotheses (as stated above) and which were therefore 
not used in subsequent analyses. The only exception to this is the measure of 
powerlessness which, although it did not relate to our main and a priori hypotheses, 
was mentioned above as it was used in order to perform post-hoc analyses (see 
below). Full details of these additional measures as well as of the items used in the 
scales described above can be found in Appendix 4.1.
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RESULTS
7. Scale reliability
Standardised Cronbacli’s alphas scores were calculated for all scales. Three 
scales yielded a good index of reliability {a > .80: Attitude to the policy, Political 
attitude to Britain, and Presentation of the policy) and two others a very satisfactory 
index {a >.70: Power and Identification).
One important scale, however, yielded a more problematic result: the scale of 
identity undennining, whose alpha was unsatisfactory low at .37. As this indicated 
that the two items of the scale were measuring substantially different ideas, it was 
therefore decided to treat those items separately in the analyses of the results. In 
order to account for multiple tests, the level of significance for analyses involving 
either one of those undermining items was lowered a priori according to a Bonferroni 
type correction (p <=.025).
2. Manivulation check
A first step in our analyses was to check if the texts had been read and 
imderstood properly (i.e. as they were intended to be understood) by the participants, 
tlirough looking at their answers to the memory questions. Overall, the results on 
these questions showed there had been few problems of attention or of 
understanding: on the first 4 memory questions, common to all conditions, only 3 
mistalces were made in total (2 mistakes on question 1, and 1 mistake on question 4; 
these were not made by the same participants so none were excluded from the 
analyses).
However, the fifth memory question (i.e. ‘according to the text, what is the 
effect of the policy on the way of life’) revealed an unexpected and quite striking 
result. Though in the dissonant condition all subjects but one were ‘correct’ in 
identifying the policy as undermining the Scottish way of life, in the consonant 
condition, only 3 out of the 18 participants answered this same question ‘correctly’, 
i.e. that the policy was protecting the Scottish way of life, while all the others 
answered that the policy was described as undermining it.
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Thus, it seemed quite clear that participants in that condition did not accept 
the description of the policy as it was intended. On the contrary, it suggested that 
they might have interpreted the policy as undermining as much as participants in the 
dissonant condition. It is slightly unfoitunate that, although the memory question 
asked participants to answer ‘according to the text’ rather than according to their 
opinion, it is not possible to determine with certainty whether they remembered 
wrongly the text and were biased by their own opinion of the policy, or interpreted 
the question wrongly and voiced their own opinion in all awareness (see discussion). 
But in any case, there was no doubt about the nature of this opinion, and, before we 
even needed to check whether or not the policy accounts did indeed induce or not a 
general perception of identity undermining/enliancement (which will be appraised 
below, in testing H2b), it showed unambiguously that our consonant manipulation 
simply failed to achieved its intended purpose, i.e. leading participants to see the 
policy as enhancing for Scottish identity. More than that, it suggested that 
participants in the consonant condition saw this policy as undermining rather than as 
enhancing.
Accordingly, our main hypothesis (H2a) needed some revision. In such 
circumstances, and following the logic of our main hypothesis (rather than the partly 
unsuccessful operationalisation of its testing), one would certainly not expect more 
pro-Union attitudes from the ‘consonant’ participants. Quite the opposite, given that 
they perceived the policy as undermining, we should expect that, as for participants 
in the dissonant condition, they would then hold more separatist views than 
participants in the neutral condition. Likewise, they should also disagree more with 
the policy than participants in the neutral condition (HI).
In consequence, as our revised prediction now formulated similar 
expectations for both experimental conditions, it was decided to collapse them 
together (N  = 35), and to compare them as one group with the control condition, in 
order to simplify the analyses and increase their power.
3. Effects o f condition on attitudes to the policy
That our prediction concerning the consonant condition needed to be reversed 
in direction was confirmed by the results of analyses aimed at testing our secondary 
hypothesis HI, regarding the effect of condition on attitudes to the policy. A T-test
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using this latter variable as the DV and the experimental condition as the IV (with the 
consonant and dissonant conditions collapsed) revealed a marginally significant 
effect of condition {t as =  1.84 , p  =  .072): participants in both experimental 
conditions tended to support the policy less (M = 4.62, SD = 2.21) than participants 
in the control condition (M = 5.90, SD =1.60). Thus, these results provided some 
support for our first (revised) hypothesis and confirmed that the manipulation 
arguments had an impact at the specific level of attitude towards the policy. It also 
confirmed the more negative perception of the policy by participants in both 
experimental conditions, i.e. including participants in the consonant condition. It 
remained to be seen, however, if our manipulation would also have a similar impact 
at the general level of political attitude to Britain.
4. Effects o f condition on political attitudes
The first part of our main (revised) hypothesis (H2a) was tested by running a 
regression analysis with the experimental condition as the IV and political attitude to 
Britain (or separatism) as the DV (a regression procedure rather than a T-test was 
used here because it was in any case required for the subsequent analysis of 
mediation). This analysis revealed a significant impact of condition {B = 1.52, SE = 
.591, p  = .358, t AS -  2.57, p  = .014). Participants in both experimental conditions 
showed a more separatist attitude (M= 6 .2 1 , 6!D = 1.88) than in the neutral condition 
(M = 4.70, SD = .1.33), thus providing support for our hypothesis H2a.
Complementary analyses were also run on the data in order to see if the 
manipulation had had an effect on other variables measured in the experiment, which 
could serve as a basis for possible alternative explanations for our results. Thus, T- 
tests revealed that there were no significant differences due to experimental condition 
on ‘Presentation of the policy’ (t a s  ~ 1.44, p  =.157), on the scale of national 
identification {t 40 = .82,/? = .417), nor on the extent that participants saw themselves 
as left or right-wing {t 40 = .061, p  = .923). This ruled out that the effect of condition 
on political attitude to Britain could be explained by differences in the presentational 
aspect of the varying accounts of the policy (i.e. that one account might be seen as 
more or less convincing, fair and clear than the others), to differences in the level of 
identification amongst participants, or even to differences in their political 
orientation. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that some of these
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variables might have been correlated significantly witli the scores of political attitude 
to Britain, but it does guarantee that these variables were balanced across conditions 
and thus could not account for the differences due to the manipulation.
5. The role o f identity undermining
In order to test the hypothesis H2b, a regression analysis was first run with 
condition as the IV and the undermining effect of Britain on Scotland as the DV (for 
each item separately). This analysis revealed no main effect on the first item of 
identity undennining (B = .002, SE = .951, P <.001, ns), and a marginally significant 
main effect on the second item (B = 1.92, SE = .845, p  = .321,  ^45 = 2.21, p  -  .028; as 
a reminder, analysis involving items of identity undermining had their level of 
significance set at p  <= .025). Participants in both experimental conditions 
(combined) perceived Britain as more undermining (M = 5.17, SD = 2.31) on this 
item than participants in the control condition {M = 3.25, SD — 3.11). Thus, these 
analyses provided partial preliminary support for our hypothesis, as far as this second 
item was concerned.
Next, analyses were run in order to appraise if the effect of condition on 
separatism was indeed mediated by its impact on identity undermining. Following 
the procedure of mediation analysis (see Chapter 3; see also Baron & Kenny, 1986), 
participants’ scores of separatism were regressed on both condition and identity 
undermining. Obviously, this was performed only for the second item of identity 
undermining given the lack of effect of condition on the first one.
This analysis revealed that the controlled effect of identity undermining on 
separatism was strongly significant {p = .492, p  < .001), while, on the other hand, the 
effect of condition, once it was controlled for identity undeimining, was substantially 
reduced to non-significance {p = .200,  ^44 = 1.55, p  = .128). Thus, our mediation 
model, represented in Figure 4.1 (see below), was successful, a fact which was 
confirmed by a marginally significant Sobel’s test (2 = 2,005 p  -  .045; see Chapter 
3). Our hypothesis H2b was therefore supported by the results, although it has to be 
noted once more that it was only so for one of the two items of identity undermining, 
a fact to which we will come back in more detail in the discussion.
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FIGURE 4.1: MEDIATING ROLE OF IDENTITY UNDERMINING
.321*
CONDITION SEPARATISM
IDENTITY UNDERMINING
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All figures represent (3 Weights 
Figures in brackets: effect controlled.
6. A question o f power and self-determination?
Though our main hypothesis, in its revised form, received support from the 
results, one central question nevertheless remained: why, after all, was the policy and 
Britain perceived as undemiining Scottish identity in the consonant condition, 
despite Scottish sources describing the policy as ‘enhancing’ for Scotland? And why 
did this condition also trigger a more separatist stance, as for the dissonant 
condition? Furtheraiore, the commonality between both experimental conditions also 
suggests that, although the dissonant manipulation yielded the expected result (i.e. 
increased perceptions that the policy and Britain are undermining Scottish identity), 
it might not be, as was first intended, the negative impact of the policy on Scotland 
as such which produced more separatism amongst the participants in this condition. 
We therefore had to ask what other feature(s) of the manipulation, common to both 
experimental conditions, might have made them having this similar effect.
One possibility is that the manipulation could simply have made Scottish 
identity more salient in both experimental conditions. Indeed, it is a fact that 
underlining the consequences of the policy on Scottish identity (whatever the valence 
of this impact) could also have made this identity more salient compared to the 
control condition, where any reference to this specific impact on Scottish identity 
was absent. However, this possibility, which would have undermined our results by 
providing them with an alternative explanation, could be rejected on the basis of the 
results on the identification scale reported above; for there was no significant 
difference between the contiol condition and both experimental conditions in the
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level of identification of participants. Moreover, further regression analyses revealed 
that, though identification on its own was a marginally significant predictor of 
separatist scores {fi = .270, ? 40 = 1.77, p  = .084), this impact was actually not 
significant when the effect of condition was controlled for {fi — .227, f  39 =  1.57, j:; =  
.128).
Another possibility is that, in both cases, the manipulation paragraph could 
have made salient the fact that decisions were taken at the Westminster level on a 
matter that was underlined as having particular importance for Scotland, whereas this 
fact was only implicit in the neutral condition, where it was simply said, in common 
with the experimental conditions, that the policy would be applied throughout 
Britain. Participants might have then estimated that Scotland should be able to decide 
for herself on such an issue, given its specific Scottish relevance. In other words, 
compared to the control condition, the experimental conditions could have made 
more salient the lack of power of Scotland in the British decision-making process 
and its lack of self-determination. This could have been the crucial fact which, 
regardless of the valence of the policy, made participants perceive the situation as an 
undeimining one, thereby showing more support for separatism.
This idea received some preliminary confirmation by the fact that, in contrast 
to the results on the identification scale, the manipulation did have quite a significant 
impact on the power variable {B = 2.19, SE = .678, p  = .434, r 45 = 3.23, p  = .002), 
with participants in both experimental conditions (combined) perceiving Scotland as 
more powerlessness in Britain (M = 6.31, SD -  1.88) than participants in the neutral 
condition (M = 4.12, SD = 2.42). Furthennore, poweiiessness revealed in turn to be a 
strongly significant predictor of separatism {p = .546,  ^45 = 4.38,/? < .001)
However, this post-hoc explanation of oui* results could be more fully tested 
by performing a mediation analysis using powerlessness as a mediator of the effect 
of condition on political attitudes (see Figure 4,2 below). Following the same 
procedures as above, such an analysis revealed that, on the one hand, powerlessness 
remained a significant predictor of separatism even when condition was contr olled 
for iP = .482, / 44 = 3.48, p  = .001), while, on the other hand, the significant effect of 
condition on separatism {p = .358,  ^45 = 2.57,/? = .014) became non-significant when 
the effect of powerlessness was contr olled for {p = .149,  ^44 = 1.07, p  ~ .289). The
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success of this mediation model was confirmed by performing Sobel’s test, which 
was significant (z = 2.425,/? = .015).
FIGURE 4.2: MEDIATING ROLE OF POWERLESSNESS
A 34**t
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7. A two-step model
Despite the fact that our post-hoc explanation of the unexpected effect of the 
consonant condition received some backing from the results, it also raised a further 
question. Indeed, we now had two potential mediators (i.e. identity undermining and 
powerlessness) for explaining our results, and one could therefore ask which of these 
mediators explained them the best, or else which respective part they play in the 
story.
However, if we follow more strictly oui* model presented in Chapter 1 (see 
also Chapter 3), the question to ask would be slightly different. Indeed, we would 
actually expect powerlessness to be an antecedent of identity undennining rather than 
its competitor or complement. Likewise, the idea of our post-hoc explanation was, to 
put it more precisely, that a salient powerlessness in both experimental conditions 
induced a perception of identity undermining, and that it is this latter which, in turn, 
had been responsible for increased separatism. In other words, our theoretical model 
as well as our post-hoc explanation suggested a two-step mediation process between 
condition and separatism, with power as the first mediator and identity undermining 
as the second.
This two-step model was tested using the causal steps method described by 
Judd and Kenny (1981), which can deal with causal chain involving several 
mediators. The differences between this method and one-step mediation analysis are
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that, first, the conti*olled effect of the IV (i.e. condition) on the DV (i.e. separatism) is 
assessed by a regression which controls for the effect of all mediators (i.e. both 
powerlessness and identity undermining in our case), and, second, that the effect of 
each mediating variable should be controlled not only for the effect of the IV but also 
for all mediating variables that precede it in the mediation chain (i.e. in oui* case, the 
effect of identity rmdermining on separatism was controlled for both condition and 
power).
In order to provide evidence supporting our model, the following conditions 
needed to be met. First of all, the effect of condition on separatism needed to become 
non-significant or be substantially reduced when both mediators were taken into 
account. This fact was confidently confirmed by the results {B = .516  ^SE = .561, p  ^  
.136, ? 43 = 1.02, p  = 315). Second, it was necessary for powerlessness to be a 
significant predictor of identity undermining even when the effect of condition was 
controlled for, a condition which was also easily met {B = .773, SE = .148, p  = .652, t 
44 = 5.24, /> <.001). Thii'd, identity undennining needed to be a significant predictor 
of separatism once both condition and power were controlled for. The results 
provided some support for this conclusion, insofar as identity undermining was a 
marginally significant predictor of separatism in these conditions {B = .239, SE = 
.115, = .337, t 43 = 2.09, p  = .043). Ideally, the significant effect of powerlessness
on separatism controlled for condition, which was demonstrated above in oui' second 
mediation model (see section 6), also needed to be reduced to non-significance (or to 
be substantially reduced) when the effect of identity undermining was further added 
to the equation. The analyses also supported that conclusion (^ = .221, = .143, ^
= .262,  ^43 = 1.54, p  = .130; see also Figure 4.3 below for a representation of the 
model).
This last result not only showed that the mediating effect of power on 
separatism was accounted for by identity undermining; it also showed that the 
possible alternative model, which would postulate identity undermining as the 
antecedent of powerlessness in the causal chain, would not fit the data so well. 
Indeed, one condition for such a model to be successful would precisely be that the 
effect of powerlessness on the DV should be significant even when controlled for 
both condition and its preceding mediator (identity undermining), which was not the 
case.
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FIGURE 4.3: MEDIATING ROLE OF POWERLESSNESS AND IDENTITY
UNDERMINING
,652-
.358* (.136)
CONDITION SEPARATISM
POWERLESSNESS IDENTITYUNDERMINING
All figures represent (3 Weights 
Figures in bold and italics: effect controlled for the IV (condition)
Figures in brackets: effect controlled for the IV (condition) AND the second mediator (power for
identity undermining and vice-versa).
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DISCUSSION
1. Summary o f the results and interpretation
This experiment started with the purpose of manipulating the perception of 
the effect of Britain on Scottish identity and the Scottish way of life, in such a way 
that it would be possible to affect the political attitude to Britain in two opposite 
directions, i.e. towards both more and less sepaiatism. Such a hope was, however, 
short-lived, as the memory question relating to the part of the texts designed to 
introduce the manipulation clearly indicated that the consonant condition was 
perceived antithetically to what it had been designed for.
Wliy most participants in the consonant condition answered this memory 
question ‘wrongly’ is unfoiiunately not totally clear. We can exclude the possibility 
that they did not pay enough attention to the manipulation paragraph, or forget its 
details by the time they reached the question, given that the constancy of their 
‘mistakes’ cannot be thought as random, and given the fact that only 1 of the 17 
participants in the dissonant condition made a similar mistake on this question (plus 
the simple fact that the manipulation did have an impact on their answers compared 
to the contiol condition). But there still remain at least two different possibilities. 
One is that they could have biased their memory according to their own views, 
without being aware of it. However, though the question did explicitly ask 
participants to answer ‘according to the text’, it is also possible that participants did 
remember conectly what was written in the account but misinterpreted that question 
and answered in terms of their personal opinion instead.
In any case, it was clear that, following the logic of our model, a change of 
predictions as regards the effects of the manipulation in the consonant condition had 
to be made. We then hypothesised, post-hoc to the manipulation check but a priori to 
the main analyses, that both the consonant and the dissonant conditions should lead 
participants to both disagree more with the policy as well as to talce a more separatist 
stance.
If the legitimacy of such a shift in predictions is allowed, then, overall, the 
experiment provided some encouiaging results. As we have seen, there was a 
significant effect of experimental condition on attitude to the policy and on 
separatism and those effects were going in the expected direction. Furthermore, the
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results also provided some evidence supporting H2b that the effect of condition on 
separatism was mediated by changes in perception of identity undennining, at least 
on one of the two items which were used in the experiment.
As an aside comment, the results regarding HI (i.e. the effect of condition on 
the attitude to the policy) suggest that identity considerations can be important not 
only in influencing attitudes towards superordinate groups, but can also help people 
in deciding on specific policies. In particular, given that the policy was selected and 
created to be balanced, one tempting hypothesis, which is consistent with the idea of 
identity as a sense-making device and as a guide to action, is that identity could be 
especially helpful for people in order to clarify their position when they have to 
decide on ambiguous issues, and where both sides of an argument can be seen as 
potentially convincing.
However, coming back to our main interests, the unexpected way in which 
the consonant condition was perceived and impacted on the attitude towards Britain 
also raised some questions. We asked ourselves why it was that this condition was 
perceived in that way and had this effect on participants’ political attitude. In that 
respect, the two most plausible candidates were an increased salience of ingroup 
identity or an increased salience of the poweiiessness of Scotland within Britain. The 
first of these possible post-hoc explanations was ruled out by the results on the 
Scottish identification scale, whereas the second one received strong support fiom 
the analysis using poweiiessness as a mediator of the effect of condition on 
separatism.
Our inteipretation of such a result runs as follows. It could be that what 
mattered for participants was not so much that the policy was said to be good or bad 
for Scotland, but the fact that decisions concerning the ingioup were (illegitimately) 
taken by someone else, especially in a context where Scotland now has a Scottish 
parliament where participants might have estimated that this kind of decision should 
be taken. To use a distinction common injustice theory (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975), the source of their discontent might have been procedural rather than 
focused on the specific content of the policy. The increased separatism found in both 
experimental conditions, including the consonant condition, could then be interpreted 
as a way of claiming that ‘we should decide for ouiselves what is good or bad for 
us’, especially given that the policy concerned a matter which was said, in those 
conditions, to be of particular relevance for Scotland. In other words, this increased
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separatism might have arisen from a need to reaffirm Scotland’s right for self- 
determination, seemingly undermined by the decision process which had led to the 
policy.
At first sight, that post-hoc explanation centred on a concern for power might 
seem to imply that participants were not chiefly determined in their attitudes by 
concerns for identity, and more particularly for identity undennining. However, as 
we pointed out in Chapter 2, power issues have to be understood in relation to 
identity. We believe that people do not claim power for its own sake, but that they do 
so m order to be able to act in the terms of their identity, and that it is precisely what 
makes power crucial in the issue of relationships with superordinate groups. 
Accordingly, the undermining of self-determination which, if our explanation is 
conect, seems to have concerned participants in our experiment, can be seen as 
closely related to a concern for the potential repression of ingroup identity, i.e. a 
concern for the undermining of the general capacity of agency and therefore of the 
means to enact and express this identity in practice (see Chapters 1 and 2). More 
fonnally, our theoretical model stipulates that poweiiessness should be a direct 
antecedent of identity undermining, and that the effect of powerlessness on 
separatism should be mediated by its impact on identity undermining. At the 
empirical level, our study provided support for both these assumptions, by showing 
that it was indeed mainly by its (significant) effect on identity undennining that 
power affected the degree of support for separatism.
2. Limits and future directions
Thus, the issue made salient by our manipulation might have been one of 
identity repression, where the question was whether the Scottish ethos and the 
specific interests it defines can or cannot be represented in British politics, and 
therefore can or cannot be expressed in practice, in policies, social institutions, and 
people’s ways of life. By the same token, these remarks might also help to explain 
one of the limits shown by the results of the study. Indeed, one could wonder why 
there was a poor correlation between the two identity undermining items and why 
there was no effect of condition on the first of those items. In that respect, it could be 
argued that the second item, which asked if Britain had undermined the ‘Scottish 
way of life’ (i.e. the expression of Scottish identity in practice), worked because it
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was perhaps closer to the idea of repression and thus the most susceptible to being 
affected by the manipulation, which made that particular issue salient in the context 
of this particular experiment. By contrast, it could be argued that the first item (Being 
part o f Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity) was 
not affected by our manipulation because it measured a slightly different side of 
identity undermining, i.e. the concern for identity loss in the long-term, which, 
although it is definitely an important issue in general and is intimately linlced to the 
issue of repression (see Chapter 2), was made less salient in this particular context.
Nevertheless, for all the attraction that this argument might perhaps provide, 
it must be stressed that it remains a post-hoc explanation of our results. Accordingly, 
such explanation must be seen less as an attempt to save oui' a priori hypotheses, in 
the view of unexpected results, than as aiming towards providing insights into the 
way subsequent studies could explore these questions flu'ther and provide a better 
test of our ideas.
Likewise, though we might have provided a consistent (and, hopefully, 
convincing) account of the unexpected results in the consonant condition, it remains 
that the failure of creating a condition which would actually have induced feelings of 
identity enliancement is a definite shortcoming of this study, and further research 
should address that issue. Indeed, providing direct experimental evidence that the 
attitude towards Britain can be manipulated in the direction opposite to separatism, 
as a fimction of its enhancing impact on Scottish identity, would constitute a more 
convincing case for our general argument.
In that respect, the present work then suggests that one possibility for doing 
so would be to try to manipulate perceptions of identity undermining/enhancement 
through a manipulation of perceptions of ingioup power, i.e. tlirough the 
undermining or enhancement of the ingroup’s capacity of agency by being part of the 
UK and its consequence for the expression of ingroup identity. The study also 
suggests that any enliancing manipulation should be made, one way or another, more 
convincing for pai-ticipants, as apparently statements by ingroup members were not 
enough for that purpose. It is true that one possibility is that those latter were in fact 
discarded as not tine group members, in which case more effort should be put into 
making them prototypical of the ingroup.
Finally, it has to be pointed out that the size of the sample used was modest, 
and should probably be increased in any further investigation. However, the reason
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for this modest size is that the present study was conceived, and should therefore be 
seen, as no more than a first exploratory step in the issue of the causal relationship 
between perception of identity undermining/enhancement and political attitudes. 
Accordingly, if we see its value as much in its potential for raising new questions and 
ideas than in its hypotheses-confirming aspect, we can affirm that it has fulfilled its 
purposes quite honourably.
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CHAPTER V 
THE STRATGIC USE OF IDENTITY 
TWO EXPERIMENTS ON GROUP 
PROTOTYPICALITY
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters, we addressed the issue of political attitudes 
towards superordinate groups in two different, though complementary, ways. In 
Chapter 2, we asked ourselves what the origins are of the meanings associated with 
group identities and the social context, and we argued that they develop, at least in 
part, thi'ough the discursive and strategic constructions deployed by those whose aim 
is to mobilise others in favour of their political projects In Chapter 3 and in Chapter 
4, we attempted to show that these meanings do indeed help to explain people’s 
political attitudes. We have thus touched upon both sides of die two-way relationship 
between political attitudes and identity meanings.
However, the overall picture suggested by these studies could be misleading 
in one important respect. We have looked at the process of strategic construction 
only in the case of politicians, and in our two studies of ‘ordinary people’ we have 
treated meanings as perceptions (rather than active construction) explaining people’s 
attitudes. This could (wrongly) suggest that strategic work would be the monopoly of 
politicians or other elites, whereas the role of ‘ordinary people’ would be limited to 
simply assimilating the meanings constmcted by such elites. Thus, there is the 
danger of a somewhat elitist and ‘top-down’ view whereby politicians would 
consciously construct versions of the world which the public would be limited to 
passively absorbing and acting upon.
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Although the importance of ‘top-down’ processes of social influence in the 
development of shared visions of groups and social reality cannot he denied, our 
perspective is that the cognitive and stiutegic dimensions of political attitudes and 
meanings, as well as the two-way relationship between them, applies to both elites 
and ‘ordinary’ people. On the one hand, and as we argued in Chapter 2, if politicians 
did not have some committed beliefs about social reality and groups, why would they 
defend any particular project in the first place? In other words, there is no good 
reason to thinlc that politicians would be characterised by different psychological 
processes than ordinary people, which means they must have ‘attitudes’ too, with the 
usual cognitive implications of such a word. If there are any differences between 
them, they are to be found at the practical level (for example, in terms of an 
increased access to means of diffusion), and perhaps in the fact that convincing 
others on political issues is likely to be more frequently a salient purpose for 
politicians (as it is required by the nature of their job). Conversely, and more 
importantly for the present chapter, there is no reason to think that ordinaiy people 
cannot make strategic use of meanings. Thus, in the following studies, we intend to 
address this issue by extending our analysis of the sti*ategic from the political elite to 
a more general public.
Furthermore, another limitation of our previous investigation of the strategic 
dimension is that we have only looked at it in qualitative (though systematic) terms 
(see Chapter 2). Although it is true that some methods can be better suited for 
addressing different questions, we do not believe that there should be a necessary 
amalgam between looking at the cognitive-perceptual or the constructivist-strategic 
sides of the issues and the choice of a particular method. In other words, though 
qualitative methods provided us with unequalled richness of data and was 
particularly suited to looking at the discursive construction of group identities and 
relationships, there is no reason why strategic effects could not also appear within 
experimental contexts and tlirough the use of quantitative measures. It is one aim of 
this chapter to provide an illustr ation of how this can be achieved. Should such an 
attempt be successful, it would help us to avoid the trap of identifying a particular 
theoretical standpoint with one specific methodology.
Thus, in this chapter, we will try to show that the content of group 
judgements should not only be seen as a mere reflection of people’s perceptions or 
cognitions, but can also be subject to strategic variations as a function of people’s
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commimicational purpose. More precisely, we will attempt to do so through the use 
of one specific example of group ‘perceptions’ taken from the intergroup literature, 
i.e. the judgements of groups’ prototypicality within a superordinate group, and the 
related phenomenon of ingroup projection, to which we alluded to briefly in Chapter 
1. Before we carry on, then, we need to provide a more detailed explanation of this 
concept of ingroup projection as well as of the reasons why we see it as an 
appropriate platform in order to illustrate our broader point about the strategic 
construction of identity meanings.
Ingroup projection or relative ingroup prototvpicalitv within a superordinate group
The ingroup projection effect, a term coined by Mummendey and Wenzel 
(1999), finds its origin in the older social psychological concept of social projection 
(Allport, 1924). The idea of social projection is that people tend to assume that their 
personal attributes (e.g. thoughts, opinions, beliefs) are shared by others, i.e. to 
project their own characteristic onto otliers. Consequently, they also tend to think 
that their characteristics and opinions are more prototypical more than they actually 
are or than other people would judge them to be (Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger 
& Clement, 1996; Spears & Manstead, 1989).
With their idea of ingroup projection, Mummendey and Wenzel hypothesised 
that a similar phenomenon could well happen at the intergroup level. That is, they 
predicted that ingroup members belonging to a common superordinate group should 
tend to project their ingroup’s characteristics on this superordinate group. Based on 
SCT’s tenet that ingroup and outgroup are compaied in relation to how prototypical 
they are of the superordinate group (Turner et al., 1987), such projection should then 
go hand in hand with a tendency to believe that the ingroup is more prototypical of 
the superordinate category that the other subgroups (i.e. a high relative ingroup 
prototypicality), given that the characteristics of this latter are appraised with an 
ingroup bias. Empirically, Mummendey and her colleagues (Waldzus, Mummendey, 
Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel et al., 2001) have collected data across many 
different types of gioups (e.g. psychology and business students, Germans and poles 
within Europe, etc.) which support this hypothesis, by showing that the ingroup is 
indeed often judged more prototypical of the superordinate category than the 
outgroup.
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As these authors also underline, however, reality constraints can sometimes 
make it difficult for the ingroup to sustain the claim of being more prototypical in an 
absolute sense. Where, for instance, the outgroup constitutes a clearly dominant 
majority, its higher prototypicality can be acknowledged by ingroup members. 
Nevertheless, their results show that, in those cases, there remains a relative ingroup 
projection effect. That is; minority ingroup members still see themselves as more 
prototypical than the judgements of ingroup members by outgroup members would 
suggest (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, in press). In other words, 
while the outgroup’s higher prototypicality is acknowledged by both groups, the 
difference in prototypicality between the two groups is judged to be lower by 
members of the ingroup minority than by members of the dominant majority.
From what we have seen in earlier chapters, the reasons why this constitutes 
an appropriate topic for our own purposes might already be apparent. Indeed, the 
studies we have described so far suggest that, in terms of judgements of 
prototypicality of both the ingroup and the outgroup, the opposite of ingroup 
projection could also happen in certain circumstances. That is, we have seen that one 
of the main basis on which supporters of Scottish independence sustain their 
separatist position is that Britain is dominated by the English (and their interests) and 
that, as a consequence, the Scots are under-represented within Britain (see in 
particular Chapter 2). They claim that the outgi'oup majority is dominant to the point 
that the identity of the superordinate group tends to be equated with outgroup 
identity, whereas ingroup identity is ignored and therefore does not contribute to 
defining the superordinate group. In consequence, we would expect support for 
independence to be associated with the claim that the Scots are in fact not 
prototypical of Britain, as a way to underline the fact that they are under-represented 
in Britain - or, to put it the other way round, to emphasise the monopoly of the 
majority over the definition of the superordinate categoiy identity (see also van 
Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984).
Thus, one way of testing our position that group judgements are sensitive to 
strategic variations would be to appraise if judgements of ingroup relative 
prototypicality can vary as a function of the political projects supported by people,
i.e. if they wish to be members of the superordinate group or if they wish to be 
separated from it. However, before we make that hypothesis, an important point to 
understand is that, still in line with the findings of Chapter 2, gioup judgements
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should be seen as political statements rather than as reflecting fixed beliefs. 
Consequently, our aigument is not that political attitudes necessarily lead to specific 
and unchanging accounts of groups’ prototypicality, but that they can influence 
people’s judgements when tliey try to make a case for their political position. In other 
words, it all depends upon the type of claim people are interested in making, which 
in turn depends upon their broad and relatively stable political project, but also on the 
specific communicational context in which they find themselves. Wliat we are saying 
is not that it is the belief in independence as such which would trigger a low relative 
ingroup prototypicality, but the claim for independence. This also means that, 
depending on changes in the rhetorical context (and thus of the type of claim people 
are trying to make within this context, which can be other than making a case for 
independence), there could be variation in judgements of relative ingi'oup 
prototypicality even within supporters of independence themselves.
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STUDY 1
Hypotheses
In order to test our ideas, we decided to run a first study whose main puipose 
was simply to appraise if, within the British context, the judgements of relative 
ingroup prototypicality would vary amongst Scottish participants, according to how 
much they did support or oppose Scottish independence. More specifically, we 
hypothesised that the more Scottish participants supported independence, the less 
they should judge the Scots to be prototypical of Britain in comparison with the 
English - i.e. the less they should show the ‘ingroup projection effect’ (HI).
Correlatively, m relation to Wenzel and Mummendey’s (1999) own 
hypothesis, we did not have a specific expectation as to whether there would be 
ingi'oup projection within the Scottish group taken as a whole. Indeed, should HI be 
true, whether there would be such an ingroup projection effect in the overall sample 
would then depend on the relative proportion of supporters and non-supporters of 
independence (i.e. should this proportion be balanced, the ratings of those different 
subsets of Scots could compensate for each other). However, it was nevertheless 
worth testing Wenzel and Mummendey’s hypothesis within the Scottisli/British 
context. Since Scots constitute a numerical minority against the English majority, we 
also included a group of English participants in the study, in order to provide a 
comparison group in case Scottish participants showed relative, rather than absolute, 
ingroup projection.
Secondly, should we find support for our main hypothesis, a potential 
alternative explanation would nevertheless need to be considered. Indeed, Wenzel 
and Mummendey have underlined the importance of dual identification (i.e. 
identification both with the ingroup and the superordinate group) in predicting the 
effect of ingroup projection. Given that separatists ai*e unlikely to possess a strong 
British identity, should we find a lower degree of relative ingroup prototypicality 
amongst them, it could then be argued that this would be due to the absence of such 
dual identification. In other words, there is a possibility that any relationship between 
support for independence and relative ingroup prototypicality would be spurious and 
explained by a lower dual identity. Thus, we needed to include identification
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measures in our studies in order to check for this alternative explanation. We do not 
deny that dual identification could indeed be a significant predictor of relative 
ingroup prototypicality. However, should that be the case, we would need to show 
that support for independence would nevertheless remain a sepaiate and significant 
predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality, even once variations in dual 
identification were taken into account (H2).
Thirdly, in relation to ingroup (Scottish) identification - considered 
independently of British identity - a more specific hypothesis could be made, in line 
with our own perspective. According to our content-based approach, the more one 
identifies with the ingroup, the more one might be motivated to make a claim related 
to this ingroup (in this case through judgements of group’s prototypicality); but the 
direction of judgements should depend upon the nature of the claim which is made, 
which in turn can be deteimined by the nature of one’s political attitude. To put it 
more formally, and muToring in some ways the hypothesis we made in Chapter 3, we 
predicted that, rather than leading to more or less relative ingroup prototypicality as 
such, Scottish identification would interact with (or would be moderated by) support 
for independence in predicting judgements of prototypicality. For those who do not 
strongly support independence, ingroup identification should lead to higher relative 
ingroup prototypicality. However, for high supporters of independence, a higher 
degiee of identification should lead to lower relative ingroup prototypicality - i.e. to 
judge the Scots as less prototypical of Britain than the English (H3).
Finally, as this argument just reminded us, the effect predicted by HI is 
hypothesised to be underlined by tlie type of claim people are making through their 
judgements of group prototypicality. In this first study, we relied mainly on an 
interpersonal difference (support for independence), which was thought to determine 
that type of claim, in order to study the strategic variability in judgements it can 
induce. However, given that the order of questions was varied in the research 
questionnaire (see below), a way of testing the impact of the more immediate 
rhetorical context was also available. The alleged topic of the research was not 
political attitudes to Britain, so the willingness to make a claim in favour or against 
independence through judgements of prototypicality should only have come into play 
when political attitudes were asked first, i.e. before groups’ prototypicality was 
measured. Only in these circumstances should the issue of independence have been 
made salient for participants, who could thereby use their subsequent answers on the
232
prototypicality measm*es as a political statement in relation to this issue. The 
hypothesised difference between supporters and non-supporters of independence in 
their degree of relative ingroup prototypicality should therefore only become evident 
(or at least be much stronger) when political attitudes were measured first, as 
opposed to when they were measuied after groups’ prototypicality (H4).
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METHOD 
Procedure and participants
100 students at the University of St Andrews, of both Scottish and English 
nationalities, took part in the study. They were approached in university 
accommodation and asked to fill in a short questionnaire about Scottish and English 
people’s perception of each other and of Britain. After completion of the 
questionnaire, which took about 5 to 10 minutes, participants were thanked and 
debriefed.
A significant propoition of participants (TV = 22) had to be excluded fiom the 
analyses because they simply failed to answer the main dependent variable 
measuring the prototypicality of the Scots and the English (see below). Of the 
remaining 78 participants, 37 were of English nationality (18 males, 19 females; age 
range 18-29) and 41 of Scottish nationality (18 males and 23 females; age range 17- 
29).
Questionnaire Design
The research questionnaire included three types of questions (an example of this 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5.1).
a) Dependent measure: prototypicality o f the Scots and the English.
The dependent measure was directly bonowed from Waldzus et al.’s (in 
press) ingroup projection studies. People were first asked to generate traits which 
they thought were characteristics of each subgroup as compared with the other 
subgroup (3 for each subgroup). They then had to rate how much each of those self­
generated traits applied to members of the superordinate category in general (i.e. to 
British people, on a scale ranging fiom 0 to 10). The mean scores for each subgroup 
on these items gave us an index of how prototypical the members of this subgroup 
were judged to be of British people in general, and the difference between the scores 
for the ingroup and the outgroup on this ‘British prototypicality’ measure thus 
constituted the index of relative ingroup prototypicality.
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In relation to the relatively high rate of missing data found on this measure 
(see above), we should note that most participants who failed to fill in these 
questions commented, in the space provided for generating traits, that they refused to 
give general descriptions of groups because they were of the opinion that ‘all 
individuals are different’. It is then very likely that, rather than being random missing 
data or the sign of a defect in the measure or in the procedure, they constituted a 
subgroup of participants adopting, in all awareness, an individualist stance (in the 
specific sense of refusing to judge individuals on the basis of their group 
membership, i.e. refusing to use stereotypes), and could then be estimated as not 
relevant for our research purposes interested in group judgements.
b) Independent measure: attitude towards independence.
This measure, which constituted our main independent variable, assessed attitude 
towards the independence of Scotland in Britain (2 items ranging fiom 0 to 10). The 
two items were taken from the independence scale used in the survey study (see 
Chapter 3).
c) Measures o f identification.
In this section of the questionnaire, participants were first asked to indicate their 
nationality, and then were asked to fill in a scale of either Scottish or English 
identification, depending on their nationality. Also, all participants had to fill a scale 
of British identification (3 scales of 4 items ranging from 1 to 7; again those were 
taken from the suiwey study, see Chapter 3).
The order of tliese three scales was alternated, thus yielding six different types of 
questionnaires. At the end of the questionnaire (iiTespective of the order of 
questions), some additional questions relating to personal details were also asked 
(age, sex, membership in political association), and a space for open comments was 
provided. The questionnaire also included a few other measures which will not be 
used in subsequent analyses and thus are not described here for purpose of simplicity 
(see Appendix 5.1. for full details).
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RESULTS
1. Scale reliability
All the scales used in subsequent analyses yielded a reliability index ranging 
from very satisfactory to veiy good. The independence scale yielded an standardised 
alpha of .90, the Scottish identification scale of .84, and the British identification 
scale of .76%
2. Ingroup projection amongst Scots and English
Before testing our own hypotheses, we first ran an analysis to check if the 
effect of ingroup projection found by Waldzus et al. could also be found in our study, 
within the British context. Mirroring these authors’ analysis, a 2 (participants’ 
nationality: Scottish vs. English) x 2 (nationality of the target: the Scots vs. the 
English) ANOVA was run with the first factor between-subjects and the second 
within-subjects.
The results of this analysis showed no main effect of the nationality of 
participants {F ij6 = 1.21; = .275) but a marginally significant main effect for the
target group {F i,76 = 3.66; p  = .060). The interaction between participants’ group and 
target group was not significant (F ijg = 2.11, =.150), The marginally significant
main effect of target group indicates that there was an overall tendency for the 
English to be judged more prototypical than the Scots by both groups (see Table 5.1 
for means). In other words, in absolute terms, English participants did show ingroup 
projection whereas Scots did not.
In terms of relative ingr oup projection, however, the table of the means shows 
that the difference in prototypicality between the two subgroups was stronger for 
English participants. In fact, when making a direct comparison between cells, this 
difference was significant only for the English participants {t 36 = 2.37, p  = .025), 
whereas the scores of prototypicality for Scottish participants did not differ 
significantly from each other {t 40 = .331, p  = .742). Thus, Scots seemed not to have 
underlined the higher prototypicality of the English as much as the English did.
' These alphas scores were computed using Scottish participants only, given that all analyses 
involving those scales were mn exclusively on these participants.
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However, the fact that the interaction was not even marginally significant does not 
allow us to support the conclusion of relative ingroup projection with confidence. In 
any case, whether or not this conclusion could be made was not relevant as far as our 
hypotheses are concerned.
TABLE 5.1
Prototypicality of the Scots and the English as a function of participants’ nationality
PARTICIPANTS’
NATIONALITY
TARGET 
The English The Scots
Scottish (N= 41) 
English (TV= 37)
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
5.34(1.35) 5.22(1.52)
5.96 (1.68) 5.14(1.56)
3. Relative ingroup prototvpicalitv amongst Scots as a function o f support for 
independence
Let us now consider in more detail the results pertaining only to Scottish 
participants (to whom we will refer from now on as ‘the participants’). First of all, in 
order to simplify the analyses, and as alluded to in the method section, a composite 
score of relative ingroup prototypicality for the Scots was created by subtracting the 
ratings of prototypicality of the English from those of prototypicality of the Scots. 
Secondly, in order to test oui* central hypothesis HI that the degree of relative 
ingroup prototypicality should vary as a function of support for independence, a 
regression analysis was conducted with the latter variable as predictor and the former 
as dependent variable. The results of this analysis showed that support for 
independence was not a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality {B = 
-.0922, SE = .12, ^  = -. 122, F  1 ,3 9  = .59, p  = .448), thus failing to provide support for 
our hypothesis.
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However, a closer look at the scatterplot of the data revealed that there was a 
possibility of a cuiwilinear (rather than linear) relationship between the two variables, 
in the form of an inverted U-shape. Indeed, for low to average scores on the scale of 
support for independence, the degree of relative ingroup prototypicality seemed to 
increase as support for independence increased, whereas for average to high scores of 
independence, it seemed to decrease as support for independence increased. A 
cuiwilinear quadratic regression yielding an inverted U-shape provided some support 
for this idea, as the quadratic component of this regiession was indeed marginally 
significant {B2 = -.0935, SE = .04, F  2,3s = 3.09, p  = .057).
This suggested the possibility that, while participants with moderate to high 
levels of support for independence might have behaved according to oui* expectation, 
participants showing very little support for independence (or, one might say, 
participants who were actively anti-independence, given their very low scores on that 
scale) might have constituted a special case which had not been foreseen. That is, 
they might also have shown a lower degree of relative ingroup prototypicality, as we 
expected from high supporters of independence (but perhaps for different reasons). 
We will come back briefly in the discussion to those participants and suggest a post- 
hoc explanation for their answers. For the moment, as this gi'oup did not as such 
constitute the most relevant focus for our inquiry, it was decided to exclude it from 
all subsequent analyses aimed at testing our different hypotheses. Practically 
speaking, this was done by taking out all participants who scored on the quarter point 
of the scale or lower (i.e. <= 2.5; 77= 14), as it can be argued that those participants 
not only did not support independence but were strongly opposed to it.
Thus, as far as HI is concerned, this hypothesis was tested again on the 
remaining 27 participants by means of a linear regression, and the results revealed 
that this time the level of independence significantly predicted (negatively) the 
degree of relative ingroup prototypicality {fi = -.497,  ^ 25 = 2.87, p  = .008). As 
expected, participants supporting stiongly independence showed judged the ingroup 
as (relatively) less prototypical of Britain than participants who were neutral or 
moderate in then support.
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4. Impact o f dual identification
As stated earlier, however, this result confirniing our main hypothesis needed 
to be checked for the possibility of a spurious relationship, in case vaiying support 
for independence would be associated with different degree of dual identification. 
Thus, following Waldzus et al.’s procedure, we first calculated a composite score of 
‘Dual Identification’ by multiplying the exponential function of both Scottish and 
British identification (both variables fust standardised). As these authors argue, such 
a transformation is necessary in order to captui*e their prediction, because what they 
predict is not any kind of interaction but a particular effect where both variables need 
to be high in order to lead to a higher degree of relative ingroup prototypicality. A 
simple product of both variables would not be adequate because the regression 
coefficient would equally increase if a combination of two low levels of 
identification also led to a higher relative ingroup prototypicality^.
The regression analyses using this new rescaled variable of dual identification 
and support for independence as predictors showed that dual identification did not 
have a significant effect on relative ingroup prototypicality {B = .074, SE = .129, f  = 
.116, ? 19 = .57, p  = .573)^. On the other hand, support for independence remained 
significant predictor of this variable (B = -.463, SE -  .203, f  = -.459,  ^19 = 2.28, p  — 
.035), i.e. it was significant even with the possible effect of dual identification taken 
into account. This might not be surprising given that dual identification did not 
actually correlate with support for independence (r = -.085, p  = .707). Thus, those 
results confirmed H2 and that the results supporting hypothesis HI could not be 
accounted by differences in dual identification.
 ^It would also have been possible to test tills liypotliesis using die MR procedure followed in Chapter 
3 (for testing interactions), as the danger pointed by Waldzus et al. would become apparent when 
plotting the interaction. Nevertheless, die exponential transformation was used here because, given the 
modest size of the sample, it also allowed us to minimise the number of variables entered into the 
equation compared to an interaction analysis.
 ^The fact diat the degrees of freedom hi diis analysis differ from die ones in section 3 is explained by 
missing values on the dual identification variable.
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5. Impact o f ingroup identification
Further analyses were conducted in order to check hypothesis H3, concerning 
the role of Scottish identification and its expected interaction with the level of 
independence in predicting relative ingroup prototypicality. First of all, a multiple 
regression was run with relative ingroup prototypicality as dependent variable and 
ingroup identification, level of independence, and the product of those two variables 
as predictors. As in all oui" multiple regression analyses involving an interaction 
term, the two predictor variables were first centred (see Aiken and West, 1991; see 
also Chapter 3). This analysis yielded a significant interaction (B = -.362, 6E = .154, 
122~ 2.36, p — .028).
Simple slopes on different conditional values of support for independence 
were then calculated in order to appraise the direction of this interaction. Following 
the standard procedure (see Chapter 3), the chosen conditional values (CVs) were the 
mean, one SD below and one SD above the mean of scores of support for 
independence. As Table 5.2 shows, the analyses revealed a pattern of results 
consistent with our predictions. Indeed, as expected, at low level of support for 
independence (CV= 3.97), ingroup identification led to significantly higher scores of 
relative ingroup prototypicality (p = .432, p  = .035). However this tendency 
gradually changed direction as the level of support of independence increased. On 
the mean (CV= 6), the simple slope was virtually flat and not significant (fi = -.038, 
p  -  .845). At high conditional value of independence (CF= 8.03), the relationship 
was negative as predicted, though it failed to reach statistical significance (/? = -.510, 
77 = .156). Thus, those results provided support for oui* hypothesis H3, though it did 
so more for low supporters of independence than for high supporters, i.e. 
identification seems to have been a more important factor for the former than for the 
latter.
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TABLE 5.2
Relationship between Scottish identification and relative ingroup prototypicality 
(RIP) as a function of level of support for Scottish independence
Conditional values of independence
Low Medium High
( = 3.97) ( = 6) ( = 8.03)
B .674 -.061 -.796
Simple slopes SE .294 .308 .542
(regi'ession of RIP P .432 -.038 -.510
on identification) t(22) 2.25 .198 1.47
P .035 .845 .156
6. Effect o f the order o f questions
As was stated before, the fact that the order of questions in the study was 
alternated allowed us to test indirectly the effect of the rhetorical context on 
judgements of prototypicality. In order to perfomi that test, the questionnaires were 
first coded accordmg to whether measures of prototypicality preceded or followed 
the measui'e of support for independence, creating a new dichotomic variable 
(Order). A multiple regression was then run with relative ingroup prototypicality as 
dependent variable, and with level of support for independence. Order, and their 
interaction as predictors. As expected, the analysis revealed a significant interaction 
{B = -.771, SE = .314, r 23 = 2.46, p  = .022), showing that the effect of support for 
independence on relative ingroup prototypicality did vary as a function of the order 
of the questions. Confiiining that the pattern of this interaction was as predicted by 
H4, the analyses of the simple slopes for each group based on Order showed that 
support for independence was a significant predictor of relative ingroup 
prototypicality only in the case where support for independence was measured first 
{B = -.898, SE = .240, p  = -.929,  ^ 23 = 3.74, p  = .001), with higher support for
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independence leading to lower relative ingroup prototypicality. When support for 
independence was measured second, it failed to bear a significant relationship with 
relative ingroup prototypicality (B = -.127, SE = .202, p  = -.214,  ^23 = .63,/? = .535; 
given the dichotomous nature of the order variable, the test of whether the 
coefficients of these two simple slopes are significantly different is equivalent to the 
interaction test).
Taking the issue the other way round, simple slopes were also calculated for 
the effect of Order at different level of support for independence. The three 
conditional values chosen were again the mean, one SD below and one above the 
mean (see above). The simple slopes on these values revealed that the order of 
question had a significant impact only at the high CV of support for independence {B 
= -2.27, SE = .874, p  = -.590,  ^23 = 2.60, p  = .016), while it did not have an effect at 
the low CV {B = .859, SE -  .896, P ~ .223, 123 = .958, p  = .348) or with the CV on 
the mean {B = -.705, SE -  .616, p  = -.183,  ^23 = 1.15, p  = .264). Thus, only for those 
participants strongly supporting independence, measuring their support for 
independence first led to lower relative ingroup prototypicality compared to when it 
was measured second. On the other hand, the order of questions did not affect the 
judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality of participants with low or moderate 
support for independence.
Nonetheless, an alternative possible explanation of those results could be that 
when groups’ prototypicality was not measured at the beginning of the questionnaire, 
the questions preceding this measure could have made ingroup (and/or superordinate 
group) identity salient, thus explaining the effect of order which was found. In 
particular, the identification questions would be likely to have such an effect, and 
there was an inevitable degree of overlap between the order of the independence and 
identification measuies in relation to the prototypicality measuies (logically, in 4 
cases out of 6, both independence and identification were measured conjointly either 
before or after groups’ prototypicality). However, a similar multiple regression 
analysis that that above but with Order coded as a function of whether identification 
(rather than support for independence) was measured before or after prototypicality 
did not yield a significant interaction {B -  -.084, SE = .355, / 23 = -.236, p ~ .816), 
allowing us to reject that possibility. By the same token, this provided a test for an 
alternative model against which the validity of ours was reinforced. It indicated that
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the significant effect of order was not just a matter of groups’ prototypicality being 
measured later in the questionnaire, but that it was the fact that it was preceded by 
the measur e of independence which mattered.
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DISCUSSION
Overall, this study yielded very satisfactory results as regards our hypotheses, 
and provided at the very least sufficient ground for exploring the issues further. First 
of all, in the whole sample, there was evidence that judgements of relative ingroup 
prototypicality did vary as a function of attitude towards independence, even if the 
relationship between the two was not linear as first expected. Secondly, this 
relationship did take the expected shape (i.e. higher level of support for 
independence leading to lower relative ingroup prototypicality) once participants 
who scored very low on support for independence (and who also showed lower 
relative ingroup prototypicality) were taken out of the equation.
As far as the answers of this latter group of participants are concerned, we can 
see at least two possible explanations for them. One possibility is that they could 
constitute a group of people recognising that the English are the dominant majority in 
Britain, and are thus more prototypical than the Scots of Britain (in a similar way to 
strong supporters of independence), but accept this fact as normal and legitimate (as 
opposed to strong supporters of independence). This would be consistent with the 
fact that not only do they not support independence, but they are strongly opposed it. 
Alternatively, they could also constitute a group of people taking an individualist 
stance (it is indeed possible that individualism might be associated with rejection of 
independence) and who therefore did not want to take a position on the respective 
prototypicality of both groups. But rather than refusing to answer the questions 
altogether as some participants did, they might have chosen to express their 
individualist stand by giving similar scores of prototypicality to both groups, thereby 
yielding low scores of relative ingroup prototypicality.
In any case, whatever the reason for the answers of this unexpected group, the 
main point remains that its presence does not underaiine the overall logic of our 
argument relating to the importance of attitude to independence in predicting how 
much ingroup and outgroup are judged prototypical of the superordinate group.
Furthermore, the results supporting oui* main hypothesis could not be 
accounted for by varying degree of dual identification amongst participants. This 
does not necessarily mean that ingroup, superordinate group and dual identification 
do not play an important role in judgements of prototypicality, only that this role 
might not be a simple and linear one. In particular, in relation to ingioup
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identification, our analysis showed that its impact worked in interaction with the 
level of support for independence. Our interpretation of this result is that, whereas for 
all participants ingroup identification might have reinforced their motivation to make 
a claim through judgements of prototypicality, the direction in which those 
judgements were affected depended upon the nature of this claim. Thus, for those 
participants stiongly supporting independence, a higher degree of identification led 
to lower relative ingroup prototypicality because this is what sustained their claim for 
independence. However, for those participants who did not support independence, 
ingroup identification had the opposite effect and increased the degree of relative 
ingroup prototypicality. One possibility is that, through their judgements of 
prototypicality, those participants aimed to underline the importance of the ingroup 
in the superordinate group, and that their motivation to do so increased as ingroup 
identification increased. That is, it could be that their answers were underpinned by 
the ingroup projection mechanism hypothesised by Wenzel and Mummendey (1999) 
and involved more classic motivations usually related to ingroup bias (although this 
is not to say that such projection could not also involve a strategic element).
Finally, the analyses based on the order of the questions provided support for 
OUI' hypothesis as to the mechanism underlying the impact of support for 
independence on judgements of prototypicality, namely, that judgements of low 
relative ingroup prototypicality are used as claims by strong supporters of 
independence in order to sustain their political position. This was confirmed by the 
fact that only when support for independence was measuied before judgements of 
groups prototypicality did those participants show a lower degree of relative ingroup 
prototypicality. Only in those circumstances was the issue of independence made 
salient prior to the measure of group prototypicality, thus allowing (and, in oui* view, 
inducing) participants supporting independence to use these latter as a claim 
sustaining their position.
In terms of our own research purposes, however, the main aim of this first 
study was not to explore in gieat detail the impact of variations in the 
rhetorical/communicational context, but simply to appraise the effect of a political 
attitude such as support for independence on judgements of groups prototypicality. In 
other words, it approached the issue of strategic variability through the use of 
relatively stable interpersonal difference. The study was successfiil in that regard, but 
in order to address strategic questions more fully, a more direct and systematic
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manipulation of the situated rhetorical context would be needed. It is with this 
piupose in mind that the next study was designed. Fiutheimore, given the small size 
of our sample, the analyses using MR in the present study should be taken with 
caution. Accordingly, another objective of our second study was to replicate our 
findings with a more extended sample. Finally, a third aim of this study was also to 
see if these findings could be replicated using an additional and alternative measure 
of gi'oups’ prototypicality.
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STUDY 2
So far, OUI" main claim has been that low relative ingroup prototypicality can 
be stiategically used as a rhetorical claim in order to sustain a separatist position. 
However, to repeat our earlier argument, it is important to understand that we are not 
proposing that it is support for independence in and of itself which leads to such 
judgements of low relative ingroup prototypicality. Rather, it is the combination of 
support for independence with a rhetorical context that malces the issue of 
independence salient, thereby motivating supporters of independence to make a 
dh'ect claim in its favour - in which case this claim for independence is best served 
by underlining the under-represented nature of the Scots within Britain (or, to take 
the other side of the coin, by underlining the dominance of the English thr ough a 
high relative outgroup prototypicality). In other words, support for independence 
should not necessarily be always linked with a lower relative ingroup prototypicality 
in every context. Should the communicational puipose of supporters of independence 
be different than making a direct case for their separatist project, they could well be 
led to different, perhaps even opposite, judgements about groups’ prototypicality. In 
fact, if this were not the case, the strategic dimension of these judgements would be 
reduced to inter-individual variability, and the unsympathetic critic could even 
question whether this variability were strategic at all.
Our first study provided some answers to that potential criticism tlirough the 
analyses of the effect of questions’ order, but our second study aimed to tackle that 
issue more directly. In this experiment, we used a similar questionnaire to Study 1. 
However, in contrast to Study 1, we also attempted to induce a systematic variation 
in the type of claim that participants would be trying to make thr ough their answer on 
measures of groups prototypicality. Oui" general idea was that judgements of groups’ 
prototypicality should still vary as a function of support for independence, but this 
time in different ways depending on the rhetorical context made salient. In particular, 
an attempt was made to create conditions in which support for independence would 
lead to a higher relative ingroup prototypicality as well as to a lower one, compared 
to non-supporters of independence.
Accordingly, the experiment comprised three conditions, depending upon 
which issue was made salient for participants (see method section). In one condition
247
{independence), it was the issue of independence itself which was made salient. This 
condition was akin to the circumstances in which half of our participants in the first 
study were put, i.e. when support for independence was measured before groups’ 
prototypicality (except that this time it was made explicitly salient). Based on the 
results of Study 1 as well as on our theoretical model, we therefore expected that in 
this condition participants supporting independence would show a lower relative 
ingroup prototypicality than participants who did not support independence.
In a second condition {neutral or control), the salient issue was “what 
Scottish and English people are like”. Though the topic in this condition cannot be 
called neutral in an absolute sense, it corresponded to what the measures of groups’ 
prototypicality would have made salient by themselves, should no other specific 
issue have been made salient to participants. This condition was akin to the 
conditions in which the other half of our participants in the first study were put (i.e. 
when groups prototypicality was measured before support for independence), and 
therefore we expected to find no specific effect of support for independence in that 
condition.
The third condition {history) made salient the issue of the importance of the 
contribution of Scotland to British history. This was the condition in which we 
expected supporters of independence to show more relative ingroup prototypicality 
than non-supporters. To understand why we made that prediction, it is important to 
emphasise that it is commonplace within the Scottish population to think that the 
Scottish contribution to British history is usually ignored, or at least very much 
underrated (e.g. in history books or teaching in schools). Thus, we hypothesised that 
in the history condition, participants would use the measiues of groups’ 
prototypicality to make a claim about the abnormality and the illegitimacy of such 
underrating. The measures would allow participants to ‘contradict’ this view by 
underlining that the Scots are indeed prototypical of Britain (i.e. important in 
defining what Britain and British people are). Though this might affect all 
participants in general, it was expected that it would particularly affect supporters of 
independence (i.e. that they would be even more motivated to make such a claim), 
given that they believe more than others that Britain is dominated by the English and 
that Scotland is ignored within Britain.
Another way to see this manipulation of history vs. independence conditions 
is that it dr'ew participants attention towards the past or the future, with the
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expectation that it would change their description of the present (i.e. their judgements 
of groups prototypicality). Indeed, in the history condition, it was expected that, in 
order to ‘con-ect’ the underrating of Scotland’s past contribution in making Britain 
what it is today, rating the Scots as prototypical of Britain would be used as a way to 
underline the present importance of Scotland in the definition of Britishness - and 
more so by supporters of independence. By contrast, in the independence condition, 
and as in Study 1, it was expected that supporters of independence would underline 
the present un-prototypicality of the Scots and domination of the English in what it 
means to be British, in order to promote projects which aim to correct that ignorance 
in the futuie.
Hypotheses
Thus, our main hypothesis was that, in the independence condition, 
supporters of independence would show a lower degree of relative ingroup 
prototypicality than non supporters, while in the histoiy condition, they would show 
a higher degree of relative ingroup prototypicality than non supporters. In the neutral 
condition, it was expected that support for independence would not affect relative 
ingroup prototypicality (HI).
We also made two additional hypotheses which miiTored H2 and H3 of the 
first study. That is, first of all, should the effects predicted by HI be found, those 
effects should not be explainable by varying degree of dual identification amongst 
participants (H2). Secondly, we hypothesised that there would be an interaction 
between ingroup identification and support for independence in predicting 
judgements of relative ingroup prototypicality (H3). However, in contrast to the first 
study, the form of this interaction should also depend on die experimental condition. 
This is because, as it has already been argued, the effect of identification is assumed 
to be due to the fact that it enliances the willingness to make a claim in relation to the 
ingroup, while the direction of this effect is assumed to depend on the nature of this 
claim. Thus, in the independence condition, we expected to find an interaction 
similar to the one found in the first study (i.e. ingroup identification would raise the 
degree of relative ingroup prototypicality at low levels of support of independence 
but decrease it at high levels). However, according to HI, in the history condition, 
the claim made by supporters of independence should be associated with higher
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relative ingroup prototypicality. We thus expected the interaction to take the opposite 
direction in that condition (i.e. ingroup identification would decrease the degree of 
relative ingroup prototypicality at low levels of independence and increase it at high 
levels). In the neutral condition, we expected no specific effect or interaction.
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METHOD 
Material and manipulation
The questionnaire used in this study was divided into two main sections (see 
Appendix 5.2 for full details of the questionnaire). The first part of the questionnaire 
introduced the manipulation. First of all, the fi'ont page introduced the alleged topic 
of the research, and the title as well the description of the research purposes differed 
according to the condition. Thus, in the histoiy condition, the title was '’What is 
Scotland’s contribution to British histoiy?’. Participants were told that there was a 
controversy about whether or not books and TV series on British history were too 
much dominated hy English history, ignoring the contribution of Scotland, and that 
we were interested in getting their own opinion on this issue as well as on the real 
conti'ibution of Scotland to British history. In the neutral condition, the title was 
^What Scottish and English people are like?’. Participants were told that there was a 
controversy about the respective char acteristics of the Scots and the English and that 
the research was designed to get their own point of view on that issue. Finally, in the 
independence condition, the title was ''Should Scotland be independent?’. 
Participants were told that there was a controversy about whether Scotland’s interests 
were or were not properly represented within Britain, that some Scots advocated 
independence because Scotland would always come second to England but that 
others thought that Scotland would lose out by leaving Britain, and that the research 
was interested in knowing their opinion on this issue. Furthermore, in order to 
maximise the impact of the communicational dimension in participants’ answers, in 
all conditions they were told that their answers would be shown to an English 
audience.
Secondly, just after this description and a page of general instructions, 
participants were indeed asked to give their opinion on the alleged topic of the 
research, in an open format. They were also asked to indicate what an English 
audience would think of the issue. Those questions were not aimed at providing data 
but were again designed to reinforce the motivation to make a claim in relation to the 
particular issue at stake, by further reinforcing its salience and/or by leading
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participants to commit themselves through an open statement of their opinion 
(Kiesler, 1971/.
The second part of the questionnaire dealt with the dependent measures, and 
the same scales were used as in Study 1 - though this time the order of questions was 
constant, with attitude to independence and identification being measured after 
groups’ prototypicality so that they would not affect the scores on this latter measure. 
However, a second, alternative measure of groups’ prototypicality was also 
introduced, in order to reinforce the strength of any potential findings. As for the first 
one, this second measure was adapted from Waldzus et al. (in press). Rather than 
asking participants themselves to generate tiaits for the Scots and the English, 8 pre­
defined halts (e.g. friendly, anogant, adventurous, etc.) were listed, and participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which each of those traits applied to Scottish, English 
and British people (3 scales of 8 items).
The traits for those 3 scales were selected on the basis of a pre-test on 
Scottish students at the university of St Andrews (N= 11). These participants were 
asked to rate both English and Scottish people on a set of 25 traits, chosen on the 
basis of the self-generated traits most commonly found in Study 1, as well as on the 
basis of a study by Hopkins and Moore (2001) on Scottish and English stereotypes. 
Participants also had to indicate the general valence of those traits. Traits were then 
selected with the aim of ensuring that the final set of 8 items was balanced both in 
terms of valence and in terms of how the traits were judged to be prototypical of 
either the Scots or the English. On the 8 selected traits, 4 were judged by pre-test 
paiticipants to apply more to the Scots and 4 to apply more to the English as 
compared to the other subgroup (paiticipants indicating a significant difference 
between the two groups at /? < .05 using t-tests, except in one case where it was 
marginally significant, p  = .010), and, within each of these two subsets, two traits 
were judged as being rather positive and two as being rather negative.
In the experiment, the ratings by participants of how much these traits applied 
to the Scots and the English allowed us to compute profile dissimilarity scores for 
each subgroup (i.e. the reverse of their prototypicality), by calculating the square root 
of the sum of squared traits differences between the subgroup and the superordinate 
gi'oup (Cronbach & Gleser, 1953). Subtracting the profile dissimilarity of the ingroup
In relation to our reseaixh purposes, the details o f the exact undei-piiniing process need not to 
concern us here.
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from the profile dissimilarity of the outgroup in turn provided us with scores of 
relative ingroup prototypicality.
Participants and procedure
In total 191 participants took part in the study. They were recmited amongst 
the student body of Dundee College in Dundee, Scotland. As for Study 1, however, 
some participants (N = 38) had to be withdrawn from the analyses because they 
failed to answer the first measure of groups’ prototypicality, for reasons similar to 
those noted previously^. Furthermore, on the basis of the results of Study 1, an 
additional 33 participants were also withdrawn a priori as they indicated they were 
strongly opposed to independence (using the same criterion, i,e. <= 2.5 on a scale 
from 0 to 10). Of the remaining 120 participants, 32 were male and 86 female (2 
missing values; age range: 16-55, 21.67, median = 18).
The experiment was run in 4 sessions, during class time (one session per 
class, groups of 30 to 57). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
conditions, depending on which type of questionnaire they received. The design was 
based on the manipulation of one between-subjects factor (experimental condition), 
with three levels: history {N = 41) vs. neutral (7/=40) vs. independence { N - 39).
 ^ Although some of these participants might have answered the second measure using pre-defined 
traits, they were nevertheless wiÂdrawn as it was reasonable to suspect that their answers on that 
second measure might not be meaningful.
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RESULTS
1. Effect o f support for independence in function o f experimental condition
In order to test oui* main hypothesis, two sets of regression analyses, with 
support for independence as predictor and the two indexes of relative ingroup 
prototypicality as criteria, were computed separately in each experimental condition. 
On the first measure of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIPl: self-generated traits), 
these analyses revealed, as expected, a marginally significant effect in the history 
condition, where support for independence led to higher scores of relative ingroup 
prototypicality {B ~ .228, SE = .130, P = .271, / 4o = 1.76, p  = .087), as well as no 
significant effect in the neutial condition {B = .046, SE = .146, p  = .051,  ^39 = .31,
= .755). Conti'ary to our expectations, however, the effect of support for 
independence was not significant in the independence condition {B = -.066, SE = 
.187, ^  = -.057,  ^38 = .36,j9 = .728).
On the second measure of relative ingroup prototypicality (RIP2: pre-defined 
traits), the analyses revealed the opposite picture. That is, on this measuie, support 
for independence did not predict significantly relative ingroup prototypicality in the 
history condition {B = .005, SE = .065, p  = .013, ? 39 = .08, p  = .938). However, in 
line with our prediction, the effect of support for independence was significant in the 
independence condition, with higher support leading to less relative ingroup 
prototypicality {B = -.179, SE -  .084, p = - .355,  ^37 = 2.13,^ = .040). The effect of 
independence in the neutral condition was again not significant {B = -.036, SE = 
.052, ^  =  -.112, ^ 3 9  =  .70, p -  .49).
In sum, the results of those analyses provided partial support for our main 
hypothesis HI. Setting apart the neutral condition, we found 2 out of the 4 effects 
which were expected.
2. Impact o f dual identification
Following those results, further analysis were conducted in order to test for 
the potential impact of dual identification in the 2 cases where support for 
independence was a significant predictor of relative ingroup prototypicality. Using
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the same composite variable of Dual Identification as in Study 1 (i.e. the product of 
the exponential of both identification variables first standardised), multiple 
regressions revealed that, in the history condition, dual identity had no significant 
impact on RIPl (B = .001, SE -  .045, P = .057, 137 = .365, p  = .717), while support 
for independence remained a marginally significant predictor of this measure {B =  
.228, SE = l ' i l ,  p = .272,  ^37 = 1.74, p  = .090). In the independence condition, and 
on RIF2, no significant effect of dual identification was found either {B = .064, SE = 
.071, = .145, 135 = .91, ^  = .37), while support for independence changed from
being a significant predictor to being a marginally significant one {B ~ -.161, SE = 
.085, p  = -.312, 135- 1.96, p  = .058). In absolute terms, however, this change was 
minimal. Thus, confirming H2, the two effects which supported HI could not be 
alternatively explained by different levels of dual identification.
3. Interaction between Scottish identity and support for independence
As with the test of H2, interaction analyses between ingroup identification 
and level of independence were calculated only in the two cases where a significant 
effect supporting HI was found, and this, separately for each of them. These analyses 
used tlie same multiple regression equation as in Study 1, i.e. both variables (centred) 
as well as their product, representing the interaction, were entered as predictors. In 
the history condition (and on RIPl), the interaction emerged as marginally 
significant {B =  .296, SE -  .080, ? 36 =  1.79, p  =  .081), while in the independence 
condition (and on RIP2), this interaction was fully significant (R = -.153, 5!E = .071, r 
3 4  =  2.15, p  =  .039).
The calculation of the simple slopes for those two interactions, using also the 
same CVs as in Study 1 (i.e. the mean, 1 SD above the mean, and 1 SD below the 
mean) revealed a pattern which was, overall, in line with our expectations (see Table 
5.3). In the independence condition, the simple slopes showed that, at high values of 
support for independence, identification led to significantly less relative ingroup 
prototypicality (J3 = -.544, p  = .037). This relationship was still negative on the mean 
of independence but not significant {p -  -.191, p  = .247), while at a low CV of 
independence, the relationship was positive, though not significant either (/? = .161,/? 
=.448). Thus, in slight contrast with Study 1, it seems that in this study ingroup
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identification had the most effect for high supporters of independence . In any case, 
the general direction of the interaction was as expected.
In the histoiy condition, the interaction took the opposite shape. In this 
condition, it was at low levels of support of independence that ingroup identification 
tended to lead to less relative ingroup prototypicality, whereas at high levels it tended 
to lead to more relative ingroup prototypicality. However, reflecting the fact that the 
interaction was only marginally significant, the simple slopes calculated at the 
chosen CVs were all non-significant (at low CV: p  = -.207, p  = .305; at medium CV: 
p  = .174, p  = .375; at high CV: P = .554, p  -  .126). Nevertheless, the general 
direction of this marginally significant interaction was also as expected.
TABLE 5.3
Relationship between Scottish identification and relative ingroup prototypicality as a 
function of level of support for Scottish independence
Conditional values of independence
Low
( = ISD below mean)
Medium 
( = mean)
High
( = ISD above mean)
B .180 -.214 -.607
Independence SE .234 .181 .279
condition P .161 -.191 -.544
(DV = RIP 2) t(34) .77 1.18 2.17
P ^48 .247 .037
B -336 383 .901
History SE ..323 .314 .575
condition P -.207 .174 .554
(DV = RIP 1) t(36) 1.04 .90 1.57
P .305 375 .126
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
7. Summary and conclusions
In sum, the results of our second study provided some support for our main 
hypothesis HI. Study 2 found that judgements of groups’ prototypicality were 
affected by support for independence, but in different ways depending on which 
issue was made salient for participants. Since the manipulation induced the same 
group of supporters of independence to react in opposite ways, and as such 
variability could not be accounted for by differences in dual identification, it ruled 
out the possibility that this variability could be reduced to inteipersonal differences. 
Rather, our interpretation of the results is that the variability in judgements of 
prototypicality was strategic and reflected the different types of claim that 
participants were trying to make, which was in turn determined by a combination of 
their broad political project and the immediate rhetorical context. In the 
independence condition, those participants who supported independence were 
motivated by making a case for their separatist project by stressing the low 
prototypicality of the Scots in comparison to the English, whereas participants who 
did not support independence had no interest in making such a claim. In the history 
condition, our assumption is that participants were motivated to make a case for the 
importance of Scotland in Britain by stressing their relatively high prototypicality, 
and that, although this might have been the case for all participants, supporters of 
independence were motivated to make a stronger case in that respect in comparison 
to other participants. This strategic inteipretation is also consistent with the results 
supporting oui* hypothesis H3, which showed that interpersonal differences in the 
degree of ingroup identification affected judgements in opposite ways, depending on 
participants’ level of support for independence but also on the salient issue at stake -
i.e., in our view, depending on what claim paiticipants were making. Overall then, 
the results of our two studies provided good evidence that judgements of groups’ 
prototypicality can be used strategically.
If we now try to relate our results to the existing research on ingioup 
projection, let us first stress that our main objective has not been to provide a critique 
of Wenzel et al.’s (2001; Waldzus et al., in press) findings. Although oui* research 
explored the impact of strategic factors which might moderate, in some
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circumstances and/or for some people, the prediction of ingioup projection, this does 
not necessarily contradict the possibility that ingroup projection might constitute a 
general and overriding tendency (i.e. a main effect) when those strategic factors are 
not taken into account.
Nevertheless, our data is not entirely congruent with the existing literature. In 
our first study, there was no sign of absolute ingroup projection and only a weak 
indication of relative ingioup projection. Moreover, in both our studies, dual 
identification was not a significant predictor of relative ingioup prototypicality. 
These findings seem to go directly against two of the predictions made by Wenzel et 
al. and to contradict their data collected in a number of different groups. The 
straightforward explanation for this contiadiction is that our own results might be 
dependent on the particular intergroup context within which our data was collected 
and/or our particular design, while it might well be that their results were collected in 
contexts and with groups for which the particular strategic factors we investigated 
were not particularly relevant (or at least much less pro-eminent) or where not made 
salient by their paradigm.
However, should this be the correct explanation, it would imply that ingroup 
projection might not be an universal phenomenon. Rather, whether or not it appears 
would depend on the specific intergroup context under consideration and/or tlie 
specific rhetorical context in which judgements of groups prototypicality are 
measured. In particular, we believe that these judgements can depend on the strategic 
purposes that both these contextual features can induce in people.
This brings us back to the main argument of this thesis. Our studies illustrate 
the more general point that, although general processes might be involved in group 
judgements, no specific predictions on the nature and direction of these judgements 
can be made without taking into account the social context in which these processes 
take place. In terms of judgements of group prototypicality, and depending on the 
specifics of this context, the same cognitive, motivational, and/or strategic processes 
can lead to judge the outgroup as well as the ingi oup as being more prototypical of 
the superordinate group (i.e., to use Wenzel et al.’s teiminology, to ‘outgroup 
projection’ as well as to ‘ingi*oup projection’).
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2. Limits and future directions
One limitation of oui* studies stems from the fact that participants’ claims 
were not directly manipulated and/or directly measured in our design, but only 
assumed to be induced by the issues made salient (in interaction with their political 
project). Our assertion that the variability in participants’ judgements reflected those 
claims therefore remains an interpretation which caimot fully rule out other 
possibilities. For instance, it could still be argued that the imderlying processes are 
purely cognitive and that this variability reflects a different accessibility of category 
representations triggered by the salient issues - although the effect of issue salience 
was shown not to be a stiaightforward one but to work in interaction with support for 
independence and with ingroup identification. Our position does not rule out the 
possibility that variability in judgements might indeed be tied to changes in cognitive 
salience. However, if that is the case, this cognitive variability should in turn be 
imderpinned by stiategic concerns and by the claims made by participants, rather 
than being an automatic product of the ‘objective’ salience of a particular issue per 
se. Whether these claims could be directly manipulated is open to question. 
Nevertheless, further studies could explore ways of assessing them more directly, 
and try to relate them more systematically to different effects on group judgements 
(Ellemers, BaiTeto, & Spears, 1999).
Another way of ruling out the possibility that issue salience per se is 
responsible for judgement variability would be to perform audience manipulation 
(see e.g. Reicher & Levine, 1994; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Barreto, 
Spears, Ellemers, & Shahinger, 2003), i.e. to lead participants to believe that their 
positions will be communicated either to an ingroup (i.e. Scottish) or an outgioup 
(i.e. English) audience. The aim of such a manipulation would be to show that it can 
equally lead to variability in judgements, despite the issue at stake being kept 
constant. Indeed, while the choice of an English audience in the present study might 
have been the most appropriate in order to trigger the particular claim associated with 
the histoi*y condition, one might wonder whether it is not a Scottish audience which 
would have more impact when it is the issue of independence which is made salient. 
In this study, we needed to keep that factor constant in order to avoid potential 
confound, but further research could well manipulate the anticipated audience to 
appraise its effect on judgements of gi*oups’ prototypicality.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
1. Summary of results
This thesis was concerned with the social psychological processes involved in 
political attitudes towards supra-national bodies -  and, more specifically, with the 
attitudes of Scots towards union in Britain and Europe. Taking the research by 
Reicher and Hopkins (2001) as a starting point, we suggested that support for, or 
opposition to, supra-national bodies depends both on the psychological process of 
identification and the social context and meanings of identities -  and, more 
specifically, on the extent to which inclusion in the supra-national body is believed to 
enhance or undermine the ability of its members to live in terms of the norms, values, 
beliefs and interests associated with their national identity. We also suggested that 
beliefs in identity enhancement vs. identity undermining would, in turn, depend upon 
whether or not there is a sense of incompatibility between ingroup identity and 
interests and those of the other nations composing the supra-national body, and also 
on the power relations between the ingroup and these other groups.
Finally, we argued that, while features of the social context and the meaning 
of identities impact on political attitudes, they can also be actively argued over and 
constiucted in order to fulfil strategic purposes. In particular, we stressed that those 
who are interested in persuading listeners in favour of separatism or integration will 
actively construct versions of national identity and the meaning of the supra-national 
body so as to create a sense of identity undermining or enhancement.
Empirically, five studies were designed and run in order to test different 
facets of our general model. In the first study (Chapter 2), we investigated the 
discoui'ses of Scottish politicians who were interested in promoting different political
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projects relating to the status of Scotland vis-à-vis Britain and Europe, and we looked 
at their argumentative and strategic work on identities and social reality. Our analysis 
showed that all of our speakers discussed issues of supra-national integration or 
independence in identity terms. They all claimed that their own political project -  be 
it separatist or unionist -  was designed to protect and enhance the national self. 
However, there was considerable variability between speakers in terms of their 
specific accounts of the nature of ingroup identity, of the superordinate group and/or 
of the outgroup(s), and of the relationship between the two. By providing a 
systematic mapping of these arguments, our aim was to show that this variability did 
not simply reflect interpersonal cognitive and/or perceptual differences (nor was it 
random), but could be understood in strategic teims, m relation to speakers’ 
underlying political projects. Thus, the variability at the argumentative level actually 
reflected something very stable and constant at the level of political projects.
Qualitatively, this analysis also unveiled two further important points. First of 
all, it illustrated that the importance of the social context and social meanings in 
political attitudes can act on at different levels. Besides the meaning which can be 
attributed to the impact of the superordinate group on ingroup identity, we saw that 
the specific content of ingroup norms and values can also be important to consider, 
for these norms and values can be argued to prescribe the way in which ingroup 
members should relate to others and to superordinate groups. Furthermore, we also 
saw that political claims have to be understood in the specific ideological context of 
today’s political world, where the predominance of nationalist ideology means that 
claims to sovereignty (if not always for statehood) are to be made on the basis of 
nationhood.
Secondly, the analysis emphasised the key role of power issues and their 
relation to identity issues, insofar as power is sought after as the ability to express 
ingroup identity and the specific values and interests it defines. This plays in both 
unionist and separatists project, for what is argued is whether these projects enhance 
or undermine this ability.
In the second study (Chapter 3), which used a suiwey design, oui* main 
purpose was to see whether the relationship found in the first study between political 
attitudes and the way the impact of the superordinate body on ingroup identity is 
constrtied, could also be demonstiated quantitatively for a sample of ‘ordinary’ (i.e. 
non-politicians) Scots. Focusing more particularly on the notion of identity
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undermining, we hypothesised that the relationship between the level of national 
identification and attitudes to supranational bodies should be moderated by beliefs of 
identity undermining, and that the impact of perceptions of incompatibility and 
ingroup powerlessness on these attitudes should be mediated by these beliefs. The 
results unambiguously supported these hypotheses in relations to attitudes to Britain. 
In relation to attitudes to Europe, and for various possible reasons which were 
discussed in the relevant chapter, it had to be acknowledged that the results were less 
clear-cut (i.e. the expected interaction between identification and identity 
undermining did not appear). Nevertheless, these results also confirmed the key role 
of perceptions of identity undennining in shaping political attitudes.
As the second study used a correlational design, in the third study (Chapter 
4), we sought to clarify the causal relationship between identity 
enhancement/undermining and unionist/separatist attitudes, by attempting an 
experimental manipulation of the former and looking at the effects on the latter. 
Although, as we have seen, this manipulation was not entirely successful, insofar as 
participants had a sense of Scottish identity being undermined in both experimental 
conditions, the study did show that identity undermining could be manipulated and 
that it did lead to increased support for separatism. Moreover, confirming once again 
the key role of power and its relation to identity, the effect of the experimental 
manipulation on perceptions of identity undermining was partially mediated by a 
sense of powerlessness in Britain.
In the final two studies of the thesis (Chapter 5), we returned to the issue of 
the strategic nature of identity constructions, but this time within an experimental 
context. Indeed, one aim of these studies was to show that politicians (or other 
‘elites’) do not have the monopoly of a strategic use of group definitions, and that the 
investigation of this strategic dimension is not limited to discursive and qualitative 
methodologies. Thus, in these studies, we used the paradigm of ‘ingroup projection’, 
according to which sub-groups tend to over-state the extent to which they, compared 
to other sub-groups, are prototypical of a shared superordinate group. In the first 
study, we reasoned that Scots who support independence should stress that Britain is 
actually more like England than Scotland (i.e. the opposite of ingroup projection), in 
order to suggest that Scottish identity is undermined in Britain and hence to sustain 
their separatist position. The results supported that view, but only when the issue of 
independence was made salient, which showed that this variability could not be
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accounted for by mere interpersonal differences in perceptions but was dependent on 
the argumentative claim participants were trying to make. In the second of the 
studies, we developed the idea that constructions of the relationship between 
Scotland and Britain (reflected in measures of groups prototypicality) should depend 
upon the argumentative context and on the claim made by par ticipants within that 
context. Thus different argumentative issues were made salient to participants in 
order to induce them to make different sort of claims. When the salient issue was 
independence, the findings of the first study were replicated. However, when the 
salient issue was the need to recognise the importance of the contribution of Scotland 
to British history, then supporters of independence rated the Scots as (relatively) 
prototypical of Britain (as in the classic ingroup projection effect) more than non­
supporters. These brought further support to the overall argument that constinctions 
of supra-national/national relations are fluid and depend upon strategic 
considerations.
Overall, then, the contribution of this thesis to social psychology can be 
summarised at three levels. First of all, at the methodological level, it shows the 
value of methodological plurality. It is by combining discursive, survey and 
experimental approaches, that we have been able to ask different questions and to 
address different, but complementary, aspects of our model. Secondly, at the 
theoretical level, and through the use of these different methods, it provides 
convergent evidence for a novel model of international integration/separation. We 
have been able to show: a) how national/supra-national relations are constructed and 
used stiategically, in both a quasi-natuial and an experimental context; b) the 
existence of a quantitative relationship between the variables postulated by the 
model; and, finally, c) the causal relations between these variables and hence the 
ability to alter attitudes. Furthermore, and through such results, this thesis makes a 
significant contribution to two central theoretical debates in social psychology. On 
the one hand, it shows that any analysis of the impact of social identity processes on 
behaviour must take into account the specific construction of category meanings 
rather than seeking to malce generic statements about the impact of social identity on 
behaviour. On the other hand, it shows the impoitance of viewing identity 
constmctions as active and strategic rather than passive and perceptual. On both 
these counts, our research has demonstrated the viability and the fruitfulness of a 
perspective which tries to take these points seriously.
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Finally, at the metatheoretical level, and tlirough its contribution to such 
theoretical debates, this thesis also hopes to contribute to the wider debate on the 
relationship between social reality, psychological processes and social action, and to 
provide an illustration of the way an interactionist social psychology can be 
conceived.
Nevertheless, it is now time to appraise the limits of the research presented in 
this thesis, as well as some of the future avenues for investigation towards which 
these limits might point us.
2. Limits and future directions for research
At an immediate level, the limits relating to each specific study of this thesis 
have already been mentioned in the discussion of their results. We have underlined 
how part of these limitations were addressed by other studies in the thesis, but we 
also identified some shortcomings which are still in need of further work. However, 
as those points have already been discussed, let us now focus on some broader 
issues.
First of all, as it is the case for any work looking at attitudes, it is necessary to 
underline that further work should be conducted in order to look more directly at the 
impact of these attitudes on social behaviour, especially given the discrepancy that 
has sometimes been argued to exist between the two realms (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 
Wicker, 1969). Although we have looked at one form of political action (i.e. political 
argumentation/discursive mobilisation), and although it could be argued that the gap 
between our measures of political attitudes and certain types of political behaviour 
such as voting might be small, it remains that there would many other forms of 
political behaviour which would be worth investigating, either in natural or 
experimentally created contexts. For instance, it would be worthwhile to investigate 
the role of factors such as identity repression/dilution or enhancement/realisation in 
the involvement in social and political movements aiming at promoting or impeding 
social and political change in the relationships with superordinate groups, as well as 
the various strategies of action (other than electoralist) which can be followed in that 
context. Likewise, a related avenue for further research would be to look more in 
detail at the impact of these variables on intergroup attitudes and behaviour, i.e. how 
these could affect the relationship with other subgroups within a superordinate group.
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Secondly, although we have looked, on the one hand, at the construction and 
the strategic use of identity meanings (as well as at the argumentative processes 
which ensue), and, on the other hand, at the impact of meanings on people’s 
attitudes, we have done so in separate studies and using, in the latter case, oui* own 
experimentally designed material. This means that we have not looked directly at the 
impact of the actual arguments and constructions used by ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ 
on the intended recipients of their message, and at the factors which might render 
certain constructions more efficient than others in terms of persuasiveness.
This is an area which could turn out very fruitful for investigation, especially 
since so far the literature on persuasion has tended to focus either on the effects of 
the characteristics of the speaker and/or his/her message or on the characteristics of 
the target of that message. By contrast, our own view is that the persuasiveness of 
arguments and constructions does not simply depend on either the content of the 
argument or the characteristics of the audience, but on an interaction between the 
two. Indeed, it could be argued that efficient constructions are the one which are 
successful in providing a framework for making sense of people’s everyday 
experience, capturing their feelings by some appropriate formula. In other words, 
constructions are efficient when, on the one hand, they rely on existing psychological 
realities (both cognitive and emotional), and when, on the other hand, they manage to 
objectify these realities, i.e. to transfoim them into social facts through public 
expression (Geertz, 1993). They then offer an articulate discourse through which 
people can make sense of their feelings and communicate their experience to others. 
This helps in creating connections between their individual experiences, which can 
be argued to be the prelude to then* translation into social action.
Thirdly, the fact that we have looked at the strategic and cognitive-perceptual 
sides of identity meanings in different studies also raises another issue. Indeed, it 
means that, although oui* model tried to do justice to both sides at the theoretical 
level, we have offered no direct empirical articulation of those two dimensions, and 
of their respective role in particular contexts. There is probably no simple way (if 
any) to captur e all the complexities of such a relationship, but what is certain is that 
improving our* understanding of it would at least require, at the empirical level, to 
move from the synchronic approach we have adopted to a more diachronic approach.
Indeed, it is in part because the studies carried out have frozen the 
phenomena at one point in time that, as a result, we focused mainly on one side at a
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time in terms of the explanation of oni* results. By contrast, studies with a 
longitudinal perspective would allow to appraise the development of meanings over 
time, as a function of the social conditions, giving us a better appreciation of those 
beliefs which cannot be entirely reduced to strategic expressions and which 
contribute to explain, amongst other things, the development of the very political 
projects we have shown to lead to strategic work on identity meanings. On the other 
hand, it would also allow us to investigate the effects of changes in the social context 
which might trigger subsequent changes in both the broad or the more immediate 
strategic purposes of social actors, thereby affecting their constructions of identity 
meanings (and, according to orrr model, they should be affected in different ways, 
depending on whether it is a change in the political project or only a change in the 
immediate communicational or argumentative strategy). Concretely speaking, this 
could mean something even as straightforward as studying political argumentation at 
different points in time, as a function of noticeable and identifiable changes in 
political conditions. In that respect, the ongoing process of European integration 
provides a highly valuable oppoiiunity to investigate these questions.
Furthermore, should we extend our investigation beyond political attitudes to 
political behavioui* as suggested above, a diachronic perspective would also allow to 
enrich our view of the two-way relationship between social context and social action. 
Indeed, by limiting ourselves to a synchronic view, there is a danger that this 
dialogue might take the appearance of a somewhat tautological circle, whereby each 
element explains the other, or else where each side of the dialogue ends up being 
reified as a separate realm in order to avoid such tautology. By replacing social 
action within its temporal dimension, we would be able to investigate how the social 
context, which might impact on social action and practices at one point in time, is in 
fact constituted through the actions and practices of social actors which have taken 
place at an earlier point in time -  that is, how socially determined behaviour feeds 
back, in turn, into the very social context which has helped shaping it (Reicher, 
1996a, 1996b).
This also implies that the issues of the meanings of social reality and 
identities are not only fought out at the argumentative or ideological level, but they 
are also fought out and formed at a more material level, i.e. through the actions and 
the social processes which aim at concretely shaping social structures and practices. 
As Geertz (1993) put it; ''The 'patterns o f meaning' by which social change is
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formed grow from the processes o f that change itself and, crystallized into proper 
ideologies or embedded in popular attitudes, serve in turn, to some inevitably limited 
degree, to guide it.” (p.253). We could add that the meanings and ideologies formed 
at one point through social action are, in turn, crystallised into institutions and 
practices which form the context for fui ther social action.
Finally, in Chapters 1 and 2 (and as reminded above; see section 1), we made 
the claim that national identities might present some peculiarities which are not 
necessarily shared with other types of identities, notably because of the particular 
content of nationalist ideology. Within the contemporary world, national identity is a 
fundamental basis on which rights and resources can be claimed, upon which 
sovereignty is claimed and self-determination is asserted. Its special status in this 
respect is perhaps best reflected in debates about inteiwention in the internal affairs of 
states as opposed to intervening when states pose a threat to others. Thus, we argued 
that, if taken seriously, the claim that psychological processes need to be put within 
their social context in order to understand and predict their effects on attitudes and 
behaviour would also require us to address this ideological dimension, and the 
particularities of national identities and of nationalist ideology.
Yet, though we touched upon that dimension and provided some empirical 
illustiation of its impact in the analysis of Chapter 2, the fact remains that, 
throughout the remainder of this thesis, we have used the terms ingroup 
identity/national identity and superordinate group/supra-national body almost as if 
they were exchangeable, thereby bracketing any further consideration of those 
potential peculiarities. As pointed out in Chapter 1, it might well be tme that, in order 
to malce empirical predictions, taking for granted the specifics of nationalist ideology 
can be, in most cases, less problematic, given the dominance of this ideology in the 
contemporary world of politics. But this is only an empirical - and thus contingent -  
fact, and it does not mean that a more proper theoretical understanding of what is 
going on can bypass those questions. On the contrary, it could be argued that the 
more an aspect of social life is taken for granted, the more it requires our attention as 
social psychologists (Billig, 1991). Moreover, however dominant any ideology might 
be, this dominance is never ubiquitous, even within a single cultural context, for 
societies always harbour alternative ideological forces, creating dilemmas and points 
of resistance (Billig, 1987, 1991; Foucault, 1984). To take but one example, we have 
seen in Chapter 2 that political discourse could also rely on the use of class
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categories, thereby potentially appealing to other ideological forces, which can be 
used in combination, but also in opposition to national categories and nationalist 
ideology.
Thus, although the dynamics of attitudes and behaviour related to national 
identities might share the same universal psychological basis as those related to any 
sort of identity, it remains that the specific political attitudes or projects we have 
investigated in this thesis, and the constmctions of national identities and social 
reality these can lead to, should also be seen as dependent on the specific content of 
nationalist ideology. A fuller understanding of these nationalist projects, arguments 
and constructions, and, more generally, of the politics of national identity (e.g. the 
importance and the role of reference to authenticity, realisation of the national self, 
historical continuity, immortality of the nation, etc.) would therefore require a 
deepened investigation at that level.
This does not mean, of course, that all aspects of these phenomena are 
specific to nationalist ideology and to the national self, and do not apply to any other 
types of identity. Certainly the claims for freedom and self-determination, for 
instance, can be made for individual or collective agents other than national ones -  
though, as it has been argued in Chapter 2, it is mostly through nationhood that the 
claim can be made that this should be actualised in a separate state. Indeed, such 
values are predominantly part of a larger modem (and mostly Western) ideology of 
individual freedom, which can potentially be applied to any such agent. But, to take 
the question one step further, one could then also ask to what extent political claims 
related to identity and national identity can reflect the historically and culturally 
situated characteristics of such other ideological forces (like the ones associated with 
individual freedom) rather than reflecting universal features of identity dynamics.
In OUI* view, there is no doubt that the self, and some of the basic motivations 
which come with it, can be seen as universal -  although the precise nature of these 
latter motivations might be a matter of controversy. Yet, getting a better 
understanding of these universal features also requires us to consider the possibility 
that the way this self is conceived of - both in tenns of its specific content and of its 
functioning -, as well as certain concerns related to this self, can be a result of 
cultural and ideological conditions, and might therefore not be as universal as most 
of the social psychological literatuie, and even some of oui* own statements, might
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lead us to presuppose. At the very least, if this might not be a matter of cultural 
exclusivity, questions relating to differences in cultural emphasis remain relevant.
To be more concrete, let us give one example, already alluded to in Chapter 1, 
of some of the questions which might be raised at that level. In an impressive study 
of the sources of our modem conception of the self, Charles Taylor (1989) has 
proposed that the view of the self prevalent in modern Western societies is one where 
this self is seen has having inner depths. Moreover, with what he calls the 
"expressivist turn”, rooted in the ideologies of romanticism, the notion has emerged 
that the depths of the self must be expressed in order to reach its realisation and self- 
fulfilment (see also Foucault, 1984; Giddens, 1991). This is not only a question of 
right but also of duty, as the message of expressivism is that one ought to express 
one’s authentic identity in order to reach self-fulfilment, lest one ends up living a 
inauthentic and meaningless life - the conelate of this being that a situation of 
repression or inliibition of this ‘self expression’ is understood as a pathological one.
Such a vision of the self took shape not only at the individual level but also at 
the social level and promoted the notion of a national self and a national culture to 
which people should be tme by expressing and realising it. In other words, nationalist 
movements took up the language of expressivism and self-realisation and applied it 
on their own gi'ound. Given that such a vision is historically, cultuially and 
ideologically situated, the question could then arise about how much and in which 
ways the concems for the expression and realisation of the national self we have seen 
thi'oughout this thesis, and their invocation in political discourse, might also be 
themselves, and at least in part, historically, culturally and ideologically situated, 
rather than reflecting universal identity processes. This remains an open question, but 
one which merits to be asked.
In sum, and as we argued in Chapter 1, it is not only that we need to 
investigate the particularities of the social and ideological context in order to get a 
better understanding of the specifics of human social action, but that such 
investigation is also required if we want to make generic statements about human 
social psychology and about the relation between psychological processes and 
social/cultuial factors, which are neither too abstract to be interesting nor too 
contestable in their universality.
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3. A final word
This final discussion has led us to reiterate some of the bold claims we have 
made at the metatheoretical level, in particular in tenns of the development of a truly 
interactionist approach to social behaviour. We shall leave the reader as the judge of 
how successfully we have applied these claims within our own research. However, as 
the history of social sciences and oui* own exposition of the trajectory of the SI 
approach has shown, claims at that level have invariably failed to satisfy everyone. It 
would therefore be foolish or over-pretentious on our behalf to expect that ours 
should be so different in this respect. Let us then finish by saying that we would be 
content already if some of our more modest claims, concerning more specifically the 
phenomena of national separation/integration, are granted. That is, most 
fundamentally, we hope that this research has led us to a better understanding of 
these phenomena and of the dynamics of identity involved in them. If the reader were 
to share a similar feeling, this thesis will have successfully achieved its main 
purpose.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II
2.1. Interview questions/guidelines.
1. During the election campaign, what did you see as the key issues?
2. What are, for you, the key elements of Scottish society and of being Scottish?
Are there distinctive priorities, interests, characteristics, values, cultural traits, way of life, etc. 
that characterise Scottish people and institutions?
3. What do you think of Scotland being part of Britain?
a) What are the relations between Scotland and England, how would you define this 
relationship?
b) What are the effects of being in Britain on Scotland? Does it benefit Scotland or does it harm 
its interests?
c) What are the implications in terms of the distiibution of power between Scotland and 
England? Do you wish for more autonomy for Scotland or do you think there should be more 
integration?
d) More specifically, what do you think of the Scottish Parliament? Has it been a good thing for 
Scotland? Should it have more powers, less, or about the same in the future? Aie there specific 
areas in which you believe in more or less integration?
4. What do you think of Scotland being part of Europe?
a) What are the relations between Scotland and the other Euiopean countries, how would you 
define this relation?
b) What are the effects on Scotland of being in Europe? Does it benefit Scotland or does it haim 
its interests?
c) What are the implications in terms of power? Dou you wish more autonomy from Eiuope or 
do you wish more integration? Are there specific areas in which you believe in more or less 
integration?
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
3.1. E-mail advertising the survey
What do you think about Scotland being part of Britain and being part of Europe? Should 
Scotland remain part of the UK? Should it remain within the European Union? In the psychology 
department, we are conducting a research project which is looking at the way Scottish people see 
these issues and we need your help! All you have to do is to go at the following web address: 
http://psv.st-and.ac.uk/misc/scotq2.html. Fill in the questionnaire and, when you have finished, 
simply click on the 'submit' button and it will automatically be sent back to us.
The questionnaire should be filled in on yoiu* own and it will take about 20 minutes of your time 
- but it deals with important and interesting issues which will affect our future and will give you 
an opportunity to express youi" views on these crucial matters. The more people who respond, the 
richer and the more valid the picture we will get - so please help us do a good job. Thank you 
veiy much for helping - we rely on your support!
If you have any questions or queries, please do not hesitate to contact Denis Sindic at ds31fg>st- 
andiews.ac.uk
3.2. Survey questionnaire
The following pages contain an example of the questionnaire used in the study. The 
questionnaire has been annotated in order to indicate the scales/items used in the analyses (the 
annotations are made in text boxes, using a different font). Reverse coded items have been put in 
italics.
SCOTLAND IN BRITAIN AND IN EUROPE 
Opinion survey
Dear participant,
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this opinion survey. This study is concerned with 
Scottish people’s attitudes towards England, Britain and Europe.
Please answer all the questions. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions in this 
survey; we are only interested in your opinion. Everything you put down will be confidential. In fact, we 
are not even asking for your name on this questiormaire, since we are interested in you as part of a general 
Scottish sample.
Please also read carefully all the instructions preceding the questions. On several questions in this 
suiwey we want you to give your answer on a numerical scale. This will usually run from “1” (‘strongly 
disagree’ or ‘not at all’) to “7” (‘strongly agree’ or ‘very much’). You should use this scale to show your 
personal opinion by circling just one of the numbers which best represents your choice. Here is an 
example:
I like classical music
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 7 Very much
Thus, if you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 6 on the scale, as shown in the 
example. Alternatively, if you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 1 or 2.
Filling this questiormaire should take about 20 minutes of your time. Please remember that you are free to 
withdraw at any time, without having to give a reason. Please also be aware that, although we would like 
you to answer all of the questions, you are free not to answer any question if you do not wish to do so.
If you have any comments on any of the questions, just write them in the margin. There is also a space 
provided for general comments at the end.
If you have any questions, before or after having completed the questiormaire, you are more than 
welcome to contact Denis Sindic, at ds31 @,st-andrews.ac.uk or at the phone number 01334 42 7849
University of St Andrews 
School of Psychology
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SCALE OF SCOTTISH 
IDENTIFICATION
FEELINGS ABOUT BEING SCOTTISH
First o f all, we would like to ask you some questions concerning your feelings about being Scottish. 
Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which 
best represents your personal opinion.
1. Being Scottish is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see myself as being Scottish.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.
Sti'ongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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THE QUALITIES OF SCOTTISH, ENGLISH, BRITISH AND EUROPEAN PEOPLE
Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of Scottish 
people.
Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of English 
people.
Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of British 
people.
Please now briefly describe what, for you, are the distinctive qualities that are characteristic of European 
people.
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SCALE OF INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE 
ENGLISH (item s 3-8)
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SCOTS AND THE ENGLISH
Now we would like to ask your opinion about how you see the relationship between the 
characteristics o f  the Scots and those o f  the English, Please state whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best represents your  
personal opinion.
1. There are no differences between English identity and Scottish identity.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. In general terms, the qualities of Scottish people and of English people are identical.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. The Scottish way of life is basically out of tune with the English way of life.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Scottish and English people are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together 
well.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. The fact that the Scottish way of life might differ from that of the English does not mean that they are 
necessarily in opposition.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. The Scots and the English are like chalk and cheese: they just don’t go together.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. Scotland and England are like members o f a team where the different qualities of each member 
combine together to make a coherent whole.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. The Scots and the English are simply incompatible.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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SCALE OF POWER IN BRITAIN
(item s 1-6)
THE POWER OF SCOTLAND IN BRITAIN
Now we would like to know your opinion about how much power you think that Scotland does or does 
not have in Britain. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, 
circling the number which best represents your personal opinion.
1. I f  the Scots really want to, they can get their way in determining British government policies.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. The Scottish interest plays a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. Decisions in Britain are based on what the English want irrespective of what others want.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Even though they might have the power to push things through alone, the English generally take the 
Scottish view into account when determining British government policy.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. When push comes to shove, the English always get their way in British policy.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. English people too often take advantage of their stronger power to make their point of view prevail in 
the politics of Britain.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. For me, Britishness means essentialy the same thing as Englishness.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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SCALES OF UNDERMINING OF SCOTTISH IDENTITY IN BRITAIN
AND IN THE E.U.
THE IMPACT OF BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ON SCOTTISH IDENTITY
Now we would like to ask your opinion about how you think that being part o f Britian and/or the 
European Union affects Scottish identity. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the first set 
of statements, concerning the impact o f Britain on Scottish identity. Circle the number which best 
represents your personal opinion. Then please do the same for the second set o f statements concerning 
the impact o f the European Union on Scottish identity.
1. Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. By being part of Britain, Scottish values are corroded by alien values which are imposed on them.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Being part of Britain has helped Scotland to preserve its identity more than if Scotland had stood 
alone.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sti'ongly agree
5. Scotland might lose part of its identity if it were independent of Britain but the loss will be even 
greater if it decides to stay in Britain.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. Scottishness has flourished inside the Union with Britain, but it would have flourished even more if it 
had been independent.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
1. Being part of the European Union has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2 . By being part of the E.U., Scottish values are corroded by alien values which are imposed on them.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. Being part of the European Union has undermined the Scottish way of life.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Being in the European Union has helped Scotland to preserve its identity more than if Scotland had 
stood alone.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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5. Scotland might lose part of its identity if it were independent of the European Union but the loss will 
be even gr eater if it decides to stay in it.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. Scottishness has flourished inside the European Union, but it would flourish even more if it was 
outside.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
SCALES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN AND THE E.U. 
(sec tio n  B an d  D resp ec tiv e ly )
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND
Now, we would like to ask you your opinion about the political future o f Scotland, regarding its 
relationship to Britain and the European Union. That is, we would like to ask you whether you support 
independence, devolution or a stronger union in relation to these two political entities.
A. Please choose among the following statement the one which best represents your opinion by circling
its number (you should choose one and only one o f the five statements).
1. Scotland should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK.
2. Scotland should remain part of the UK with its own parliament, but this parliament should have more 
power than at present.
3. Scotland should remain part of the UK with its own parliament, and this parliament has about the 
right amount of power at present.
4. Scotland should remain part of the UK with its own parliament, but this parliament should have less 
power than at present.
5. Scotland should remain part of the UK without its own parliament.
B. Please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements, circling the number 
which best represents your personal opinion.
1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the
long-term.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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3. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing only if it ultimately leads to total independence.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the 
UK.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. I support devolution but I don’t support independence nor do I support being in die UK without a 
Scottish parliament
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. I oppose devolution because it endangers the union between Scotland and England.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
C. Please choose among the following statement the one which best represents your opinion by circling
its number (you should choose one and only one of the five statements).
1. Scotland would be best off being totally independent of the European Union.
2. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, but more power should be given to the nation­
states and less to the EU than at present.
3. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, and the balance of power between the nation­
states and the EU is about right at present.
4. Scotland should remain part of the European Union and more power should be given to the EU over 
the nation-states than at present,
5. Scotland should be part of the European Union and the EU should become a new state in which the 
old nation-states would cease to exist as such.
D. Please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements, circling the number 
which best represents your personal opinion.
1. Scotland would be best off being totally independent of the European Union.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. Scotland should not pool any of its sovereignty into the European Union
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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3. I do not the support the European Union at all.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. Scotland should remain part of the European Union, but the nation-states should retain their 
sovereignty and their veto on important matters.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
5. Scotland should be part of the European Union, but keep most of its sovereignty.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
6. I generally support the European Union but not if it means the disappearance of the nation-states.
Strongly disagi'ee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
7. Scotland should be part of the European Union and the EU should become a new state in which the 
old nation-states would cease to exist as such.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
8. The European Nations, including Scotland, should look beyond their own interest to create a real 
European Community where only the interests of all Europeans would rule.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
9. I support the idea of an European Union as a new state in which the old nation-states would cease to 
exist as such.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
E. Wliich political party do you intend to vote for at the next election?.
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SCALES OF INTERGROUP STEREOTYPES (sec tio n  1, 2 and  3) and  
INTERGROUP ATTITUDES (sec tio n  4, 5 and  6)
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENGLISH, EUROPEANS AND SCOTS
Now, please try to think about typical people in Scotland, in England and in Europe, and sum them up 
using the following characteristics. For each one, circle the number which best represents your 
impression o f the relevant group. We know how difficult it is to make generalisations like this, but 
please try your best.
1.1 think that the English are in general
Hard working not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Unsociable not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Intelligent not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Arrogant not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Creative not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Unfriendly not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
2.1 think that the Europeans are in general
Hard working not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Unsociable not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Intelligent not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Arrogant not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Creative not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Unfriendly not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
3.1 think that the Scots are m general
Hard working not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ve/y much
Unsociable not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Intelligent not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Arrogant not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Creative not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 veiy much
Unfriendly not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
299
4. What are your general feelings towards the English?
How much do you like the English? 
How much do you admire the English? 
How much do you trust the English?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
5. What are your general feelings towards the Europeans?
How much do you like tlie Europeans?
How much do you admire the Europeans?
How much do you trust the Europeans?
6. What are your general feelings towards the Scots?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 vety much
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
How much do you like the Scots? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 veiy much
How much do you admire the Scots? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
How much do you trust the Scots? not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
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SCALES OF BRITISH AND EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION
FEELINGS ABOUT BEING BRITISH
Now we would like to ask you some questions concerning your feelings about being British. Please 
state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best 
represents your personal opinion.
1. Being British is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other British people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see myself as being British.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not British criticises the British.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
FEELINGS ABOUT BEING EUROPEAN
Now we would like to ask you some questions concerning your feelings about being European. Please 
state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, circling the number which best 
represents your personal opinion.
1. Being European is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other European people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see myself as being European.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not European criticises the Europeans.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
301
GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF
How old are you ? ..........
What sex are you ?:......
Are you a member of a political party or a political student association ? If Yes, please state which 
one(s)................
Aie you a member of any other relevant association ? If Yes, please state which one(s)....................
What is your occupation ?..................
What is your parents occupation ?..................
If you want feedback on the results of this study, please provide your e-mail address..........................
OPEN COMMENTS
If you have any comments on this questionnaire, you can put them down here and/or use the back 
of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your political opinion and your 
attitudes towards Britain and the European Union, please feel free to do so. We cannot ask people 
about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there are other important things to 
consider in order to explain your attitudes.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND HELP IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV
4.1. Experimental questionnaire
The following pages contain an example of the questionnaire used in the study. This 
questionnaire has been annotated in order to indicate the changes due to experimental conditions 
(i.e. changes in the description of the policy and in the memory questions) and the scales/items 
used in the analyses. Reverse coded items have been put in italics.
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Attitudes to Public Policy
This study is concerned with attitudes towards policies and policy-maldng in Britain. First of all, 
you will be asked to listen to the account of a new policy regarding access to the land and the 
countryside. A transcription of what you will hear* will also be provided on the next page to help 
you follow. This should not take more than 5 minutes. It is very important that you listen to 
the tape and read the text very carefully. We will be checking youi' memory of the account 
later.
When you have finished listening and reading about the policy, you will be asked to answer a 
series of questions, mostly concerned with what you thinlc of the policy and what your views are 
in general. This should take no more than 15 minutes. Please note that all your answers will 
remain anonymous. You will be asked to sign a consent foim, but this will be kept separate 
from the questionnaire in which you won’t be asked for your name.
Please try your best to answer all the questions. However, if there is any question you really 
feel uncomfortable to answer, you are free not to do so. Please also remember that you are free to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
On several questions in this research we want you to give your answer on a numerical scale. This 
will usually run from “0” (‘strongly disagree’, ‘not at all’,...) to “10” (‘strongly agree’, ‘very 
much’,...). You should use this scale to show your personal opinion by circling just one of the 
numbers which best represents your choice. Here is an example:
I like classical music
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  10 Very much
Thus, if you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 9 on the scale, as shown 
in the example. Alternatively, if you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 
0,1 or 2.
If you have any questions, please ask them now.
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A new policy on access to the countryside
IN ALL CONDITIONS, THE FOLLOWING TEXT DESCRIBED THE POLICY:
An All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Westminster Parliament last week published 
a report on Access to the Countryside. The report recommended important changes which will 
affect all outdoor activities, most notably hill walking and mountain biking. Given the consensus 
amongst members of the Committee, it is very likely that this recommendation will soon be 
accepted by the House of Commons and become law throughout Britain.
The most significant proposals concern a licensing system which will limit what people can do 
and where. For instance activities such as walking may be prohibited at particular times (such as 
walking near nest sites during breeding times) and other activities such as cycling may be totally 
prohibited in particular places. Violations could lead to withdrawal of licences and to other 
punishments such as fines.
These ideas have led to considerable controversy.
On the one hand it has been argued that such steps are absolutely crucial if we are to maintain the 
environment and to protect wildlife. Increasing use and lack of respect has led to problems of 
erosion in some of oiu most tieasured sites and to several species becoming endangered. The 
proposals will make the countryside a much more attractive place for everyone to enjoy.
Others have suggested that the proposals are an attack on one of our basic freedoms: the freedom 
to enjoy our national countryside. They are a means by which landowners can restrict the ability 
of ordinary people to access the land. They represent an attempt to roll the clock back by half a 
century or more and to get rid of hard won liberties.
IN THE DISSONANT CONDITION, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS ADDED:
In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has been argued that the 
proposal would destroy something that is central to Scottish life and to what it means to be 
Scottish. In the words of one Scottish campaigner: “Scotland is a big and beautiful country with 
a small population and so we have always had a special relationship with the land. Many of our*
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symbols are of the land -  the hills and the moors and the lochs and the glens. Our countryside is 
unique, in terms of landscape, vegetation, and wildlife. It is Icnown and admired throughout the 
world. It is a precious heritage which should be available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy. So 
if you keep us from the land you take away an important part of who we are. What’s more, since 
we understand and we care about die land, we certainly don’t need a law to tell us to respect it”. 
Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: “this proposal takes no account of the situation in 
Scotland; if it goes through, it would mean changing our traditions and undermining an essential 
part of the Scottish way of life”.
IN THE CONSONANT CONDITION, THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS ADDED:
In Scotland, where the policy would have particular relevance, it has been argued that the 
proposal would support something that is central to Scottish life and to what it means to be 
Scottish. In the words of one Scottish campaigner: “Scotland is a big and beautiful coimtry with 
a small population and so we have always had a special relationship with the land. Many of our 
symbols are of the land -  the hills and the moors and the lochs and the glens. Our coimtryside is 
imique, in terms of landscape, vegetation, and wildlife. It is lorown and admir ed tliroughout the 
world. It is a precious heritage which should be available for everybody in Scotland to enjoy. So 
if you damage the land you destroy an important part of who we are. What’s more, since we 
understand and we care about the land, we, more than anyone, appreciate the need to take steps 
to protect it”. Indeed, another Scottish activist has said: “this proposal is sensitive to the situation 
in Scotland, if it goes through, it would enhance our traditions and protect an essential part of the 
Scottish way of life”.
REACTIONS TO THE POLICY
When reading about the policy and its effects, to what extent did you feel:
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angry
irritated
happy
enthusiastic
N otatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
N otatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 10 Very much
9 10 Very much
9 10 Very much
9 10 Very much
SCALE OF ATTITUDE TO THE POLICY
ATTITUDES TO THE POLICY
To what extent do you agree or disagree with this policy?
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
There should be tighter controls of where and when people have access to the land 
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
This policy will be effective in protecting the land
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
This policy will undermine the ability o f ordinary people to enjoy and experience the land 
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
SCALE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND
We would like you now to indicate to what extent you thinlc that the Scottish parliament should 
receive more or less power in the future, on a scale of 0 to 20, where 
0 = no power at all for the Scottish parliament (i.e. total union in Britain)
10 = the present balance of power
20 -  total power for the Scottish parliament (i.e. independence.)
No power Present situation Total power
0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20.
307
1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest of the UK.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. The goal of having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total 
independence in the long-teim.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing only if it ultimately leads to total independence.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part of the UK.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
5. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence 
from the UK.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
6. I support devolution but I don’t support independence nor do I support being in the UK 
without a Scottish parliament
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
7. Scotland should remain part of the UK but without a separate parliament.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
8. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
9. I oppose devolution because it endangers the union between Scotland and England.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
SCALES OF IDENTITY UNDERMINING (item s  1-2) AND POWERLESSNESS (item s 5-6) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTLAND. ENGLAND AND BRITAIN
L Being part of Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. Being part of the UK has undermined the Scottish way of life.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. Scottish and English people are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together 
well.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. The Scots and the English are simply incompatible.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
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5, The Scottish interest p la ys  a p a r t  in determ ining British governm ent decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Strongly agree
6. Decisions in Britain are based on what the English want irrespective o f  what others want.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
ATTITUDES TO THE WESTMINSTER AND SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTS
1. To what extent do you think that the policy proposed has been pushed by the English?
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
2. To what extent do you think that Westminster politicians in general
- have a concern for people in Scotland?
N otatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
- are only interested in themselves?
N otatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
- care about ordinary people?
N otatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
- do a goodjob?
Notatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
3. To what extent do you think that politicians in the Scottish parliament
- have a concern for people in Scotland?
Notatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
- are only interested in themselves?
Notatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
- care about ordinary people?
Notatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
-do a good job?
N otatall 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
FEELINGS TOWARDS THE ENGLISH
1. How much do you like English people in general?
N ota ta ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
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2. H ow much do you admire English people in general?
N ota ta ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
3. How much do you trust English people in general?
N ota ta ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Very much
EFFEC TS O F TH E PO LIC Y  ON SCOTLAND
Regarding the policy which has been proposed in the text:
Do you think that this policy is, on the whole, a good or a bad thing for Scotland?
A very bad thing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 A very good thing 
This policy threatens an important aspect of the Scottish way of life
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree 
This policy protects an important aspect of the Scottish way of life
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
SCALE OF PRESENTATION OF THE POLICY
TH E PRESEN TA TIO N  O F TH E PO LICY
Do you think the presentation of the policy was
- fair? Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- convincing? Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- clear? Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 10 Very much
9 10 Very much
9 10 Very much
MEMORY QUESTIONS
M EM O RY  QUESTIONS
1. According to the text, who is proposing the policy:
a) An All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Westminster Parliament
b) An All-Party Environment Select Committee of the Scottish Parliament
c) A government Environmental Comittee in the Westminster Parliament
d) A government Environmental Comittee in the Scottish Parliament
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2. Which of the following statements best describes the policy:
a) A licensing system which limits where and when people can have access to the countryside
b) A trespass law which makes it illegal to walk near the nests of endangered birds
c) A permit system where people have to pay to walk in the countiyside
d) An access law which gives people greater rights to go where they want in the countryside
3. What arguments have been made in favour of the proposed law
a) It is absolutely crucial if we are to maintain the environment and to protect wildlife
b) It is absolutely crucial if we are to raise money for new environmental schemes
c) It is absolutely crucial if we are to get more people to experience the countryside
d) It is absolutely cmcial if we are to stop too many people using the countryside
4. Wliat arguments have been made against the proposed law
a) It is an attack on our basic freedom to enjoy our national countryside
b) It is an attack on private property rights
c) It means that only the rich will have access to the countryside
d) It will endanger wildlife
In c o n so n a n t an d  d is so n a n t co n d itio n s  only:
5. According to the text, what is the effect of the policy on the way of life
a) It will undermine the Scottish way of life
b) It will protect the Scottish way of life
c) It will undermine the British way of life
d) It will protect the British way of life
SCALE OF SCOTTISH IDENTIFICATION
FEELINGS ABOUT NATIONALITY
What is your nationality?__________________
If you are not Scottish, please replace with yom* nationality in the following questions
1. Being Scottish is very important for me.
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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3. I see m yself as being Scottish.
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when som eone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
POLITICAL ORIENTATION (left vs. right-w ing: i te m i)
POLITICAL ORIENTATION
1. In general terms, would you define your views in politics as being rather left-wing or rather 
right-wing in ?
left-wing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Right-wing
2. Which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Scottish elections?
3. Which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Westminster elections?
PERSONAL DETAILS
A g e .............
Sex:..............
Are you a member o f  a political party or a political student association ? I f  Yes, please state which 
one(s)....................
Are you a member o f  any other relevant association ? I f  Yes, please state which one(s).............................
What is your subject o f  study?....
What is your parents occupation ? ......................
How often do you go walking or cycling o ff  road in the countryside
A. Once a week or more B. Roughly once a month C. few  times a year D. Never
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OPEN QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
Please indicate what you know concerning current laws governing land access (e.g. trespass laws) 
and, in particular, the role of the Westminster and Scottish parliaments in deciding on those laws.
If you have any comments on this questionnaire or on the policy which you have been presented, 
you can put them down here and/or use the back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would 
like to add about your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain, please feel free to do so. 
We cannot ask people about evei*ything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there are 
other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V
5.1. Study 1 questionnaire.
Pages 314 to 319 contain an example of the questionnaire used in this study. It has been 
annotated in order to indicate scales/items used in the analyses. The order of the three sections of 
questions was alternated (i.e. section 1: measures of prototypicality; section 2: measure of 
support for independence and other measui'es; section 3: measures of identification -  personal 
details and comments always presented at the end)
5.2. Study 2 questionnaire.
Pages 320 to 333 contain an example of the questionnaire used in this study. It has been 
annotated in order to indicate the scales/items used in the analyses. Changes due to experimental 
conditions are also indicated, i.e. there ai e tliree different versions of the first and the third pages 
of the questionnaire.
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SCO TS A N D  EN G L ISH  IN  BR ITA IN  
O pinion survey
Dear participant,
Thank you very much for agreeing to answer this questionnaire. This study is principally concerned with 
Scottish and English people’s perceptions o f  each other and o f  Britain.
P lease note that all your answers w ill rem ain anonym ous. In fact, w e are not even asking for your 
name on this questionnaire, since w e are interested in you in terms o f  your nationality - either Scottish or 
English.
Please try your best to answ er all the questions. There are no right or wrong answers to any o f  the 
questions in this survey; w e are only interested in your opinion. However, i f  there is any question you  
really feel uncomfortable to answer, you are free not to do so. Please also remember that you are free to 
withdraw fi'om the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
On several questions in this research we want you to answer on a numerical scale. This scale w ill usually 
run from “0” ( ‘strongly disagree’, ‘not at a ll’, . . . )  to “ 10” ( ‘strongly agree’, ‘very m uch’,.. .) .  You should 
use this scale to express your personal opinion by circling the number which best represents your choice. 
Here is an example:
I like classical music
N o ta ta l l  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 ( ^ 1 0  Very much
Thus, i f  you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 9 on the scale, as shown in the 
example. Alternatively, i f  you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 0,1 or 2 (but 
please circle only one num ber on each scale).
If you have any comments on any o f  the questions, just write them in the margin. There is also a space 
provided for general comments at the end.
If  you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.
University o f  St Andrews 
School o f  Psychology
SECTION 1 : MEASURES OF GROUP PROTOTYPCALITY 315
THE QUALITIES OF SCOTTISH. ENGLISH. BRITISH PEOPLE
A. Please list three attributes that you thhik are characteristic o f  Scottish people, as compared to English 
people.
1.
2 .
3.
B. Please list three attributes that you thinlc are characteristic o f  English people, as compared to Scottish 
people.
1.
2 .
3.
C. N ow , please indicate how much exactly you feel that the attributes you choose to describe Scottish and 
English people apply to British people in general.
Scottish attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above);
1.......................
How much do you thinlc this attribute apply to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much 
2 ........................
H ow much do you think this attribute apply to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much 
3.....................
How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
English attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above):
1.......................
How much do you think this attribute apply to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
2 ........................
H ow much do you thinlc this attribute apply to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
3.....................
H ow much do you think this attribute apply to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
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TH E C O N STITU TIO N A L STA TU S OF SC O TLA N D
W e would like you now to indicate to what extent you think that the Scottish parliament should receive 
more or less power in the future, on a scale o f  0 to 20, where 
0 == no power at all for the Scottish parliament (i.e. total union in Britain)
10 =  the present balance o f  power
20 = total power for the Scottish parliament (i.e. independence.)
No pow et' Present situation Total p o w er
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20.
SCALE OF SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE (item s 1-2)
1. Scotland should becom e an independent countiy, separate from the rest o f  the UK.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. The goal o f  having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the 
long-term.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part o f  the UK.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the 
UK.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
5. Scotland should remain part o f  the U K  but without a separate parliament.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
6. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence
Strongly d isagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Strongly agree
7. England should have its own English parliament.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
TH E R EL A T IO N SH IP B E T W E E N  SC O TLA N D . EN G LA N D  A ND B R IT A IN
1. Being part o f  Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity. I
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree  j
2. Being part o f  the U K  has undermined the Scottish way o f  life. i
Strongly d isagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
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3, Being part o f  Britain has allowed England to keep its specific and separate identity.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Strongly agree
4. Being part o f  the U K  has undermined the English w ay o f  life.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
THE POWER OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND IN BRITAIN
1. The Scottish interest plays too little a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. The Scottish interest plays too much a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. The English interest plays too little a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. The English interest plays too much a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
POLITICAL ORIENTATION
1. In general terms, would you define your view s in politics as being rather left-wing or rather right-wing?
left-wing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Right-wing
2. I f  you live in Scotland, which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Scottish elections?
3. Which political party do you intent to vote for at the next Westminster elections?
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SECTION 3 : IDENTIFICATION SCALES
FEELINGS ABOUT NATIONALITY
What is your nationality?
I f  you are Scottish, please answer the questions in section A.
If you are English, please answer the questions in section B.
In either case, please also answer the questions in section C.
A. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING SCOTTISH
1. Being Scottish is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see m yself as being Scottish.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sti'ongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
B. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING ENGLISH
1. Being English is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other English people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see m yself as being English.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when som eone who is not English criticises the English.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
C. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING BRITISH
1. Being British is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other British people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see m yself as being British.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when som eone who is not British criticises the British.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
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PERSONAL DETAILS
Age;
Sex:
Are you a member o f  a political party or a political student association? I f  Yes, please state which 
one(s)....................
Are you a member o f  any other relevant association? I f  Y es, please state which one(s).............................
What is your occupation?......................................
I f  you would like to receive a feedback concerning the results o f  this research, please provide an e-mail 
address or other contact details (optional)
OPEN QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
If you have any comments on this questionnaire you can put them down here and/or use the 
back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your perceptions of 
English/Scottish people, your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain, please feel free 
to do so. We cannot ask people about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there 
are other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.
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Study 2 questionnaire
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INDEPENDENCE CONDITION
SHOULD SCOTLAND BE INDEPENDENT ? 
Opinion Survey
For many years now there has been a controversy about how well Scotland fares in Britain 
and how much influence Scotland has when it comes to key decisions. Some argue that 
Scotland will always come second to England within Britain and therefore should seek 
independence. Others argue that Scottish interests are very well represented and that Scots 
would lose out by leaving Britain. So what do you think? Should Scotland seek 
independence. We want your views on the real influence that Scotland has in Britain today.
This study is pait of a program of resear ch we are conducting in Scotland and England looking at 
how people tliinlc about Scotland England and Britain. Our aim is to understand how Scots and 
English people think about these issues and also to improve understanding by showing each 
gr oup what the other thinks. Hence, in future studies we will be showing your responses to 
English groups and looking at how it affects their views.
Hence your views have a double importance -  both to let us know what you think and also to 
help an English audience know what you think.
University o f  St Andrews 
School o f  Psychology
322
NEUTRAL CONDITION
WHAT SCOTTISH AND ENGLISH PEOPLE ARE LIKE ?
Opinion Survey
For many years now there has been a controversy about what English and Scottish people 
are like. People hold many different views, some which are very much at odds with each 
other. So what do you think? We want your own views on the characteristics of the Scots 
and the English and how both are related we view British people as a whole.
This study is part of a program of research we are conducting in Scotland and England looking at 
how people thinlc about Scotland, England and Britain. Oui* aim is to understand how Scots and 
English people thinlc about these issues and also to improve understanding by showing each 
group what the other thinks. Hence, in futuie studies we will be showing youi* responses to 
English groups and looking at how it affects their views.
Hence youi* views have a double importance -  both to let us Icnow what you think and also to 
help an English audience know what you thinlc.
University o f  St Andrews 
School o f  Psychology
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HISTORY CONDITION
WHAT IS SCOTLAND’S CONTRIBUTION TO BRITISH HISTORY ?
Opinion Survey
In recent years a number of books and a number of television series about the history of 
Britain have led to a controversy about the part Scotland has played in shaping what 
Britain is today. Some argue that these histories concentrate far too much on England and 
ignore the contribution of Scotland and the Scots. Others argue that Scotland has played a 
small part in the history of Britain and therefore it is only right that the major focus should 
be on England. So what do you think? How much influence has Scotland really had? We 
want your views on the real contribution to British history.
This study is part of a program of research we are conducting in Scotland and England looking at 
how people think about Scotland, England, and Britain. Oiu aim is to understand how Scots and 
English people think about these issues and also to improve understanding by showing each 
group what the other thinks. Hence, in future studies, we will be showing your responses to 
English groups and looking at how it affects their views.
Hence your views have a double importance -  both to let us know what you thinlc and also to 
help an English audience know what you think.
University o f  St Andrews 
School o f  Psychology
324
Instructions
On several questions in this research we want you to answer on a numerical scale. This scale w ill usually 
run from “0” ( ‘strongly disagree’, ‘not at a ll’, . . . )  to “10” (‘strongly agree’, ‘very much’,.. .) .  You should 
use this scale to express your personal opinion by circling the number which best represents your choice. 
Here is an example:
I like classical music
N o ta ta l l  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 ( ^ 1 0  Very much
Thus, i f  you like classical music quite a lot, you might circle the number 9 on the scale, as shown in the 
example. Alternatively, i f  you do not like it very much at all, you might select the number 0,1 or 2 (but 
please circle only one num ber on each scale).
Please try your best to answer all the questions. There are no right or wrong answers to any o f  the 
questions in this survey; we are only interested in your opinion. However, i f  there is any question you 
really feel uncomfortable to answer, you are free not to do so. Please also remember that you are free to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
If  you have any comments on any o f  the questions, just write them in the margin. There is also a space 
provided for general comments at the end.
If  you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.
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INDEPENDENCE CONDITION
SHOULD SCOTLAND BE INDEPENDENT ?
A. Please write down, in your own words, whether you think Scotland should become 
independent or not.
B. What do you think a typical English person would have to say about Scotland’s 
independence?
C. Finally, please answer these questions from your own point of view
1. I really don’t care what English people think about these issues
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Strongly agree
2. I feel it is important that English people are aware of how Scottish people see things
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. I want to put the English right about things are for us in Scotland
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. The views of English people on these matters are unimportant.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
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NEUTRAL CONDITION
WHAT SCOTTISH AND ENGLISH PEOPLE ARE LIKE ?
A. Please write down, in your own words, what Scottish and English people are like.
B. What do you think a typical English person would have to say about what Scottish and 
English people are like?
C. Finally, please answer these questions from your own point of view.
1. I really don’t care what English people think about these issues
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Strongly agree
2. I feel it is important that English people are aware of how Scottish people see things
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. I want to put the English right about things ar e for us in Scotland
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. The views of English people on these matters are unimportant.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
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HISTORY CONDITION
WHAT IS SCOTLAND’S CONTRIBUTION TO BRITISH HISTORY ?
A. In your own words, what are the main things you would want to say to an English 
audience about the contribution of Scotland to British history.
B. What do you think a typical English person would have to say about the contribution of 
Scotland to British history?
C. Finally, please answer these questions from your own point of view.
1. I really don’t caie what English people think about these issues
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. I feel it is important that English people are aware of how Scottish people see things
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. I want to put the English right about things ar e for us in Scotland
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. The views of English people on these matters are unimportant.
Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
SCALES OF GROUP PROTOTYPICALITY (first m easu re ) 328
THE QUALITIES OF SCOTTISH. ENGLISH. BRITISH PEOPLE
A. Please list three attributes that you think are characteristic o f  Scottish people, as compared to English 
people.
1.
2 ,
3.
B. Please list three attributes that you think are characteristic o f  English people, as compared to Scottish  
people.
1.
2 .
3.
C. N ow , please indicate how  much exactly you feel that the attributes you choose to describe Scottish and 
English people apply to British people in general.
Scottish attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above):
1. .......................
How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
2 ........................
How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
3.....................
How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
English attributes (please fill in the gaps according to your answers above);
1.......................
How much do you think this attribute applies to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
2 ........................
How much do you thinlc this attribute applies to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
3.....................
H ow much do you thinlc this attribute applies to British people?
Does not apply at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Does apply very much
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SCALES OF GROUP PROTOTYPICALITY (seco n d  m easu re )
D. Please indicate how much do you thinlc that the following attributes apply to Scottish people:
- Unhealthy D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Adventurous D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Arrogant D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Passionate D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Boastful D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Pessimistic D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Successful D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Friendly D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
E. Please indicate how much do you thinlc that the following attributes apply to English people:
- Unhealthy D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Adventurous D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Arrogant D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Passionate D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Boastful D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Pessimistic D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Successful D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Friendly D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
F. Please indicate how much do you thinlc that the following attributes apply to British people:
- Unhealthy D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Adventurous D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Arrogant D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Passionate D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Boastful D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply v e iy  much
- Pessimistic D oes not apply a t all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Successful D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
- Friendly D oes not apply a t a ll 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 D oes apply very much
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IDENTIFICATION SCALES
FEELINGS ABOUT NATIONALITY 
ARE YOU SCOTTISH? YES / NO
(If you are not Scottish, please replace with your nationality in the following questions).
A. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING SCOTTISH
1. Being Scottish is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other Scottish people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see m yself as being Scottish.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when som eone who is not Scottish criticises the Scots.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
B. FEELINGS ABOUT BEING BRITISH
1. Being British is very important for me.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
2. I feel strong ties with other British people.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
3. I see m yself as being British.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
4. I feel personally criticised when someone who is not British criticises the British.
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SCOTLAND
W e would like you now to indicate to what extent you think that the Scottish parliament should receive 
more or less power in the future, on a scale o f  0 to 20, where 
0 = no power at all for the Scottish parliament (i.e. total union in Britain)
10 =  the present balance o f  power
20 = total power for the Scottish parliament (i.e. independence.)
No power Present situation Total power
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20,
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SCALE OF SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE (item s 1-3)
1. Scotland should become an independent country, separate from the rest o f  the UK.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Strongly agree
2. The goal o f  having a parliament in Scotland should be ultimately to achieve total independence in the 
long-term.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing only i f  it ultimately leads to total independence.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. Scotland should have its own parliament but remain part o f  the UK.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
5. I support devolution but I don’t support independence nor do I support being in the U K  without a 
Scottish parliament
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
6. Having a Scottish parliament is a good thing but it should not lead to total independence from the 
UK.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
7. Scotland should remain part o f  the U K  but without a separate parliament.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
8. I support the Union in Britain but not devolution or independence
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
9. I oppose devolution because it endangers the union between Scotland and England.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCOTLAND. ENGLAND AND BRITAIN
1. Being part o f  Britain has allowed Scotland to keep its specific and separate identity.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. Being part o f  the U K  has undermined the Scottish way o f  life.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. Being part o f  Britain has allowed England to keep its specific and separate identity.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. Being part o f  the U K  has undermined the English way o f  life.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
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THE POWER OF SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND IN BRITAIN
1. The Scottish interest plays too small a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
2. The Scottish interest plays too great a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Strongly agree
3. The English interest plays too small a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
4. The English interest plays too great a part in determining British government decisions.
Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9  10 Strongly agree
PERSONAL DETAILS
Age:
Sex:
In general terms, would you define your view s in politics as being rather left-wing or rather right-wing?
left-wing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Right-wing 
I f  you live in Scotland, which political party do you intend to vote for at the next Scottish elections?
Which political party do you intend to vote for at the next Westminster elections?
Are you a member o f  a political party or a political student association? If  Yes, please state which 
one(s)....................
Are you a member o f  any other relevant association? I f  Yes, please state which one(s)............................
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OPEN QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
If you have any comments on this questionnaire you can put them down here and/or use the 
back of this page. Also, if there is anything you would like to add about your perceptions of 
English/Scottish people, your political opinion and your attitudes towards Britain, please feel free 
to do so. We cannot ask people about everything in a questionnaire, and you might think that there 
are other important things to consider in order to explain your attitudes.
